Metaphysics is indeed a central area of philosophy: you will rarely find a philosophy department that doesn't have a course (or many) in metaphysics. We've chosen not to use the name here because it probably doesn't mean anything to someone who doesn't know much about philosophy. If you'll notice, the category names at left are all everyday terms that have some significance even to those who've never encountered philosophy. There are plenty of questions/responses about metaphysics on the site: you'll find them in categories like Color, Existence, Identity, Science, Space, and Time.

And it might be worth adding that the absence of a "method" doesn't really distinguish philosophy from any other interesting rational inquiry. There is no "mathematical method". And, contrary to how many people speak, there is no "scientific method" either, at least not in any interesting sense of "method".

Easier asked than answered. Philosophers are people who do philosophy, and so your question really amounts to what philosophy is. The problem is that what philosophy is is itself a philosophical question. Many grand disputes in the history of philosophy can be viewed as conflicts over how to proceed in philosophy, over what the rules of the game are, over what philosophy's method and central problems ought to be. So, I suppose one "definition" of philosophy might simply be the discipline which takes as its subject its own nature . Of course, that has a circular whiff about that as well. Philosophy is a little like pornography: hard to define, but one knows it when one sees it. But really, most concepts are like pornography in that respect: there's pretty widespread agreement about how they apply, but little hope of working out independently intelligible definitions. That fact itself is something of great philosophical interest. But don't ask me to define precisely what I mean...

I'm not so confident that perusing a panelist's publications will helpthe layperson see which questions animate the philosopher. Those publicationsusually begin far into a long conversation and it might be hard to find in themthe simple questions that kicked off the discussion in the first place. So I'll place one on the table. I'd love to have a satisfying answer to this question: "What are we saying when we claim that 5+3=8?" Ilike Thomas' suggestion though. I'll start: I'm not sure I understandwhy many colleagues are as convinced as they are that work in empiricalpsychology is relevant (if not central) to many long-standingquintessentially philosophical questions. It seems to me that the 20th Century saw a number of subtle criticisms of this conviction that have been more ignored than answered. (I'm not assuming its irrelevance. I'm just puzzled at times by the confident, or at least untroubled, assumption of relevance, especially in the face of powerful dissents.)

This question has been addressed. Please search for "continental" or follow this link to a few entries that discuss the matter.

Philosophers often think of the philosophy of science as being less of a descriptive enterprise than is either the history or the sociology of science. The philosophy of science, it is often said, concerns itself in part with an evaluation of scientific practice. For instance, a philosopher of science does not just want to know what scientists have, as a matter of fact, accepted as good explanations; scientists might, after all, have jointly succumbed to some widespread error. Rather, the philosopher of science wants to know what would really constitute a good explanation—where it is assumed that scientists might on some occasions have taken something to be an explanation which was not. The philosophical project is thus in some sense a normative one, namely to determine what the scientist should take an explanation to be. Likewise, to consider another example, the philosopher of science is not particularly interested in whether scientists do believe ...

You might also check out some of the ideas and further resources mentioned on the website Philosophy for Kids (you can find a link in the right column of this page).

Two mention just two further wonderful writers in English: J.L. Austin has a very powerful voice. And W.V. Quine has an extraordinary style about which much could be said. (And I would not call Wittgenstein's style "portentous". Pitch perfectly resonant, yes.)

I'm not sure why you think there's a general answer to your question any more than there is to the question of why people become doctors, or gardeners, or urban planners. Some people go into philosophy because they love reading and writing philosophy, some because they love to teach it, some because it's just the thing they've been doing since they were 17, some have no idea why they're doing it. And why aren't philosophers "thinking up the answers to the world's problems"? Well, one response is: they are. The problems of philosophy are as much a part of the world as any other. In fact, they've been part of the world for far longer than most problems. Perhaps by "world's problems" you mean something like "practical, pressing problems involving human suffering" -- that's often what people have in mind when they use expressions like "real" problems, or problems "out in the world". Again, I don't know why you expect a general answer to that question any more than there is one to the question...

Do we have "the answers" to these questions? I don't think so. Seems rather like philosophers have many responses to them, most more or less tentative. For some suggested reading, you might look at the responses to Question 363 .