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Truth

One can create axioms that make statements like "all bachelors are married" true. What is wrong with calling these truths analytic as a shorthand for the type of truth it is based on the type of axiom it is derived from, much in the way we use the adjectives arithmetic, set-theoretic, or logical to denote those types of formal truths? I feel like one could decide whether a truth is analytic by seeing which (kinds of) axioms need to involved in making it true.

There is nothing stopping you from defining an analytic theorem of a formal system to be one whose derivation requires appeal to at least one member of a designated subset of axioms. But on what basis are you deciding to single out that particular subset of axioms? If you say you're being guided by the fact that those particular axioms express truths about meanings, whereas other axioms express substantive truths about the world, then you owe an explanation of what that distinction amounts to -- and arguably, that will be no easier to give than an outright analysis of "analytic". (You might also look at W.V. Quine's discussion of Semantic Postulates in his paper "Two Dogmas of Empiricism.")
Time
Truth

Does a proposition about the future have to be true today? If so does this preclude contingency and is every proposition of the future necessary?

In connection with Professor Stairs' last two paragraphs, you might also read Question 997 and some of the further entries referred to there.
Knowledge
Truth

Consider the statement, "There exists at least one true statement." Is a demonstration of the truth of this statement possible, which does not assume the statement's truth? If so, what is that demonstration? If not, does it then follow that certain knowledge - that is, knowledge that is conscious of itself as knowledge - is impossible?

The truth of "There is at least one true statement" (*) follows logically from the claim that " S is a true statement" (**), where S is some particular statement. So if we could establish (**) without presupposing the truth of (*), we would have answered your first question affirmatively. Let S be the statement "There is a pen on my desk now." Observation tells me that S is true. It seems that I can know that S is true, i.e., that (**) is the case, without the need to assume that (*) is the case. Hence, I can establish the truth of (*) in a non-circular fashion.
Truth

If everything so far found in reality has been captured in words, and words are built upon letters which are also a creation of man's imagination, is not everything a construction of the human mind to categorize the world, to make it familar and give it definition? Given that this is true, then are not most if not all philosophical questions (made up of our tools of language) redundant and pointless because they are rendered meaningless by the fact of their imaginary basis? So the only real questions of philosophy should be only those relating to emotions like hunger, satisfaction, pleasure and pain, happiness and sadness? Everything else is metaphysical .... so rights and freedoms, ethics and morality is all relative to the extreme and basically non-sensical. What is the answer?

Yes, we use language to describe the world. Yes, we need language to describe the world. Let's even assume that language is a human construction — say there was a committee a long time ago that got together and created human languages. And finally, let's accept that the theories we elaborate within those languages are also constructions of human beings. I don't understand why you think that it follows that the views we've arrived at are just products of our fantasy that bear no connection to reality. We don't just make up stories about the world, do we? We test our stories against the evidence, we drop the stories that don't help us organize and understand the evidence, and we accept and elaborate those stories that do. Yes, scientific theories are "constructions of the human mind", but not just any construction will do!