Todd, I'm not quite sure I see the relation that you intend between your first and second sentence. If you are arguing that there are lots of people around who call themselves 'philosophers' but who are not 'true philosophers' in Socrates sense, and this has led to the situation in which philosophy is esoteric or complicated, then I quite disagree. My observation is that the use of the terms philosophy or philosopher in everyday circumstances is such as to make the subject appear really simple or trivial. So, my local pet shop has a sign that says 'Our philosophy is...'. What they mean is 'We consider it good practice to...'. Likewise, there is a range of toiletries called 'Philosophy', and I recently bought a bottle of wine that had printed on the label ' philosophie par le fruit ' (which I think is really endearing, but it ain't Kant). Everyone is encouraged to have their 'personal philosophy', this makes it seem like philosophy is easy, what's all the fuss about. Moreover, it makes it seem trivial...

Please see question 1066 and replies.

My personal strategy, regardless of whether something is a short paper or a book or a difficult classic, is to sit down in a quiet, comfortable, brightly lit place with a large cup of tea, and read. But this may have to do with the fact that I like comfortable places and I like tea. Much more interesting than my personal preferences is whether there ought to be different strategies for approaching different kinds of philosophical texts. I suspect the most important determining factor is not the kind of text, but rather the kind of purposes you, the reader, have in your reading. Are you just trying to get an overview of a position, trying to answer a particular question, engaging in sustained research on a narrowly prescribed problem, or something else? Published philosophy is a resource to be put to work, but there are lots of different kinds of work. Please also see the following question and answers: http://www.askphilosophers.org/question/1066

Yes and no, I'd say. Let us assume that two of the things that makes a good elementary school teacher are (i) encouraging thinking and asking questions about why things (including the pupils themselves) are the way they are, and (ii) encouraging a certain playfulness with concepts (seeing what happens when one tries to extend their reach, use them outside conventional employment). These activities are also a significant part of the basic toolkit of philosophy. So, even without knowing it, a good elementary school teacher is teaching philosophy. However, does such a teacher need any formal, academic training in philosophy? Almost certainly not. Please see the materials listed under a link on the right hand side of the AskPhilosophers page.

I run a freshman course with the rather over-egged title 'The Metaphysics of the Everyday'. It's purpose is to begin, each week, with a different current event or issue, and try to tease out what philosophical issues might be at play. Obviously, we cannot go into a great deal of depth about either the issues or the philosophical notions; that's not the point. The point is rather to encourage the recognition of the influence and ubiquity of certain ideas. Why am I telling you this? Seeing philosophy at work in 'everyday life' is a skill that first has to be acquired. A good, though probably a silly, analogy is with bird-watching: one might think that the ability to spot birds is related simply to eyesight or attention, but it really is a skill that needs to be acquired by many chilly dawns in forests. Moreover, there are good reasons why many people never acquire this skill (spotting philosophy, I mean, not birds), or even feel the need to acquire it. I would say that we all have a relation to...

Thank you for your question. It seems to me that the 'rational philosopher' in your question starts out from the assumption that there is one and only one type of rationality. This, however, is patently false, since what is and what is not rational, and why, and how do we know, are all key questions within philosophy. Think of Quine or Wittgenstein, among many others. 'Rationality' is indeed one of the categories on this site (on the list to your left). The philosophers you mention one and all believe that philosophy is essentially historical. By this I mean they tend to agree that philosophy is not an enterprise that can be conducted except through a constant interrogation of its own roots. Not surprisingly, one of the historical facts that fascinates these philosophers is that the notion of rationality is constantly changing. A few examples: the dialectical method in Plato should be considered (arguably, at least) not a technique among potential others (others that could have arrived at or...

A fascinating question. In defining philosophical error, we are venturingclose to trying to define philosophy itself -- and about that there is littleagreement! So, I’m going to try to avoid answering your question in such away as to assume an answer to that other one. This time of year, my thoughts turn to the marking of student philosophyessays. It's worth remembering that not all errors in philosophy essays aredistinctively philosophical in some way. There are factual errors about historyor language; errors of understanding or exposition; errors of reasoning. Thesecould be errors in a science paper, a history paper or whatever. In fact, I'mhaving trouble thinking of any type of error that could not be re-categorisedadequately in one of these ways. The best I can do are something like anerror of omission. For example, where an opportunity is missed to draw andinteresting conclusion, or make a fruitful connection to some other idea. To besure, such errors are also common in other disciplines....

How is it that philosophers make their views know to others? By lecturing at a University, for one. But here we have competition for students: Universities with each other, and between departments over students. The student-customer has to make a choice where and what to study. So, in order to be able to lecture, the philosopher must enter into and have some success in competition. Still more so with publishing: since publishers are in competition, the authors must likewise. However, does this competition necessarily influence what philosophers say and think, or just how they market themselves? That is not so clear. Fashion is more difficult still. It certainly often looks like there are philosophical bandwagons that roll rapidly for a few years or decades. No doubt the element of competition is important here: a young PhD student will want to write on a topic that is likely to get him or her a job. But the latest idea in philosophy may be attractive not merely because it is new, or because...

That's a hugely complex, and interesting, question. The answer to the ‘does’ part of the question is certainly ‘yes’, at least in the field of practicing artists with which I am much more familiar. However, the mode of influence is often unpredictable and surprising. First of all, a philosopher who sets out to influence the way artists work will almost certainly be ignored. Second, it is not necessarily the particular field of aesthetics that has influence: the philosophy of language has been taken up by poets, the philosophy of perception by painters, political thought or the metaphysics of freedom in the music of Beethoven or Wagner. Third, the influence is generally two-way: artistic achievements challenge philosophers to ‘keep up’, and again not always in the field of aesthetics. The ‘should’ is trickier. In general, because an artist should have the freedom to find inspiration in pretty much anything; and if a philosopher provides inspiration to a scientist, so much the better too. But I...

I agree that the two designations do not have much geographical significance, or significance in the nature of problems pursued or methods employed. I also don't think style is a very consistent indicator. Finally, the differences between philosophers within one of these very loose groups might be more important than any differences between groups. Perhaps, therefore, the distinction should be retired from the language. If there is a difference that is more than anecdotal, it is historical in character. Please see my answer to question 926. http://www.amherst.edu/askphilosophers/question/926 However, for the moment, we're stuck with it. The distinction has been institutionalised in ways beyond your or my control -- for example, in publishers' catalogues, in journal readership and subscriptions, in the categories of work presented at national and international conferences, or for the British Research Assessment Exercise.