Such a view about legitimate state action often rests on the following sort of argument: (1) Since coercion is generally wrong, the coercive activities of the state (setting up rules that are backed up by credible threats of punishment) need a special justification. (2) The only such justification that would be possible is the actual or hypothetical prior consent of those to whom the rules apply. (3) No one would reasonably give prior consent to being coerced to act in her own self-interest (except, perhaps, under conditions in which she loses her mental faculties). (4) Therefore, paternalistic laws (those that require citizens to act in ways that further their own self-interest) are unjustified. All three premises of this argument are debatable.

I agree with you that the distinction, on which the law must rely insuch cases, between genuine consent and non-consent is tricky. If youagreed to do a sexual act that you regard as repulsive in order to saveyour life, did you or did you not “consent” to the action? If I give a kidnapper$100,000 in order to obtain the safe return of my child, have I actedwillingly? You might worry that Nicholas Smith suggested a positive answer to these questions whenhe suggests that a loving spouse can find sex distasteful but nonetheless “consent” to sex with herhusband “out of love.” She doesn’t want to do it, he suggests, butnonetheless, since she consented, the sex wasn’t rape. I don’t, however,think that Smith’s suggestion has the implication that victims ofcoercion, such as you experienced, count as having “consented” to theiractions. So what is the difference between you and the dutifuland loving wife? In both of these cases, a person agrees to dosomething that she would not otherwise have desired to do had it...