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Existence

This is not a factual question of whether conscious being can be aware of it´s own existence in the world. Rather how the chain of reasoning can be non-contradictory if one is to assume the world exists, and that this world is not a part of oneself. Consider the following: Do I or do I not exist? I exist and there exists also something which I am not. Does the "something which I am not" exist if I do not exist?(a question as to whether the world is not me) Well if it is not a part of me, then it would surely be possible for it to exist if I do not. But if I do not exist, the world does not exist, for if the necessary perspective of observation is the perspective of the observer then the facts existing are only those which the observer can yield true or false. Therefore there can be nothing that exists when I do not exist and, stretching it further, there exists nothing which I am not. I do not believe that www.askphilosophers.org and this computer are a product of my imagination, so please, explain how...

I understand your long complex sentence to make this argument: (1) the necessary perspective of observation is the perspective of the observer. Therefore (2) the facts existing are only those which the observer can yield true or false. Therefore (3) if I do not exist, the world does not exist. If I understand correctly what you mean with these sentences, then I think there are two problems with your reasoning. The premise (1) states that observation requires an observer. Fair enough. From this you want to conclude that (2) things can exist or facts can obtain only if there is an observer who judges them to exist/obtain. But this conclusion does not really follow. Without an observer, the Rocky Mountains would not be observed or known, and the fact that there are these huge mountains would not be known to obtain. But not being known is not the same as not existing. It does not follow from the fact that mountains are not perceived by anyone that these...
Existence

Is it legitimate to talk about "society" as an agent, when "society" is neither a cohesive unit nor a uniform set?

I share your qualms in regard to common formulations about how society approves of this and condemns that. But most societies have some fairly determinate decision procedures that can result in collective decisions and actions, as when Danish society does not recognize polygamous marriages. In cases of this kind, a society can be said to act: to decide to recognize same-sex marriages, to declare war, to ban the use of pesticides. Saying this makes sense when there is a decision procedure which is widely recognized within the society and whose decisions are effectively enforced (insofar as they are not voluntarily complied with).
Existence

It makes sense to me that there should be nothing rather than anything. I find this issue rather mind boggling because obviously there is something. Fortunately I'm able to dismiss this issue and go on to other things. My only hope is that if there is an afterlife, and there are orientation sessions I will ask the lecturer (an angel?) about it. I'm just afraid that his reply will be a board with a bunch of incomprehensible formulae. My question is do philosophers deal with this issue or has it already been dismissed as undealable.

As your formulations nicely bring out, the problem here arises from the combination of two phenomena: that there is something rather than nothing, and that our mind finds it more natural (less surprising, less boggling, more sense-making) that there should be nothing rather than anything. Our disposition to find certain things disturbing is a feature of the mind we have, which developed through evolution and education. It's not hard to tell a story about why our mind should have developed this way: we do best concentrating our explanatory efforts on events and changes rather than where nothing it happening. So we reason with a maxim like "nothing happens without a reason" (meaning: whenever something happens, then there is a reason for it). But this useful maxim, deeply entrenched in even our more unreflective behavior, may not serve us best in all contexts. It may make us overlook that in some cases a non-event needs explanation (Sherlock Holmes' famous case of the dog that did not bark). And it...
Existence
Religion

Couldn't we take the "ontological proof" of God's existence to prove that there are many God-like creatures? For instance, imagine a creature that has all thinkable perfections except for the fact that it has dirty fingernails. If existence is a perfection, then this creature must have this perfection, since one can both exist and have dirty fingernails. And so, if the ontological proof proves that God exists, then it proves that dirty fingernails-God exists too. Doesn't it?

I read the question differently from Oliver. The questioner agrees that dirty fingernails are an imperfection, in fact, this is part of the point. We are to imagine a being that is all-perfect except for those dirty fingernails. Now if existence is a perfection, as the ontological argument assumes, then this imagined being has it. So it exists. (And never mind whether it's Divine or Divine-like, that's irrelevant to the point.) And likewise for all the other imaginable beings that are all-perfect except for one imperfection (other than non-existence) -- each of them also exists. And so do all the other imaginable beings that are all-perfect except for two imperfections (other than non-existence). And so on. So I think this is a nice reductio ad absurdum of the ontological argument for God's existence. If the ontological argument proves the existence of God, it also proves the existence of a vast number of other beings whose existence those interested in proving God's existence would have wanted to deny.
Existence

"Unique" is surely an absolute. Something either is different to anything else or it isn't. So, suppose I have a collection of 100 CDs (and I'm referring to titles, rather than the physical objects). If someone else had 99 of the same CDs in their collection, then mine would only be 1% different, but it would still be unique (obviously assuming that no-one else had the exact same collection). However, if I again have a collection of 100 CDs and the closest anyone could get to having the exact same collection is to just match with one of my CDs - my collection would be 99% different, and would be unique. Both collections are unique, but is one *more* unique than the other? If so, surely being 'unique' isn't an absolute but a question of degree. If neither are more unique than the other, how can they both be equally unique if it would only take 1 changed CD to match someone elses collection (and lose the unique status), but with the other it would take 99 changed CDs to match another collection.

We use language to draw distinctions of various kinds. Some suchdistinctions are binary -- such as that between prime and nonprimenatural numbers or that between pregnant and nonpregnant female personsand animals. Other such distinctions are scalar -- such as that betweenobjects called long or short, fast or slow, North or South, suggestinga scale along which things can be ordered. Yet other such distinctionsare plural -- such as the distinctions we draw by means of colorpredicates. As your example brings out, distinctions ofdifferent kinds can sometimes be applied within the same space. In thespace of colors, for instance, we might operate with a simple binarydistinction (blue/nonblue) or with a scalar distinction (bright/dark)or with a plural distinction (mauve/crimson/turquois/...). Similarly,in regard to CD collections, we might operate with a simple binarydistinction (unique/nonunique) or with a more complex scalar or pluraldistinction. Which kind of distinction we employ typicallydepends on...