Your question raises a number of really interesting issues. One of these is how to distinguish ethical questions from non-ethicsones. Could it be the case that your question about toplessness doesnot raise any moral issues at all and so isn't the sort of questionthat can be answered by appeal to ethics? You are right, of course,that questions of nudity strike an emotionally-charged nerve in ourculture. But does this necessarily mean that these responses are bestunderstood or assessed as ethical responses? For example, people in ourculture feel strongly about table manners but these seem to beculturally relative and more a matter of etiquette than morality. Arepeoples' positions about toplessness akin to those non-moral questionsof etiquette? If so, maybe it is wrong to seek a specifically ethicalassessment of the norms and conventions you wish to understand. Another important ethical issue arises no matter how you address theissue I just described: The ethical significance of the norms...

I agree with you that honesty in a relationship to preferable to deception, but I disagree with your suggestion that that chosing not to raise your disapproval of your boyfriend's actions amounts to a virtuous realism that acknowledges how hard it is for a committed couple to remain sexually faithful to each other. Louise's reflections on the complexity of human sexuality are excellent ones that should be of great use to you. I have three additional points to make: First, that you appreciate some of your boyfriend's actions (for example, his willingness to refrain from having sex with others when you are present) doesn't mean that you consent to his actions that you find problematical (for example, his willingess to have sex with others when you are absent). Second, that you cannot create an "abstract" argument objecting to your boyfriend's lack of sexual infidelity does not mean that you should not discuss with him what you expect in your relationship and how you experience his actions...

This question raises interesting issues about animal cognition. I tend totake a rather hard line on this—a view similar to one held by the stoics and bythe contemporary philosopher Donald Davidson---according to which (non-human)animal cognition is so different from human cognition that animals cannot give thesort of consent that humans use to justify their sexual interaction. So, my own answer to your question is this: If it is morally wrong to interactsexually interact non-human animals without consent, then this sexual contactis always wrong because that sort of consent is impossible to obtain. I suppose one who shared my view of animal cognition could take a hardline on this and say that it is morally acceptable to use non-human animals assexual objects for human pleasure, but I would disagree -- at the very leastKant is right that treating animals as ends is wrong because it tends to leadto cruel treatment of humans, and it is probably true that animals are worthyof much stronger moral...

I associate recent defenses of this claim with criticisms of "sex positive feminism," which stresses ways that embracing and affirming their their own sexualities can help feminists to resist the patriarchy and can empower themselves and others; the basic criticism by MacKinnon and others is that the immoral consequences of patriarchy are so intense and pervasive in our culture that they undermine this sort of sexual liberation. So, for example, in some articles Catherine MacKinnon's position is stronger and more radical than the one Alan describes because her pessimistic view extends to all expressions of sexuality, and is not limited to heterosexuality. In "Sexuality, Pornography, and Method: 'Pleasure Under Patriarchy'", MacKinnon argues that there exists in our patriarchal society a "rape culture" that is so strong that it is internalized even by those who oppose the patriarchy most strongly. Her pessimistic conclusion is that this makes morally problematical all sexual activity, including...