ask a question

recent responses

all topics

info

⚲

Philosophers

Help me to understand this quote from Voltaire: "The infinitely little have a pride infinitely great." I already tried to understand it, but I can't find a consensual thought of it. With the best regards from Portugal, Olímpio P.

I am not a Voltaire expert; I can't even find the source of thequotation (putting it back into context is likely to help anyinterpretation), although it is very similar to a line at the end of'Micromegas'. However, for what it's worth, I'll happily share whatI've always taken it to mean. 'Little' is a metaphor for rank on a scale of things one mightreasonably have pride in. As Voltaire is a satirist, there are infact very few things near the top of that scale, but never mind. (In'Micromegas' little means literally little, but ALSO pathetic,insignificant, narrow.) So, the quotation implies that there is aninverse proportionality between greatness and pride. Those who aregenuinely great either refuse pride or have little need of it; thosewho are insignificant have great -- though irrational and undeserved-- pride. One reason for this is that 'littleness' entails anarrowness of point of view or closed-mindedness. Thus, the littleare incapable of understanding that by comparison with...
Philosophers

Hi. This is a question on the nature of Reality, or rather Actuality. I say Actuality, because I like the distinction that Kant makes between Appearances he calls Phenomena, and things in themselves he calls Noumena. Anyway he ends up saying we can never know the thing in itself, i.e. actuality, but only our experience of reality, i.e. appearances. What I would like to clear up is if there is a way to experience the thing in itself, or whether we have to accept on good faith that actuality exists independently of us, and that it stops with I think therefore I am. In short is there an answer to the sceptics? My question has been fueled by the book, _A Beginner's Guide to Reality_, by Jim Baggott, which ends in "it depends on what you believe", which doesn't really do it for me. Cheers, Pasquale

This problem preoccupied many philosophers after Kant. Amongthe easiest to understand alternative view according to which thething-in-itself CAN be 'experienced' is that of Schopenhauer (have alook at section 18 onwards of volume one of The World as Will andRepresentation). However, sticking simply with Kant, it appears the two alternativepositions you propose ('experiencing the thing in itself', or 'accepton good faith') are not the only possibilities. Indeed, we might saythat these alternatives are pre-Kantian. For example, Hume is ofteninterpreted in this way. Kant's position is that experience is defined in terms ofappearances, and the notion of experiencing the thing-in-itself isself-contradictory. (There appears to be a difference between'thing-in-itself' and 'noumenon', but we'll pass over that.) On theother hand, what he calls appearances (reality) are precisely whatmost people would call 'actuality'. Appearances ARE 'independent' ofus, in any normal sense of that word. ...
Philosophers

Would Immanuel Kant oppose alternative rock? If we were to universalize the maxim "It is permissible to listen to alternative rock" then "alternative" rock would become mainstream, since everyone would listen to it. This of course creates a contradiction, implying we have a perfect duty not to listen to alternative rock. (I'm not trying to be silly. I think I've wildly misinterpreted Kant, and I was wondering if you could clear it up.) You might say that just because alt. rock was permitted, that doesn't mean everyone would listen to it. But if stealing was permitted, it doesn't logically follow that everyone would steal. (Same goes for lying.)

Very clever question. Maxims can fail to live up to the moral law in (at least) two ways. Either they are themselves impossible as universal laws; or they are impossible for us to consistently will to be moral laws. An example of the first type would be a rule such as ‘lie when it is in your best interest’. This is not universalisable at all. Lying only forms an advantage to you when the other person trusts you, and they would only trust you if they thought there was a strong possibility that you were not lying! Universal lying destroys trust, and thus makes lying itself impossible . An example of the second type would be ‘do not be charitable even to those in dire need’. This rule can be universalised in the sense that it is entirely possible that human nature should have been so constituted that charity was impossible. But, Kant claims, it is impossible for us consistently to will this state of affairs. We might find ourselves in dire need of help from others, and will the opposite. You cannot...
Philosophers

I'm a philosophy student, and like most philosophy students (and philosophers), I've been known to rhapsodize about Plato. Even if I don't agree with all of his views, he is 'the' philosopher, a great man, and so we put him up on a pedestal. But I've had a sort of crisis of consciousness. The Republic is, more or less, a fascist book, no? If I met anyone in real life who held the views Plato claims to in the Republic, I would be horribly disturbed-- I wouldn't devote my life to seriously considering her philosophy. I understand the merits of distancing yourself from emotions when doing philosophy, and just considering the ideas on their own merits. Isn't that what philosophy's all about, actually? But at the same time, I don't really want to seriously consider fascism, I don't think it deserves it. And why are people still seriously discussing Plato's ethics like they might have something useful to tell us? Shouldn't we stop at "Plato was a fascist"? And what does it say about philosophy that a fascist...

I'm not convinced that we should equate Plato's political philosophy with fascism, although certainly this claim has been made seriously and with rational argument. But let's put that to one side. It seems to me that there are two questions here. First, should we judge historical figures by the same moral standards that we hold today? And, second, in what sense can someone whose views we find repugnant ever be considered a 'great' philosopher? The first question paints one directly into a corner: it seems that either we should reject historical philosophers because of the views they held (in which case there would be not much of the history of philosophy left!) or, we are forced to take seriously, over and over again, morally and politically dubious positions. But what does it mean to 'take seriously'? One approach would be a broadly historicist one: Plato's political theory can be understood as rational only given the historical circumstances in which he lived; since those circumstances no...
Philosophers

What exactly does Kant mean when he says that we should never treat anyone as a means to an end? Surely there are many situations where I am trying to choose the lesser of two evils. Take a politician for example. He has a certain amount of money to spend on some people, so anything he does will be treating someone as a means to another end, as someone will always miss out at the benefit of someone else (though notice there is no element of selfishness here). I suppose my question is, does Kant mean we shouldn't cause suffering in another for our benefit, or we shouldn't cause suffering in another for ANY end such as for the benefit of another, or does he mean something else entirely? Thanks, Holly M. Fantastic site by the way, I'm addicted.

Please have a look at the question and especially the answer here: http://www.askphilosophers.org/question/1476 It is interesting how economics in particular seems to offer the most obvious examples of how one's ends are always 'mixed'.
Art
Philosophers

I am having a little trouble distinguishing the difference between the Dionysian and Apollinian artists that Nietzsche talks about. Any way you could clarify?

You are certainly not alone in having a little trouble! These terms are used by Nietzsche in his Birth of Tragedy, which was his first published book. It is important to keep a few things in mind when reading this book. First, Nietzsche’s explicit intent was not to talk about the Greeks at all, but rather to talk about the contemporary European scene by way of a complex historical analogy with Greece. Thus, it is not even clear whether any particular artists that Nietzsche may have had in mind are to found in ancient Greece, or 19 th Century Germany. Second, Nietzsche is employing a fairly conventional anthropological notion: that deities and myths are ideal representations of underlying cultural trends. Thus the Apollonian and Dionysian as concepts stand for trends or forces in Greek culture rather than specific cultural products. Third, Nietzsche is also not particularly interested in the Apollonian or Dionysian in themselves. He becomes interested only insofar as these two cultural forms work...
Philosophers

Is there a particular reason that Socrates chose to present his work in the form of dialogues (as opposed to, say, essays)?

The dialogues we read today were written by Socrates' student, Plato. Socrates was a teacher who believed that debate and discussion were the only ways to arrive at knowledge or, at least, to recognise ignorance. So, Socrates didn't write books of any kind. Plato's dialogues are a kind of compromise: they are written down, but written down as debates and discussions , and presumably designed to stimulate thought in the reader in a way that is at least akin to the face to face teaching of Socrates. (In the Phaedrus , one of the Socratic dialogues by Plato, a rather compelling argument against writing can be found.) It is usually assumed that Plato's earliest works are pretty close representations of Socrates' techniques and ideas, and that later works are in Plato's own voice, so to speak. However, since the dating of the dialogues involves considerable guesswork, this is difficult to establish. Plato probably wrote treatises on philosophical topics along the model of other Greek...
Philosophers
Philosophy

How can a rational philosopher attempt to understand philosophers, such as Heidegger, Derrida or Foucault? These philosophers claim to be against the method of reason. Can a philosopher still philosophize without using reason?

Thank you for your question. It seems to me that the 'rational philosopher' in your question starts out from the assumption that there is one and only one type of rationality. This, however, is patently false, since what is and what is not rational, and why, and how do we know, are all key questions within philosophy. Think of Quine or Wittgenstein, among many others. 'Rationality' is indeed one of the categories on this site (on the list to your left). The philosophers you mention one and all believe that philosophy is essentially historical. By this I mean they tend to agree that philosophy is not an enterprise that can be conducted except through a constant interrogation of its own roots. Not surprisingly, one of the historical facts that fascinates these philosophers is that the notion of rationality is constantly changing. A few examples: the dialectical method in Plato should be considered (arguably, at least) not a technique among potential others (others that could have arrived at or...
Philosophers

Nietzsche seemed to believe that eternal recurrence was a reality if time were infinite, which we know it is not. Therefore, does anyone now take his views on this matters seriously (other than metaphorically as a guide to the type of life one might lead)?

Nietzsche was very careful in his presentation of the notion of 'eternalrecurrence'. In his published work, it is always put forward as a hypothesis --the purpose of which is, as you say, something like a guide. Mainly innotebooks did he experiment with trying to demonstrate it as a metaphysicaltruth. Assuming for the moment that we disregard Nietzsche's well-knownscepticism concerning the standard modes of metaphysical argumentation, theargument does indeed require as one of its assumptions the infinite extent oftime. But this is not the only assumption: he also requires a broadlydeterministic conception of cause and effect, the idea that all events areinextricably interconnected, and the principle of the conservation of energy.And many of these assumptions, also, he himself challenges elsewhere. In brief, in order to take seriously the eternal recurrence as ametaphysical claim, you would need to redefine almost beyond recognition manyof the constituent concepts. One such attempt, controversial...
Ethics
Philosophers

Socrates said "It is better to suffer evil than to do it". I am trying to work out if a consequentialist could make good sense of this claim, if anyone can!

Just adding one point. A case could be built, I imagine, for saying that doing wrong in the present makes it more likely that one will do wrong in the future. Or, similarly, one will be less able to resist the temptatation to do wrong in the future. (It might even be the case that suffering a wrong in the present makes it less likely that one will commit a wrong in the future.) These claims will be very similar to Socrates' harm argument: here, doing wrong harms one's character. So, a consequentialist would reason that not only the present act, but the increased or decreased likelihood of future acts, should be taken into account. Therefore, from the point of view of my decision whether to suffer or commit a wrong, suffering would generally be preferable on the consequentialist analysis. I can see many possible holes in this argument, but it's a start.

Pages