I think you raise one of the strongest objections possible to relativism, one so strong that it renders relativism impossible to formulate in that way (i.e., "All truths are relative"). But I do warn you that things get stickier as your get into relativistic theories. What makes them compelling? Here are a couple of general strategies that I've run across. 1. Negative Proof : Negatively, non-relativistic theories of truth seem, at least in the view of many, to have irresolveable problems of their own, arguably greater problems. So, if non-relativistic theories can't be right, some kind of relativism must be correct. 2. Positive Proof : Positively but indirectly, relativism seems (1) to answer serveral questions about the way the meaning of language and the designation "true" is determined and correlatively (2) it seems to be the consequence of investigations into matters concerning topics like whether a body of evidence can determine only one conclusion (answer: no), whether a word can...

Yes, that's because inheritance underwrites certain virtues and social goods--for example, (1) it stimulates productivity among those who create wealth, (2) it provides financial security, (3) it binds families together, (4) it produces general social stability. But note that it's also the case that it's ethically sound to limit inheritance and to tax inheritance. That's because doing so mitigates the vices of inheritance and produces vitrues of its own. Among the vices of inheritance are (1) the cementing and even magnifying of social inequalities of power and priviledge, (2) intensifying class-based prejudice and hostility, and (3) dulling incentives to create wealth among inheritors. Among the goods that limiting and taxing inheritance produces are (1) a stronger democracy through greater equality of social goods and social power and (2) improved general welfare through the gathering of revenue to underwrite goods provided by government such as educatiion, healthcare, national defense,...

As is so often the case in philosophy, so much depends upon how one defines the relevant terms. "Sexism," like racism, is a rather vague concept, or at least a concept with a fairly large number of meanings. So, with any interlocutor you're dealing with, it would be important to acknowledge the definitions in play. I take it that those with whom you've been discussing the issue have claimed something like, "Some patriarchy is not objectionable" or "Some patriarchy is benign." Certainly. as a term of social science, "patriarchy" should remain as free of moral judgment as possible. In that scientific sense, a society might be described as "patriarchal" without implying a moral judgment about that society. In such a case, however, "patriarchy" is not sexism at all. (Here I'm using "sexism" as a term that carries moral judgment and is not a scientific term.) Rather, patriarchy in a scientific sense is just a certain kind of social structure, one where, let's say, men rule women. Or perhaps...

I will begin by acknowledging that neither the philosophy of mathematics nor the metaphysics of identity are my specialties. But if you'll take what I say with a grain of salt, perhaps I might make a helpful observation nonetheless. Keep in mind that "being equal" mathematically is not exactly the same thing as "being identical," mathematically or otherwise. "Being mathematically equal" means, one might say, having the same mathematical value, in the sense of amounting to the same thing. Identity on the other hand means being the same thing, in the sense of having all the same properties. This difference can get confusing because commonly in symbolic logic the equal sign, "=", is used to express identity. But, if you follow me, then "2+2" equals "4" but is not identical to "4." Why? Well, while they both have the same mathematical value, they don't both have the same properties. "2+2", for example, is a formula composed of two Arabic numbers and a symbol for the mathematical relation of addition....

I agree with Thomas Pogge's remarks, but I also have a couple of cents to add. First, consider very seriously and act in light of the fact that your information comes to you second hand (from a lab tech and not the child's physician or parent)--unless, of course you are the MRI technician. Second hand reports are notoriously inaccurate, and so I suggest proceeding with caution and when you act qualifying your comments with the acknowledgment that your information may be inaccurate. The tech may be exaggerating the physician's instructions or otherwise distorting them. Secondly, it's worth pointing up front that (again unless you are the technician) that it was probably unethical for the technician to have given you medical information about the boy. Medical information is by law, custom, and moral principle extremely private material. The technician's poor conduct in providing you with medical information about the child further calls his or her credibility into question. Thirdly,...

This is a fascinating question because medical care is not a commodity like many others--for example televisions or ice cream. It is a service related to the most pround of human needs. For that reason, I answer your first question with a "no"--but with qualification. It really depends upon what you mean by "economic considerations." I think it would be wrong to use simple supply-and-demand considerations where the supplier (the surgeon) charged the highest price the market will bear. Why? Because higher prices will exclude those with less money from the service, and I don't think it morally defensible to distribute essential medical services on the basis of wealth. Moreover, people suffering from illness are not in a position to bargain for fees with medical providers in the absence of coercion. (Think of how little a surgeon would charge if he or she were at risk of dying if a prospective patient decided to seek care elsewhere.) For this reason, I find the American medical system on the whole...

It's a fine question, isn't it. Short, sweet, and deeply provocative. In the interests of full disclosure, however, I should, at the outset, let you know that I don't think we should eat beef--in part because of the sort of reasons this question elicits. That being said, I don't think that the claim the question seems to advance is by itself decisive--namely that it's human's superior intelligence that provides grounds for eating beef. After all, if minimal intelligence itself justified eating an organism, then humans with minimal intelligence (including the aged, those with brain injuries, infants and fetuses, the mentallly retarded, public officials, etc.) would be candidates for consumption, and various computers would have moral standing. But establishing moral standing isn't simply a matter of determining intelligence. Rather, I'd say that what principally (not exclusively) marks an entity as one not to be consumed is its sharing or its capacity to share (or have shared) in certain projects and...

I think this is a fascinating question, one which will probably bounce around in my mind for a while. I can well imagine music companies, for example, writing recording contracts only for musicians who pass drug tests. But I do think there are a couple of relevant differences between musicians and athletes concerning performance enhancing drugs. (1) The nature of the competition in music is not as exclusive. And (2) the extent to which drugs enhance rather than undermine performance is clearer in sports than in music. You see in a running race or playing a match, there can be only one winner. The victory of one implies the defeat of another. In music, by contrast, many musicians can be successful, and it's not clear that the success of one prevents the success of others. Many records can go gold. Now, I'll grant you, in music sometimes success is exclusive. Only one person can be first violin of the New York Philharmonic. Only one performer can win the Grammy in a given year. It's in cases like...

Okay, here's a concise answer: Immoral, unless certain predictable consequences are mitigated or corrected. Why? Well, it depends precisely what you mean by capitalism. If one takes a pure form of market capitalism, I'd say it's immoral because it makes no evaluative judgments that take into account the distribution of goods and services or costs and benefits, the suffering of various actors, or considerations of flourishing. Says the radical capitalist: whatever outcome the market produces is okay. I disagree. I think that because of (1) the profound importance in human life of the issues and (2) the intimate connection between (a) economic matters like distribution and (b) moral matters like need, fairness, flourishing, justice etc. the operations of a capitalist economy must be regulated, guided, and directed to produce morally desirable outcomes. In particular moral considerations should guide economic activity to produce outcomes that are fair, moderate and equitable, outcomes that promote...

Yeah, these are the kinds of questions that lead many of us to "Argggh!" They're also the kind of questions that I approach with a great deal of trepidation because they are knottier than knotty. So, please understand that what I say here by the nature of this kind of exposition will be very rough and overly simplistic. You'll also probably find more than a few of my colleauges to disagree. But anyway, let's barrel right on with it. I don't think you can be absolutely sure that what you see is what's "real"--though you really ought to take some time to parse out what you mean by that word because it's LOADED. I take it that you mean by "real" something like what's out there independently of us. In a sense, actually, my best shot is that what you or we see isn't exactly real in that sense. Do remember that old Aristotelian question, "When a tree falls in the forest and there's no one around to listen, does it make a sound?" Well . . . get ready . . . almost yes, but no. No in the way that...