I agree that it can be unsettling to learn about the profound vulnerability of life. I don't think, however, that life's existence on earth constitutes evidence for God's existence: the universe is large, and for all we know life has failed to begin or has been extinguished many times at many places and we exist at one of those rare spots where life has managed to hang on (so far). Since there is a plausible atheistic explanation of the facts you describe, those mere facts by themselves do not prove that God exists.

Perhaps this is the answer: Young children and philosophers can both discuss the world in unconventional ways, children because they have not yet learned to think conventionally and philosophers because they have unlearned this. Sometimes children will discuss the world in ways that also interest philosophers; philosophers, however, will address these issues in much more sophisticated ways, and the added complexity of their perspectives makes them much less likely to match a young child's confident assertiveness about the way the world is.

Some philosophers revel in ambiguity or metaphor, but most do not;somephilosophers do not take the time to write clearly, but must takereasonable care about this. So, these factors don't get to the heart ofthe matter of why so much philosophicalwriting is so difficult to understand. I think the most important point is simply that philosophicaltopics are difficult to discuss clearly in the first place, andespecially so when they are first developed or when new types ofarguments are put forward. Given this, I'm not at all surprised that alot of exegetical work needs to be done before one can assess thestrengths of the arguments even of the best philosophical writers likeHume.

I'm not sure what you mean by "legitimate harm," but it strikes me that any failure to accord others the dignity they are due as human beings causes significant harm to oneself and to others. If you agree that racism is a failure to respect human dignity, you ought to recognize it as morally objectionable and ought work to correct that failure in your own life by, for example, striving to overcome the racist fears you describe.

Graduate study is not the only way to nurture an ardent passion in philosophy, and so passionate undergraduates should consider a doctorate only if they understand the job market and can live with all that it (and the prior extended period of study) entails economically and personally. Other panelists can comment on the rationality of the admissions processes at their own Universities, but it strikes me that there may well be an oversupply of doctorates and so admissions may not be exclusive enough. (I worry, in particular, that there are too many total doctorate programs because some Universities wish to "upgrade" to doctoral status for reasons that have nothing to do with the intellectual welfare or career prospects of their prospective graduate students.) All that said, doctorates who can't find satisfactory academic employment need not end up homeless because they have skills that are prized within business, law, and other professional fields.

Even though determining exactly when one should or should not obeylawful authority is complicated, nothing that you describe here strikesme as a moral reason to disobey. For a richly-nuanceddiscussion of breaking the law for moral reasons, see Henry DavidThoreau's classic 19th century essay "Civil Disobedience," whichaddresses Thoreau's moral opposition to legalizez slavery in America,his desire not to be an "agent of injustice to another," and and hisdecision not to pay several types of taxes. There are many other fascinating and relevant texts of political philosophy; Socrates's decision not to escape his execution is an especially interesting text to pair with Thoreau -- see Plato's Crito . Mybasic point would is that there is a strong moral obligation to obeylaws, and that none of the economica or social facts you mention raisethe sorts of moral issues that might override that obligation.Theoreau's desire to resist lawful slavery might do this; the desire tocompete in a capitalist...

Certainly scientists make epistemological, metaphysical, ethical, and methodological assumptions that affect their work. Historians and philosophers of scientists have discussed this quite a bit, and so have sociologists of science. Although determing the exact content of these assumptions is too complicated and too controversial an endeavor for there to be a comprehensive non-controversial list, many specific examples have been proposed and debated. Panelists who work in this area can provide their own favorite examples and references, but if you have not read much about what philosophjers have said about this I recommend Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer's engaging historical study Leviathan and the Air-Pump and Thomas Kuhn's classic contemporary study The Structure of Scientific Revolutions . You are right that similar types of assumptions affect all of us in varied and sometimes profound ways. For an engaging study of this topic in a wider context than the practice of science, I find...

As you suggest, studying and practicing philosophy improve's one's analytical and creative skills: reading, writing, thinking. So, that is one significant way that philosophy is useful -- and especially so if it were true that doing philosophy is a comparatively powerful means of refining those skills. Likewise, studying philosophy (and perhaps especially the history of philosophy) can give you powerful insights about yourself, the history of your culture, and your world. Exactly what use you make of those increased skills and powerful insights is for you to determine, and I would submit that there are many opportunities to use them in productive and interesting ways. How to do this depends on your exact interests, goals, and passions with respect both to philosophy and your life goals, but certainly these opportunities extend far beyond publishing philosphical literature. About studying philospohy: If after thoughtful reflection you find some areas of philosophy narrowly uninteresting or...

With respect to beginning to study the history of philosophy, Ithink that it is almost always more interesting and rewarding to engagewith primary philosophical texts without consulting commentaries andother secondary sources: direct intellectual contact with the mostpoweful philosophers and philospohical arguments is a profoundlypowerful experience.You are right of course, that this is a difficult experience to secure, but the effort is almost always worth it. Patience is important. Reading even the most abstruse philosophical texts becomes much esaierwith practice; my general advice is to stick with the primary textswith a good degree of patience and confdence that you will becomecapable of more and more sophisticated engagement over time. Iknow that it is tempting to "turn to" secondary source when youconfront a difficult and frustrating text. If you are a student whowill be learning along with classmates and can gain additional insightfrom a professor, I urge you to resist this temptation --...

I agree with Peter that one need to specify exact criteria for progressbefore making the sort of assessment that you describe. All suchcritiera and assessments will be controversial because our knowledge ofourselves and our histories is limited and controversial, but this byno way means that producing and rationally defending such assessmentsis worthless -- on the contrary, they can be extremely useful andinteresting. Thepolitical theorist George Kateb provides an interesting--andfascinating--example of how to assess human progress in the modern age.In his recent collection of essays. Patriotism and Other Mistakes (Yale University Press, 2006), Kateb assesses human progresses on thebasis of a richly sophistcated conception of human and argues that theUnited States Constitution represents a significant achievement in thesupport of human dignity, which he defines (again, in a richlysophisticated and fascinating way) in terms of rights-basedindividualism. While Kateb's criteria for progress and...