The question 'What is art?' has the form of a classical philosophical question--questions of that form were raised by Socrates in 'early' dialogues such as the Euthyphro --and although this question has received considerable attention from philosophers, it's not universally accepted that this question is indeed well-formed. (It has been claimed, for example, that the concept 'art' is a 'family resemblance concept' that does not admit of a characterization in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions for falling under that concept and, hence, that much of traditional aesthetics, has rested on a mistake.) So the question of whether the question, 'What is art?' is indeed a genuine philosophical question is also a philosophical question!! Even if one were to conclude, however, that the question, 'What is art?' does indeed rest on a mistake, it should not therefore be concluded that reflection on the nature of art is not philosophically or artistically illuminating: it might well be argued that...

This question seems to raise an aesthetic version of what has come to be known as the 'Euthyphro Question' (from Plato's dialogue Euthyphro ), where it is asked if what is holy is holy because the gods love it, or if the gods love what is holy because it is holy. If one answers that what is holy is holy because the gods love it, one endorses a version of the view that values are created, or even subjective; if one answers that the gods love what is holy because it is holy, one endorses a version of the view that values are discovered, or even objective. (There are, of course, a range of alternatives between these poles, but let's stick to them, since they bring out the issue most sharply.) By parity of reasoning, it might seem that if one believes that the capacity to appreciate beauty reflects the sophistication of one's aesthetic judgment, then it would seem that beauty is independent of the perceiver, discovered by perceivers, and maybe even is objective; if one believes that beauty is...

What seems to be at issue in this question is not racial discrimination, in terms of which the question begins, which would seem to imply that what's at issue is negative bias towards people in virtue of their race, which certainly wouldn't be an aesthetic, but a moral issue; the second sentence suggests that what's really at issue in the question is the nature of the basis for distinguishing among people with respect to their race, which is a distinct matter, and which need not--although, admittedly, it tends to--have moral and political implications. Now there is no doubt that individuals from different races often appear different--even if, as recent empirical work has suggested, there is little to no genetic difference between such people, so that they are not essentially different, even though they appear different--and it does not seem implausible to me that one might, whether because of habit, preference or other reasons, find individuals of certain races less attractive than those of...

You're absolutely right that aesthetic terms are sometimes used to characterize action. Whether, however, there is an internal or conceptual or fundamental connection between judging an action in such aesthetic terms and judging it morally is a difficult question. In the early modern period, writers on ethics often divided between seeing morality in aesthetic terms and seeing it strictly in terms of moral relations. (David Gill has written on this issue in Philosophy Compass , starting from the historical question and then moving on to the more general question of whether morality is more like math or beauty--in other words, whether moral judgments are supposed to reflect eternal, immutable standards, or rather whether they are supposed to reflect one's 'taste'.) It's not clear to me, however, that there need be an opposition between characterizing an action as right or wrong and characterizing it as cruel or repulsive, for aesthetic judgments, like moral judgments, rest on reasons, and it is the...

It's not clear to me that the question of whether one should undergo plastic surgery even falls within the scope of morality. (Following certain recent philosophers, such as Robert Adams, T. M. Scanlon, J. B. Schneewind, and Susan Wolf, I am inclined to think that the scope of morality is actually rather narrow.) Here's one way to frame the issue in terms of morality. If one thought that one's body has been entrusted to one by God to preserve, then one may think it impermissible, indeed a transgression against God's will, if one were to tamper with that body. But then, it would seem, such a person would also be unwilling to lift weights, use make-up, go to the hair salon, etc.. This, however, seems to me to be a somewhat implausible position, that would have all sorts of problematic consequences, especially when one considers medical care (Christian Scientists encounter problems on this score). To my mind, it seems that one has the right to do with one's body what one pleases, and the only...

There is no connection between enjoying food and its being healthy, or good for one's body. Why should there be a connection between enjoying an artwork and judging it to be good?