Consider the following scenario: an acquaintance I personally do not particularly enjoy talking to is learning French and asks me for a favour, namely to chat with them an hour per week in French, my mother tongue. Would it be morally good to do them the favour, even if it would just be out of duty? Or another scenario: my mum wants me to visit her for Christmas, but I wish not to, just as much as she wants me to go. Should I go out of duty?
According to Kant, good actions must be motivated by a sense of duty, as opposed to inclination. But shouldn't it be just the other way round, at least if the action is about doing another person a favour? It almost seems immoral to do somebody a favour only because of duty.
Kant never says that good actions must be motivated by a sense of duty. What he does say is that actions have genuine moral worth to the extent that they are performed out of a sense duty. Many philosophers have certainly felt as you do--namely, that there is something backwards about this claim. I find it strangely compelling, and so let me try to motivate it a bit. Kant actually provides a wonderful example in the Groundwork . There he asks us to imagine someone (let's call him Joe) who spends his life doing good merely because he feels like it. He has a natural desire to help other people, and he takes great pleasure in meeting others' needs. Kant acknowledges that Joe's actions are "right" and "amiable," but he denies that these actions have any true moral worth. Kant believes that moral esteem is esteem of a very special sort. It is a sort of awe that we reserve for a select few actions and characters. But is there anything especially impressive or awe-inspiring about Joe simply...
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