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Ethics
Justice
War

Why is the use of police force justifiable to stop the attempted murder of a neighbor, but military force unjustifiable when used to stop the attempted murders of civilians in other countries who peacefully advocate for human rights (speech, assembly, voting, etc.)?

There are various potentially relevant differences. First, interventions abroad are often more likely to be counterproductive. The foreign government committing or condoning the human rights violations may be so powerful that the attempt to stop it will cause much more death and destruction than is now occurring. By contrast, we can bring overwhelming force to bear domestically and thereby crush even well-armed crime gangs.Second, internationally we do not have unique authority to judge and to act. We are just one of many similarly placed agents possibly able to do something. These agents (the governments of powerful states) are likely to see things differently -- e.g. may support different factions in a country that's facing a violent power struggle. For example, some potential interveners may believe that the Sri Lankan all-out assault upon the Tamil Tigers was a crime that had to be stopped (because so many civilians were also hurt and killed). Other potential interveners may believe that the assault...
Ethics

My question has to do with why we attribute differing levels of blame for equivalent actions that produce different outcomes. For example, why does attempted murder go along with a much lesser sentence than actual murder. If I try my hardest to kill you and you get away, how is that action less punishable than if I was sucessful? Another example would be drunk driving. Consider three drivers driving home after one too many drinks: One arrives home safely. Although there is a spectrum on this issue, most will consider this a minor offense. The next driver was pulled over and arrested. He goes to jail and is considered by most to be a criminal. The last driver hits and kills a pedestrian and is charged with Vehicular Homicide. When he eventually gets out of jail, this person is a pariah. Given that these three drivers had the same number of drinks in the same amount of time, how are any of these three situations different? From a judicial standpoint I can see an argument for the differing levels...

May I refer you to earlier discussion of this issue under questions 348 and 897 ? If you don't feel satisfied with the answers there, do feel free to ask a more specific further question.
Justice
Philosophers

I have a question about Rawls' theory of justice. Part of his difference principle stipulates that "social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all." I understand part (b), but part (a) I have some problems with. If I'm interpreting this right, there's a "safety net" so that the least-advantaged members of society don't go below. Thus, it takes care of the poor people, but what do the rich get out of it? After all, part (a) says that it's to everyone's advantage. But what advantage do the rich have by giving up something so that the least-advantaged members benefit?

What you are citing is not the principle Rawls is actually defending as his second principle of justice, it is merely a principle he considers along the way. In its canonical formulation, the second principle reads: "Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to be attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity [the opportunity principle ]; and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society [the difference principle ]." With the correct text substituted, your point about the least advantaged makes more sense. Still, what Rawls is demanding for the least advantaged is really in one sense more than a safety net. The word "safety net" suggests a certain minimum, perhaps some amount sufficient to meet one's basic needs. But Rawls is demanding the highest feasible bottom position, even if this turns out to be well above the level needed for economic security. So, even if...
Ethics

Is it unethical to work in intelligence, as say, a spy, where one's job might involve lying to others, listening to others' conversations, and in general, misleading people?

Such work is surely often unethical or downright wrong -- for the reasons you suggest and also for the additional reason that such work may well be used by others to commit great crimes (e.g., to single out for torturous interrogation French citizens suspected of having ties to the Résistance). But your question, I think, is whether such work is unethical, or wrong in itself. To this my answer is no , for two separate reasons. One reason derives from what I call the "sucker exemption": in some cases, ordinary moral constraints on one's conduct toward others are weakened or canceled by how these others are behaving or have behaved. If you have various agreements with another person, for instance, and he turns out routinely to violate these agreements whenever it suits him, then you are not morally required to honour your agreements with him when it does not suit you. Similarly here, it may not be wrong to spy on spies or, more generally on people who themselves flout serious moral constraints. I...
Ethics
Science

I'm a scientist. The results of my research may generate technologies that could potentially be used in both and offensive and defensive military applications. These same technologies could potentially help people as well. Here are two examples: (1) My work could potentially create odor-sensing devices to target "enemies" and blow them up, but the same work could aid land-mine detection and removal. (2) My work could help build warrior robots, but it could also help build better prosthetics for amputees. For any given project, I have to decide which agency(ies) my lab will take money from. I do not want to decide based on the name of the agency alone: DARPA has funded projects that helped amputees and killed no one, while I would bet (but do not know for sure) that some work sponsored by the NSF has ultimately been used in military operations. So I'd like to base my decision on something more than the agency acronym. How can I start to get my head around this? What sorts of questions should I...

Adding to Professor Solomon's good points: One question that you seem not to be raising, but should, is whether research is alright when it does more good than harm. This cannot be universally correct. Think of the Tuskegee experiments. Or think of the horrific experiments German and Japanese doctors conducted on prisoners. The latter experiements apparently yielded very useful results -- so useful that the US offered immunity to doctors willing to share their knowledge and know-how. Still, participation in such experiments is generally wrong even if, in the long run, the benefits outweigh the harms. Philosophers have discussed these issues -- often in the context of criticizing or defending utilitarianism (or, more broadly, consequentialism) -- under two headings (which will enable you to retrieve relevant literature). They have debated whether negative duties (not to harm) have greater weight than positive duties (to help or benefit). And they have debated whether harms that are intended ...
Justice
Law

Are there ever occasions when justice might require the law to be broken?

Yes. Clear cases are ones where the agent has strong reasons to believe that (1) the law is unjust, (2) compliance would cause substantial harm, and (3) non-compliance would neither (3a) lose much greater benefits, nor (3b) cause harm of comparable magnitude or (3c) unreasonable cost upon the agent. The Nazi period offers examples. Justice required German citizens in typical circumstances not to obey a law that mandated that they report Jews to the authorities for internment in concentration camps. This is so because German citizens knew, or could and should have known, that (1) the internment of Jews (and others) was unjust, (2) reporting a non-interned Jew to the authorities was very likely to harm this person greatly, (3a) the internment of the person reported would not bring any substantial benefit, (3b) the non-internment of the person would cause no harm comparable to the harm of internment, and (3c) not reporting a Jew was typically without risk to the agent (at least when one could plausibly...
Death
Ethics
Sex

Is, say, necrophilia ethically wrong? Arguably the ultimate societal taboo, necrophilia is something which the vast majority of people -- myself included -- consider disturbing and repulsive. It seems, however, that if we deem it morally objectionable we are left in a precarious situation, as we are forced to acknowledge that certain sexual behaviors without victims are wrong in and of themselves. If we accept this fact, what's to stop a person from deeming gay marriage wrong on the same grounds? Where could we possibly draw the line? Having read some of the responses posted on this site, I have recently accepted the position that a person can be harmed even after their death. So, when I am speaking of necrophilia here, let's assume the person gave their consent before dying.

We might think of this on three levels. First, is it permissible for a liberal state to outlaw necrophilia? The argument for an affirmative answer could appeal to various public health reasons as well as to the fact that this practice may give considerable offense to others even while the cost of abstention is relatively small and borne only by a few. This argument might run roughly parallel to that justifying the permissibility of outlawing nudity or defecation in public places. The case of gay relationships is substantially different for two reasons: the cost to gay people of not having the opportunity of a romantically fulfilling and socially recognized relationship is enormous and, with roughly three percent of all people being gay, the number of people who would be (and have been) bearing this cost is substantial. Second, is there something ethically wrong with practicing necrophelia? Taking ethics in the broad sense, its concern is the good life for human beings. A good life centrally...
Emotion

Are there any philosophers that address emotional apathy? Are there any that warn against it? I know Plato, Kant, and presumably Aquinas would argue against apathetic sentiment for political and religious reasons, but I was wondering if there are any that stress the importance of emotional zest or passion?

Nietzsche and Camus come to mind. They don't exactly address emotional apathy as a philosophical problem. But they both develop philosophical positions that, in quite different ways, combine intellectual argument with emotional engagement. You might have a look at Nietzsche's Thus Spoke Zarathustra and Camus' The Rebel .
Ethics

If someone who has been a high achiever, who has earned respect for work done in, say, a creative field, most explicitly forbids the writing of a biography, is anyone entitled to ignore this stated position and write the book anyway? Assuming the subject is no longer living, should friends and associates supply what they know of the life lived and its effect on the work done? And what if someone who believes the original request should be respected, accidentally comes into possession of information which would influence ... or at least colour the finished account? Should this person, in the interest of a balanced account, divulge what has been learned? This is assuming that the second person has already argued that the biography was not wanted by its subject, which probably would anyway be well known, and had the objection waved aside.

Legally, sure, others are entitled to write (non-libelously) about someone regardless of the latter's wishes. Morally, they ought to take these wishes into account; but how much they count for will depend on how these wishes were motivated and -- especially -- on the relationship the potential biographer had to the subject. To illustrate, potential biographers have less moral reason to respect the subject's wishes when these were motivated by the desire to conceal the subject's frequent encounters with child prostitutes in Cambodia than if they were motivated by the subject's desire to avoid the power of his or her work being diminished by simple-minded psychologizing. And potential biographers have much stronger moral reason to respect the wishes of their subjects if the deceased was a close friend (or even spouse) rather than a stranger. An exception to the responsibilities of friendship here are cases where the potential biographers made clear to their subject all along that they intended to write a...
Education

Does the Western education system violate human rights? It does after all restrict freedom of movement (as absence from a set class at a particular time results in punishment and it's illegal to skip school altogether). It also violates freedom of thought - one of our most fundamental rights - as it requires a student to think about a set subject at a set time. Even intrinsic biological necessities such as the expulsion of bodily waste are often denied to students. Is it fair to conclude that there is something radically wrong with this system?

Insofar as pupils have the same human rights as adults do, your argument is compelling. If we did to adults what we are doing to adolescents, we'd be violating their human rights. An obvious defense of our education system (BTW, non-Western ones are not much different and mostly more restrictive) would claim that each person's human rights become more extensive as they grow up and that mandatory schooling of people below a certain age does not violate the narrower set of human rights they already have. There is surely something to this story: a mother is not violating a human right of her toddler when she prevents him from exiting down the stairs -- the toddler does not yet have the relevant human right to freedom of movement (though he already does have the human right not to be killed). But can this be developed into a defense of forcing a 14-year-old to attend school? There's amazingly little serious work on this general question: on what competences and capacities children must possess...

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