I'd be appalled if anyone was to suggest that there was something morally wrong about self-harm. Not least because the very worst thing that one could do to a cutter would be to make her feel even more guilty and ashamed than she probably already -- though quite undeservedly -- does feel. But is it in her own best interests to be cutting herself? In the moment, perhaps it can bring some fleeting relief from overwhelming psychological pain -- just as, in the moment, smoking can bring some fleeting relief from its own withdrawal symptoms. But, in the long run, smoking can lead to serious health problems; and habitual cutting can increase a sense of isolation and self-hatred, and generally tend to perpetuate the very psychological problems that led to it in the first place. Wouldn't it be nicer to be free of that emotional distress altogether, so that there'd no longer be any need to resort to such violent means to release it? Or at the very least, until that pain goes fully away, to develop some...

I'm reminded of a famous remark from the economist, John Maynard Keynes. On once being accused of inconsistency -- what I believe the Americans like to call 'flip-flopping' -- he replied: "When the facts change, I change my mind. What do you do, sir?" I don't think any philosophers would wish to insist that one's ethical behaviour and philosophy must always remain consistent over time . In terms of individual actions, when the situations are not identical, it might well be absolutely appropriate to behave in different ways. And even in terms of more general ethical principles, it's entirely right and proper for us to reassess and potentially revise these in response to changes in the world or even just changes in ourselves. The kind of consistency that I think philosophers would, however, wish to insist upon is consistency at a particular time, or within a particular situation. If one maintains as a general rule that nobody, oneself included, ought to do X, and yet still goes ahead and does X...

First of all, a spot of jargon. Philosophers often draw a distinction between (i) the field of 'ethics' (or sometimes 'normative ethics'), which is basically concerned with the rightness and wrongness of various types of behaviour; and (ii) that of 'meta-ethics', which is not really concerned with behaviour at all, but instead looks at the epistemological or ontological status of those notions of rightness and wrongness themselves (e.g. whether they have any truly objective foundation, or are merely expressions of subjective sentiments). Now, when someone -- and it doesn't matter who they happen to be, whether a professional philosopher or just an ordinary civilian -- claims that slavery is wrong, what they are making is an ethical claim. But nothing whatsoever need be presupposed about the meta-ethical status of such an utterance, or even about the opinion the speaker might happen to have on that meta-ethical question. Ethics and meta-ethics are distinct fields. There are certain links between...

I guess it's justified if it works . I would say that swear words definitely do have a legitimate, and even an important, place in our wider linguistic behaviour. Used sparingly, they can do an excellent job of adding emphasis when you feel you need to give things that extra little boost. They can often convey emotion more effectively than more neutral terms would. In certain social settings, their use can help to establish a sense of informality and intimacy. And so on. And then, of course, such language also has its disadvantages. In other social settings, the use of these words might cause offence or discomfort to the audience, something which, other things being equal, is best avoided. And their use will often serve to undermine the user's communicative goals, by prejudicing the audience against the speaker in such a way that they are no longer inclined to give any heed to the point the speaker was hoping to convey. I guess the latter point is what's really at stake in the specific case you...

I think it comes down to a question of guilt or innocence. A criminal has committed a major sin, and hence deserves a major punishment: an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, and a life for a life. Even just an ordinary adult will have some track-record of sin behind them -- none of us are perfect. They might not quite be evil enough to deserve to be targetted directly, but nevertheless it wouldn't be such a terrible thing if they were to become the victims of collateral damage in war. But an unborn baby, having had no opportunity to sin, is completely and utterly innocent, an unblemished soul, and consequently of greater moral worth. As far as I can discern, that's roughly the idea that those fundamentalists have. Speaking for myself, I regard this attitude as wholly abhorrent, both antithetical to the teachings of Jesus and morally repugnant in itself. But, hey, that's just my opinion, and what do I know?

I don't really have any firm views on this issue -- though I am inclined to agree that morality need not have any particular link to attitudes to death -- but the question did just happen to remind me of the following passage from Herodotus ( Histories , 5.3-4): "The Thracians have many names, each tribe according to its region, but they are very similar in all their customs, save the Getae, the Trausi, and those who dwell above the Crestonaeans. As for the Getae, who claim to be immortal, I have already given an account of their practices. The Trausi, who in all else conform to the customs of other Thracians, do as I will show at the times of birth and death. When a child is born, the kinsmen sit around it and lament all the ills that it must endure from its birth onward, recounting all the sorrows of men. The dead, however, they bury with celebration and gladness, asserting that he is rid of so many ills and has achieved a state of complete blessedness." It's something to think...