If I see somebody getting robbed on the street and, in order to help them, I confront the attacker, should I be worried ethically (and legally I suppose) about the result of my actions toward the perpetrator? For example, what if simply telling them off isn't enough and, in order to stop the robbery, I have to use force and that force causes the death of the criminal? (I guess, for example I could push the robber away from the victim and the robber might hit his/her head too hard on the ground, etc.) Should I stop and think about the best way to stop the robbery that would avoid potentially killing the criminal (and thus risk being too late to help or try something ineffective) or should I rush in to help but risk excessive harm to the assailant? Would I be morally responsible for the well-being of the perpetrator? Thanks so much!

Yes, you do have a moral responsibility toward the apparent perpetrator. This responsibility results from two factors. First, what appears to you to be a criminal act in progress may not be one: perhaps these guys a filming a movie, practicing for a play, or just horsing around. Secondly, your response should be proportional to the threat to the crime victim as modified, perhaps, by the culpability of the offender. When you surprise a large man who is vigorously assaulting another with a knife, you have strong reason to believe that the danger to the victim is imminent and substantial; so a forceful response seems appropriate to reduce this danger, even if it risks harm to the assailant. On the other hand, when you surprise a teenager snatching a $10 bill from a shopper and turning for a quick get-away, you should not risk serious physical harm to the thief when the only danger you thereby reduce is the danger that the shopper will lose the $10. You should be especially reluctant to risk harm to the...

Are there rules we ought to follow (in the absence of coercive institutions, such as the state or an employer) that are *not* ethical rules?

Yes, we ought to follow rules of logic, rules of scientific method, rules of rational choice, and rules of prudence, for example. Sure, we are often not doing anything unethical by violating such rules, so we may not have a moral reason to obey. But not all good reasons are moral reasons. And we typically have good non-moral reasons to follow rules like the ones mentioned above.

Is it ethical to kill someone in self-defense? My instinct was yes at first, but upon further reflection, in a situation where it's "you or them", I can't seem to think of a reason to kill someone in self-defense, other than the fact that you simply want to live. After all, you're still taking a human life. (Also if you could explain why it is or isn't ethical would help me out a lot thanks!)

Your puzzlement seems to arise from the symmetry of the situation. One of you will die, each prefers his/her own survival to that of the other, and so on. Looking at it from an impartial standpoint, you see no good reason why either one of you should be preferred. But there is a good reason: the other one -- not you -- is the cause of the problem, the cause of the need for one of you to die. You have a plausible reason for using force against the other, a reason that she lacks. While you cannot survive without using force against her, she can survive (could have survived) without using force against you. To be sure, there are exceptional cases where the other must attack you to survive. She may be coerced by a third party aiming a gun at her, for example, or she may be unable to keep herself afloat without the only available life preserver which you are wearing and need just as urgently. And there are other exceptional cases where the other firmly believes -- falsely but on good grounds -- that...

Are spousal hires unethical? Do companies have an obligation to consider job candidates on their merit as individuals alone? I would have thought that spousal hires were obviously unfair, and therefore objectionable. But I've talked to many people who think that they are often legitimate.

This is an interesting and difficult question. One might start with the presumption that a company's hiring may be conducted in whatever way its top officers deem most advantageous. Thus imagine a company that has two positions to fill and is considering four candidates. The hiring officers rank these candidates in the following order: Alice, Ben, Celia, David. So they would like to hire Alice and Ben. But unfortunately Alice is married to David, and she will decline unless David is also made an offer. So the hiring officers discuss whether the firm is better off with Alice and David or with Ben and Celia. They determine that the Alice-David combination is more advantageous, and so they promise Alice that, if she accepts, David will also be hired. Does Ben have a complaint in this case? I don't think so. It is true that, other things equal, he would add more value to the firm than David would. But other things are not equal: if Ben is hired over David, then Alice will decline; whereas if David is...

A few people are born with a rare disorder that prevents these people from feeling pain. Is "hurting" these people - i.e. doing to them things that would cause others to feel pain but don't have much of an effect on these people - just as morally significant as hurting people who do feel pain? (Let's assume there are no long-lasting injuries involved.) I ask not because I want permission to hit people, but because I wonder how closely related pain as a neurological phenomenon is to suffering as a moral phenomenon.

Part of what makes it wrong to hit or torture people is surely that such behavior causes pain. It follows naturally that, when such conduct is wrong, it is more wrong when it inflicts more pain. An unprovoked slap on your thigh by a stranger is a lesser wrong than a full strength blow to your nose. By the same logic, it would seem to be less wrong to hit a stranger if you ensure (perhaps by first inviting him to a good glass of Scotch or through prior local anaesthesia) that he feels little or no pain. And it would then also seem less wrong if you hit his "bad" leg (where he has lost feeling after a botched appendicitis) rather than his "good" leg (which has normal pain sensitivity). This is easily extended to saying that it is less wrong to hit one stranger's "bad" leg than another stranger's "good" leg. And this in turn pretty much is the proposition you query: other things equal, a behavior is less wrong if it causes less pain. Of course, it does not follow that a behavior is not wrong if it...

If somebody behaves unethically, and knows they are doing so, have they made some sort of error of reasoning? Is it coherent to consciously choose to do something one knows is wrong? Or does it merely demonstrate that the person is emotionally indifferent to unethical behavior?

Such behavior would seem to manifest an error of reasoning only if the person also has a commitment never to act unethically and somehow believes that she is acting in accordance with this commitment. Most people have no such commitment. They are ready to act unethically in certain situations and, when they do, there is nothing wrong with their reasoning. I don't think that people thus acting unethically are always emotionally indifferent to unethical behavior. They may emotionally enjoy the thrill of doing something unethical. Or they may be disturbed by their conduct, albeit not disturbed enough to avoid it. For example, someone finds her neighbor's wallet with $4000 in it. She is emotionally upset by the idea of stealing the money, and she would refrain if the amount were much smaller. But with such a large amount she decides to accept some emotional distress for the sake pocketing the cash. No emotional indifference here, and also no error of reasoning.

It is said that average IQ in prisons is well below the average among the whole population. The most selfish people I know are either very young children or mentally impaired adults. Do you think it probable that there is a positive correlation between intelligence and morally correct behavior?

It's credible that morally correct behavior is less common among very young children and the mentally impaired than among the rest. But your point about prisons does not seem to me to lend sufficient support to the larger positive correlation you suggest for at least three reasons. First, a great deal of selfish, immoral and highly damaging behavior -- e.g. in politics or in the business world -- is actually not criminal; and more intelligent people are probably substantially overrepresented among those engaging in such behaviors. Second, many people commit crimes but nonetheless manage to avoid prison -- either by not getting caught or by creating enough reasonable doubt to sway a prosecutor or a jury; and in this group, too, the more intelligent are likely to be overrepresented. Third, a surprisingly high percentage of prison inmates (esp. in the US) are actually innocent of the crime they have been convicted for, and they languish in jail even though they have not acted immorally or have...

Do ethical truths change in response to social or technological developments? Or is what was true two thousand years ago still true today?

There is surely some such change. For example, it was not wrong 2000 years ago to have as many children as you could comfortably raise with your spouse or partner; but today -- when global warming and resource scarcity are real threats and when it is quite possible for affluent people to adopt children who would otherwise grow up under very oppressive conditions -- it would be wrong to have a dozen children. But the change here may well be explainable in terms of some unchanged ethical principle that persists. For example, Kant's principle that tells us to permit ourselves only such conduct as we could permit to all others as well. In 12 AD, it would have been fine if everyone had felt free to have as many children as s/he could afford to raise. Today such conduct would impose great harms of future generations as well as on various impoverished contemporaries. Some dramatic changes in the prevailing morality do not have such an explanation. Suppose, for example, that social and technological...

Is Kant's Categorical imperative overly dependent on empirical considerations? I think it is since judging the morality of an action by asking what would happen if everybody did the same thing means that the morality of an action is dependent on the contingent features of the world that produce that effect. If everyone did a certain thing then there would be chaos so that is not good Kant seems to say. Well that chaos of course depends less on the nature of the action and it underlying intentions than on the world that action took place in. If everyone stole then society would fall apart but that seems to have more to do with principles of sociology than something that pertains to ethics.

You suggest that Kant's criterion of wrong conduct turns on this question: "If everyone acted the way I am proposing to act, would this have undesirable consequences?" I think Kant's actual question differs in two respects. Kant is not asking whether the agent would like some fictional world (find it desirable), but whether the agent can will it and her own proposed conduct in it. And the world Kant envisioned is not one in which all act the way the agent is proposing to act, but one in which all are permitted (and take themselves to be permitted) so to act. So Kant's question is: "Can I will the action I am considering along with its universal permission?" The basic idea here is that I should not permit myself an action that I cannot permit all others at the same time. Let's see how this plays out in Kant's promising example. The agent considers extricating himself from financial difficulty by making a false (lying) promise. He then asks himself whether, in a world in which all took themselves to...

This is a time when overpopulation is a growing problem. It seems that there is no slowing down of procreation even though people are aware of the problem. At the rate it is going I see that it will result in Authorities having to take drastic action to sustain the human race. Any decision they make will be unfair in some way. I wonder whether it would be right to stop trying to cure terminal illnesses such as Cancer and AIDS (as they seem an unbias/fair population control system). On the one hand it would be better for the future of mankind and yet it seems unjust to let people die when we can help them. Where does this issue stand with ethics? as it seems both moral and immoral.

Letting terminally ill people die will do little to slow population growth because the vast majority of these people are not going to have (additional) children anyway. But there are other solutions that would actually work. You write that there seems to be no slowing of procreation. This is quite false. Total fertility rates (average number of children per woman) have fallen spectacularly since 1955 ... but only in countries and regions where poverty has been meaningfully reduced. For example, the TFR of East Asia fell from 5.42 to 1.72 (below the rate of reproduction) -- and East Asia is the most populous region on Earth. So this is highly significant. There were large drops also in Portugal, Australia, Botswana, Italy, and so on. Where poverty persists, on the other hand, so do high TFRs. Many African states are good examples of this. Niger's TFR has increased from 6.86 to 7.15, and other high-poverty countries (Mali, Senegal, Equatorial Guinea) are not far behind. The evidence is overwhelming,...

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