I can think of two reasons why you might have come across this attitude. The first is simply a form of parochialism: the members of a specific disciplinary community may well believe that their forms and subjects of inquiry are the best, the most important, the most interesting, etc. This is partly due to self-selection: why work so hard and for so long to gain the credentials necessary to become a member of a specialized community if you do not already value what that community does? There are undoubtedly other sociological factors in play too -- for example, gaining prestige within a community like this may require single-minded ambition that rewards narrow parochialism, retaining motivation to work hard to remain with such a community may require continuing to value that communities mode of inquiry, etc. (I also note that this sort of parochialism occurs within academic sub-communities, and so there are philosophical sub-communities who view their particular sub-field as more respectable than others...

I forgot to add: There is a long and extremely interesting account of why scientific inquiry has become so valued in our culture -- an important source the thought that empirical inquiry is more respectable than philosophical inquiry is a more general attitude that treats the fruits and methods of scientific inquiry as among the most respectable forms of inquiry full stop. So, for example, this attitude helps to explain the righteous indignation of many liberals (and, indeed, others) towards politicians who seemingly ignore the results of scientific inquiry. Likewise, according to one conventional theory the rise in the esteem of science is so important in our culture that it has "pushed out" or "subtracted away" important religious practices and attitudes and so has led to a change and diminution of religion. Scholars who work in the history of ideas may be best equipped to explain the rise in the esteem of science over the last centuries, but one philosopher who does very interesting work in this...

I don't have expert knowledge about the epistemic status of mathematical truths, but I can report on my intuition that it is perfectly clear that there could exist a society that genuinely believed that it was morally acceptable to torture innocents for pleasure but not at all clear that there could exist a society that genuinely believed that two plus four was equal to five. So, my sense is that the two claims you present have different statuses. Your question, however, is not about whether a society could treat that statement about the immorality of torture as false. And, likewise, your question is not about whether or not there exist specific moral beliefs or systems that endorse the truth of that statement. Instead, the heart of your question is the thought that there might exist "moral laws" that demonstrate that the statement condemning torture is necessarily true. About the notion that the universe functions according to moral laws, I would draw your attention to a recent discussion by the...

In his magnificent recent book, A Secular Age , the Canadian social philosopher Charles Taylor addresses exactly why it is that many North American and Western Europeans find themselves able to view religious belief as a choice that one can make on rational or other grounds. Taylor's sophisticated philosophically-nuanced historical account of this and related questions show that philosophers can address issues like these with considerable success; psychologists undoubtedly also have a lot to say, but Taylor demontrates that the question you raise engages numerous fascinating philosophical issues in social philosophy, political philosophy, and metaphysical issues related to identity.

First, I believe that factors other than rational assessment of information help guide decisions and greatly affect the success of human decision-making. Sociologists and psychologists probably investigate this more than do philosophers, although an approach to critical thinking championed by the Canadian philosopher Douglas Walton sheds some light on this through its emphasis on discussing critical thinking in terms of human dialogue that needs to be understood with reference to concepts like the "emotional dynamics" of a situation where two or more people are working hard together to make an important decision and of a general "context of dialogue" that involves more than the processing of information. Factors like those may explain why individuals with perfectly good information may fail to make a good decision if their emotional dynamics are horrible, as can occur when one of the interlocutors is belligerent or when the interlocutors misunderstand each other's expectations and needs. On the other...

Descartes' arguments suggest that he believe d that, for any empirical test that you might devise to determine whether you are awake or dreaming, it might be the case that anytime you appeal to putative test results you have merely dreamed that you have performed the test. So, I think you are right that, whatever arguments Descartes developed to respond to his own skeptical doubts, those arguments were not straightforward empirical ones appealing to things like tests of that sort. Similarly, when he addressed issues related to skepticism Descartes' eighteenth-century successor developed a style of non-empirical transcendental argumentation. Another way to approach the issues that your question engages is to focus not on Descartes' specific argument but rather on the general skeptical doubt that it can raise so hauntingly. The contemporary philosophy Barry Stroud puts this doubt this way in his wonderful book, _The Significance of Philosophical Skepticism:"Could not the external world be completely...

To add to Kalynne's answer, once you have identified a work of philosophy "broadly speaking," a useful thing to do is to reflect on whether or not that specific work is likely to meet your specific objectives for engaging with philosophy -- that question can be much more useful, I think, than simply understanding whether a given work can rightly be categorized as a work of philosophy. Reading and reflecting on Pirsig, working your way through an introductory text, browsing within the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, and reading a set of specialized journal articles on a narrow topic each involve engagement with philosophy under one or another conception of what philosophy is, and each offer different opportunities for learning and growth. As you read around, you will get a sense of which types of texts offer which kinds of opportunities, and you may also get a better sense of which opportunities matter the most to you.

I think that Jennifer's answer is well-stated: with respect to intellectual inquiry, there are many topics and objectives which can best be pursued through methods other than analysis, and for those cases where analysis is appropriate there is great benefit in understanding how to apply those methods thoughtfully and not with an obsessive or unrelenting "heavy hand" that can lead to what might be called an obnoxious intellectual bulldozing that leaves inquirers blink to important nuances. I don't know whether this general answer about intellectual inquiry speaks to your daughter's situation, however -- at least the high school textbooks that I remember never raised intellectual issues like those! So, the textbook you mention may have something different in mind. For example, the textbook author may recognize that the subject of the text is scary for students and may intend a slogan like "do not over analyze" to encourage students not to become so focused on those fears that they fail to engage with...

I agree with Oliver that Occam's razor is not an "especiallypriviliged" principle in this or other contexts, but I also agree withPeter that it nonetheless is perfectly appopriate to use this principlewhen thinking about whether God exists. Whether or not you willultimately find Occam's razor useful depends, first, on your ownintellectual aims and, second, your other thoughts about God. On theone hand, I agree with my colleagues that there is no prospect thatOccam's razor can provide you with a "knock down argument" againsttheism: if such arguments exists, identifying and assessing them willrequire must more than an application of that single principle. So, ifthat is your intellectual aim I think you won't find much comfort inOccam. On the other hand, if you are interested in sustainedphilosophical reflection on whether or not God exists whether or notOccam's razor is useful to you will depend on exactly how yourreflections go -- like any other component of one's "philosophicaltoolkit," this...

I agree with the thought that being the subject of aggression does not necessarily license extremely violent responses like killing, and I would add that pacifists believe there can be--depending on the exact pacifist views being considered--principled and/or pragmatic reasons for refusing to respond to aggression with any form of violence directed toward the aggressor. So, for example, Gandhi believed that a pointed refusal to respond to aggression with violence against the aggressor could serve to change the behavior and attitudes of the aggressor and of other witnesses to the aggression. A useful summary of some assessments of pacifism by philosophers is here .

As Richard suggests, the success or failure of arguments of this sort depends on the success or failure of arguments about the nature of the content of our beliefs and other thoughts. So, for example, in his later writings Davidson made clear that his account of (as he called it) the veridicality of belief--his account of why by their very nature the vast majority of our beliefs must be true--depends on his defense of a version of a doctrine that philosophers call "externalism," and which asserts that the content of our beliefs and other thoughts is (in part) determined by the very external objects those thoughts purport to be about. If this view of the content of our beliefs is correct, then the thought that the world might be completely different from what we perceive it and believe it to be would be mistaken in a rather strong sense: despite appearances, massive error of that would turn out to be unintelligible. Understanding whether or not any one view of content is correct is a...