I can't speak for the theologians, but it does seem to me that we don't need to go down this path. Suppose that God, if there is one, is the greatest conceivable being. That might mean that God possesses the maximum of all kinds of goodness (though even that is tricker than it seems), but it doesn't mean that God possesses the maximum of all characteristics whatever. After all, the greatest conceivable being presumably wouldn't be a sadist, let alone the greatest possible sadist. The slide in the argument seems to be from "God is maximum goodness" to "God possesses all qualities." However, many qualities have nothing to do with goodness. There's a somewhat different argument hinted at in your suggestion: that God is all things, hence must embody all qualities. Apart from wondering about the relationship to perfection, one obvious question is what would it mean to say that God is all things. If it means that God is literally identical to each thing, then the doctrine would have nothing to...

Prof. Maitzen will. I hope, offer his own response, but I'm a bit puzzled. First, I'm not sure which professional mathematicians you have in mind, but that's not so important. Let's start elsewhere. The usual axioms of arithmetic do, indeed, tell us that every natural number has a successor. From that it follows with no need for induction that there's no largest natural number. For suppose N is the largest natural number. Then N+1, its successor, is also a natural number, and is perforce larger than N. So I'm tempted to ask if I'm missing something. The problem I'm having is that I don't know what I'm being asked to contemplate. Perhaps there's some sense of "possible" (though I'm not convinced), on which it's possible that we're so massively deluded that we can't even get simple arguments like the one just given right. But in that case, all argumentative bets are off. Put another way, if we're wrong in thinking there's no largest natural number, then we're so hopelessly confused that...

It may be true, though it may not be, that ethical questions only come up in relations with other people. (It may not be true, because many ethical views hold that we have duties to ourselves.) In any case, let's grant it. And having granted that, it may be true, though it may not be, that pursuing non-social passions lies outside the realm of the ethical. And from all that it may follow, though it may not, that private passions have no ethical value. Even if we grant the first assumption and the accompanying "maybe"s, it still doesn't follow that pursuing private passions is unethical. After all, if we start down that path, we'll end up arguing that sleeping is unethical, and if ever there was a silly ethical claim, that would be it. The most that would follow is that rock collecting and such have no ethical value; not that they're positively unethical. And since there's no reason to think ethical value is the only kind of value, this is hardly a devastating conclusion. But let's...

There's difficulty that stand in the way of answering your question. In the actual world, it's not a law that physically beautiful people aren't virtuous. Some are, and some aren't. So your question is about a world with different laws than this one and you're asking what would be the explanation for a regularity in that world that doesn't hold up in this one. Now such questions aren't necessarily meaningless. One way to understand them: think about a world that's otherwise as much like this one as possible, except that beautiful people aren't virtuous. Do we have any hope of getting a grip on that question? Possibly. Though there certainly are people in the actual world who are both beautiful and virtuous, perhaps there's some statistical correlation between beauty and lack of virtue. (I'm skeptical, but let that pass.) If so, then the way to answer your question would be to investigate whatever it might be in this world that underlies the statistical pattern, and extrapolate from that to a...

First, a bookkeeping detail. Some people may not like to talk about corporations as having rights, duties or whatnot because they want to keep a clean distinction between corporations and persons. For anyone who thinks that way, substitute talk of management, boards of directors, owners or whatnot for "corporations" in what follows. With that out of the way, I'm going to offer a parable and change the question. Suppose someone has read my postings on this site, followed things I've said on social media, and has decided that people with my views shouldn't be teaching in public universities. He decides to befriend me; he earns my trust and becomes a close confidant, all in the hope of finding out things he can use to embarrass me or get in the way of my career. Does this person have a right to act this way? In various senses of "have a right," the answer is yes. Is it right ? I'd guess most of us think the answer is no. What we're considering is deception and betrayal of trust. Sometimes this...

I'm a little worried about the distinction between the decision and the situation. A judge's decision is impartial, roughly, if it amounts to applying the law to the facts as opposed to tinkering with what the law actually calls for or what the facts actually amount to. The decision can be impartial even if the judge privately wishes that the right verdict were otherwise. A simple example: I might judge that one of two students deserves a prize because his record is stronger, even though I wish the other student were the one who should win. My judgment is impartial even though I have private and partial attitudes that, if acted on, might lead to a different result. Is the situation impartial? Perhaps not; I do, after all have a preference about how I wish things would turn out. But that's consistent with the decision being impartial. That's because there are many cases where we're capable of setting our personal views aside. And that's all we can reasonably ask. That said, in some cases it's asking...

A lot to talk about here; I hope others will add their thoughts. A couple of asides. I'm puzzled that you say it's likely rape if a person is "blotto," to use your word. But I'm more puzzled by something else: you say "I don't think impaired judgment is a standard to go on" and yet you don't give any reason why not. Let that pass, however. I don't know if there's a sharp line that marks the difference between too drunk to consent and sober enough. More important, I don't see anything strange in the idea that the standard might not be the same for all cases. Karaoke is pretty low-stakes; getting married, for example, or signing a potentially costly contract (your example) is a different story. Your reply might be that you could accept that; the standard is higher the higher the stakes. But you go on to argue that the stakes are pretty low in the case of bad sexual "decisions." I'm guessing you'd say it's on the order of deciding to sing karaoke in a crowded room. Others disagree. For...

If word origins were a good guide to the nature of a profession, a secretary would be a keeper of secrets and a plumber would be someone who works in lead. That suggests we have some reason to be suspicious at the outset. Even if we grant that "philosopher" comes from the Greek for "lover of wisdom," that doesn't tell us much about what the discipline of philosophy actually is. Let's take the philosophers who think of themselves as systematically, critically examining principles of being, knowledge and/or conduct. Do they see themselves as engaged in the pursuit of wisdom? Some might, but I'd guess most don't. They're trying to sort through interesting and abstract questions of a particular sort, but no wise person would think of abstract theoretical understanding as amounting to wisdom nor, I submit, would any wise person think that wisdom requires abstract, theoretical understanding. I'd side with the wise here. Wisdom isn't easy to characterize in a sound bite, but I think of a wise...

Hi John. Humans create lots of terms to help them talk about the world. But if you think about it, none of our terms have a meaning for creatures who aren't capable of language. The word "electron" doesn't have a meaning for your dog, but that doesn't tell us anything about the reality of electrons. But terms as such aren't the point. Outside of the human world, few if any earthly creatures have a concept of evil. But from that nothing follows about whether some things just are evil. Indeed: I'd be willing to say that wanton cruelty to animals is a clear example of evil, even though the animal doesn't have the conceptual wherewithal to see it that way. Your further idea seems to be a kind of relativism: what gets counted as "evil" is simply a matter of culture and upbringing. That's a familiar view but it's not as obviously correct as it might seem. For one thing, the fact that people in different groups disagree doesn't mean that there's no independent fact of the matter. For example:...

On one way of understanding your question, the answer seems not just to be "No," but "Hell no!" What I mean is this: the discipline of philosophy isn't a mystical practice. Among its most important techniques are careful analysis and well-reasoned argument. The kind of thinking philosophers pursue needs to be embodied in a rich and subtle language. And on one meaning of "conventional" -- i.e., based on shared conventions and meanings -- we would be unable to communicate successfully without the conventions of language. Now for a couple of caveats. Good philosophical ideas might come by any number of routes, including sudden bursts of insight. But the discipline of philosophy calls for shaping and articulating those insights. And if by "complex language," you mean bad, bloated writing, then indeed that can get in the way of understanding. But this goes for any discipline; not just for philosophy. So yes: philosophers sometimes smother their ideas in a blur of verbiage. But good philosophy...