I have a friend who is an Atheist because he claims that the burden of proof (for the existence of God/other practices and belief's) is on religion and he has not been satisfied with any proof set forth. He says, "if you propose the existence of something, you must follow the scientific method in your defense of its existence. Otherwise, I have no reason to listen to you." Should one believe in God or practice religion only if it can be proven by the scientific method? What do you think of his reasoning? Is it rational to believe in a God/Religion without the SM? Thanks and I'm a huge fan of the site!

It would be interesting to draw your friend out a bit more on what he means by the scientific method. Is he including non-behaviorist psychology, in which it is permissible to describe and explain people's subjective experiences, employing introspection? Does he include history? Or is his domain only the natural sciences? Even addressing these questions will, I believe, bring to light that your friend is operating on something that goes beyond the "scientific method"; he is employing a philosophy of science. Science alone (physics....) will not tell you that it is the only reliable basis of knowledge, and if a physicist says this, then she is being more than a physicists; she is a philosopher of physics or science. In any case, questions about ethics, religion, and meaning go beyond science (I suggest) and in fact science as a practice must presuppose some ethics (minimally one must be trustworthy / not falsify data, etc) in order to be practiced at all. Questions about whether or not there is a...

Are historical facts always true, throughout time? Consider the fact that Barack Obama is the forty-fourth president of the United States of America. Was it true two hundred years ago? If someone in the nineteenth century had said "Barack Obama is the forty-fourth president of the United States of America", would it have been true?

This is an excellent question and one that is much debated historically and today. It has implications about freedom and determinism, logic, and the philosophy of God, good and evil. It seems that classical logic requires that propositions are either true or false. "Barack Obama is the forty-fourth president of the USA " appears to be a proposition. And we have found it to be true. But in that case, it seems that Obama could not have failed to have won the election against McCain. It has seemed to some (but certainly not all) philosophers that this would mean Obama's election was fixed in some sense, perhaps determined. Some who worry about this problem are theists who think that if God knows from eternity that in August of 2011 you would ask your question, then there is no possibility that you would not have typed in and submitted your question to Askphilosophers. For many theists, it is vital to affirm that creatures / human beings have free agency, otherwise it would seem that God has...

I have a question regarding moral philosophy as it relates to political viewpoint. I can understand why philosophers in general might have some affinity for an argument that says those of us who are relatively 'well off' have a moral duty to assist those who are temporarily (or permanently) 'in need' of assistance. However, I want to look at it from the perspective of the person who needs the help. Many of us talk about improving ourselves so that we can make a difference to others. Why do we deny the opportunity to make a difference to those who need help? Isn't that demeaning and stultifying to them? Isn't there an implicit message that 'you are not competent to take care of yourself, and so you have to rely on us to do that for you?' My father says that is because career politicians are cynical and are merely using 'we have to help others' as a reason to entrench themselves in power indefinitely at good salaries with nice benefits. He points out that certain programs are based on income...

Interesting! The case of not allowing the patients of the psychiatric hospital to produce goods seems clearly wrong, though perhaps the worry was that in cases of severely damaged persons who might not even know what they were doing this was in some way exploitive. Still, I know a terrific half-way house for emotionally damaged persons (Spring Lake Ranch in Vermont) in which labor is encouraged and patients produce food and other goods (maple syrup has been important), and I believe this activity is actually part of the therapy. Addressing your father's point more directly: one of the reasons why a state government goes beyond mere subsistence in terms of benefits (for the unemployed, say) is because this is a temporary measure and providing more than subsistence contributes to a more stable culture. A neighbor lost his job and was out of work for about 11 months. He received benefits during that time which (along with his savings) meant he did not have to sell his apartment and (now that he is...

It is said that the government officials we elect represent the people. But do they represent those who voted against them as well, in a meaningful sense? (i.e. beyond the pure legal sense)? Or do they only represent the majority that elected them?

That is a brilliant, timely question, especially given the current political state of play in the United States --where I live and work. In practice, it seems that some congressman (perhaps a little more commonly than senators in the USA ) see themselves as largely or even only representing those who voted for them. There is clearly some reason to think that if a candidate ran on the promise that she or he would advance policy X, then it is both likely and appropriate that, once elected, the congressman would advance policy X. However, there remains a very real and evident sense in which that congressman is the representative of all in her or his district. If, for example, a citizen from her or his district dies in the service of their country (as a soldier, say) or dies as a rescue worker (policeman or fireman, say), it is very natural and expected for that congressman to express and embody the grief and gratitude of the people as well as the government for the person's sacrifice, irrespective of...

If you could recommend one novel for high school students about the subject of philosophy what would it be? I'm looking for a work that is readable, entertaining and raises important philosophical issues as they relate to the Theory of Knowledge. Many people online have recommended Life of Pi or Tuesdays with Morrie. Any other suggestions? Much thanks in advance.

Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintainance might fit the bill, though it is a bit more oriented to metaphysics than epistemology / the theory of knowledge. I am not sure it is super entertaining, but C.S. Lewis's book Until We Have Faces is terrific; it is a re-telling of an ancient myth. You might also like novels by Hermann Hesse like Sidartha --it is a re-telling of the tale of Buddha's enlightenment, and is quite moving and rich for stimulating philosophical reflection. There is a new book: Alice in Wonderland and Philosophy, raising all sorts of great puzzles (including epistemological ones) and that could be read alongside of reading Lewis Carroll's classics. You might also check out the Ultimate Harry Potter and Philosophy book, which unearths interesting philosophy in connection with Rowling's work. Although not out yet, there is a forthcoming Sherlock Holmes and Philosophy book which might be great to read along side short stories and novels about Holmes. Here is another radical idea:...

In a recent question / answer, it was asked "how can a person know that an action is immoral, yet do it anyway?" and the response was "a person can 'know' things on different levels and so can engage in self-deception." I have a question about the response, which then leads to a deeper more qeneral question. Suppose a person knows that an action is immoral, yet does it anyway. Might that not indicate that the person [at least in this instance] does not care whether s/he behaves in a moral manner? and where does the concept of 'evil' stand in philosophy, and how might the concept of 'evil' explain this apparent disparity?

I hesitate to reply to this question because I think you are replying to my response to the question about akrasia, a case in which persons with "moral weakness" appear to do what they seem to know is evil, and it would probably be best to hear from a different philosopher. I may not be utterly useless, however, in first bringing to your attention something on the philosophical horizon. I am one of the general co-editors (along with Chad Meister) of a six volume work called The History of Evil for Acumen Press in the UK involving over a 100 philosophers and so I feel that I can report something of interest: in four years, you should have available a massive set of works by philosophers of all different persuasions on evil. This, of course, does not answer your question, but I could not resist spreading the word that questions about the nature and concept and reality of evil is on the minds of many philosophers today (and in some respects these books are being written for you, readers of...

Is it possible to truly, completely understand and know that a certain act is unethical or immoral, and yet still do it (absent any external pressures, or internal pathologies like psychopathy)? Or is it so that full knowledge of immorality exclude one from acting immorally, and that a person who behaves immorally actually doesn't understand the immorality of their actions?

You have identified the classic problem of AKRASIA (Greek for incontinence) and arguments that go back to Socrates' close connection between knowledge and ethics. Socrates and his student Plato, and Plato's student Aristotle, each found it puzzling how someone can do an act that he or she knows to be wrong. I actually share in this intuition because it is very hard to describe how an agent might willingly do what he or she fully and consciously acknowledges to be wrong. Arguably, if someone knows something (say, stealing from the vulnerable) is wrong, they thereby disapprove of it. So, when someone steals from the vulnerable they would have to simultaneously do the stealing (and thus on some level approve of it) while at the same time disapprove of it. The best way to address the issue (I suggest) and avoid thinking that all immoral agents either don't know what they are doing or they are pathological or subject to external forces, is to claim that we can know things on different levels and be...

Actions can obviously be unethical, but what about emotions, or opinions? If you have an opinion or an emotion but do not act on them in an unethical way, can they still be unethical? Is hate, for example, an unethical emotion? Is the opinion that illegal immigrants should be shot at the border an unethical opinion, if one does not in any way act on this opinion or political support such measures?

There seem to be forms of hedonistic utilitarianism (maximize pleasure) that might allow for the permissibility of unethical opinions, provided they are not likely to lead to acts of great disutility and the one who has such opinions enjoys holding them. That, in any case, was once advanced as an objection to J.J.C. Smart's brand of utilitarianism. But I suggest it is difficult to insure that unethical opinions don't impact our action. Someone who thinks illegal immigrants should be shot may not do any shooting, but he or she might injure or harm an immigrant, given the chance. Also, ethics (in the west and east) is often (though not always) cast in terms of love and hate one is to love justice, hate cruelty. Someone with the unethical opinions you describe --wanting to shoot illegal immigrants rather than merely prevent them entering one's country seems to be someone who is loving cruelty. And I think many of us do think that cruel desires and pleasures are ethically repulsive in themselves. ...

I enjoy philosophy very much though doing it has caused me a good deal of suffering. The problem is, is that I can no longer relate to people the way I used to. I avoid discussions with people in my ordinary day-to-day life because it often can't be conducted in the kind of systematic and sensitive way that characterizes most philosophical discourse and that I find myself accustomed to. It has also caused other people to not be able to relate to me as well. I was strange before though now I fear it is unforgivably so. (It also doesn't help that doing philosophy (for me at least) requires long bouts of solitude.) How should I deal with this horribly lonely feeling of detachment?

There may be times when solitary philosophical reflection is healthy and vital. In totalitarian societies it can be dangerous to practice philosophy in public and maybe some thinkers (perhaps most famously Montaigne) appear to do their best thinking alone, but the model of philosophy we have from Socrates and Plato and others is one that encourages dialogue and community (even if Socrates was executed by his beloved or not always so beloved Athens!). I would encourage you to recall that "philosophy ' literally means the love of wisdom and that wisdom involves knowing WHEN and HOW to reflect and with whom... Of course I have no way of knowing this, but you might consider whether your love of philosophy as a practice is leading you to be overly rigorous or contentious or to promote estrangement from friends and others in your day-to-day life. You might follow the example of some great philosophers like Hume and Kant who were (to offer an under statement) highly critical and (in some respects)...
War

I've noticed that Western media – and perhaps society as a whole – pay far greater attention to civilian deaths (and coalition deaths) than to the deaths of enemy military personnel. The best current example of this is Libya – when civilian deaths due to NATO's campaign are suspected, this is heavily reported. But it is hard to get any sense of how many of Gaddafi's soldiers have been killed by NATO. From the point of view of the media (and NATO) these numbers don't seem to matter. The neglect of loss of military life (on both sides) seems to me indefensible. If Gaddafi's soldiers were entering the conflict of their own free will then we may try to argue (incorrectly, in my view) that their deaths have less moral significance than the deaths of civilians. However, it is likely that many of Gaddafi's soldiers are not in the conflict of their own free will, because defection is punishable by death. My question is this: shouldn't philosophers fight as hard for the rights of military personnel (whichever...

You make very good points! HIstorically, philosophers have been concerned about the status, importance, and duties of soldiers. Aristotle has a very high view of the warrior (and this perhaps makes quite good sense when one notes that he was a tutor of Alexander the Great) and Socrates was very concerned about not punishing (executing) members of Athens' navy who neglected to rescue sailers. Actually, Socrates' interest in soldiers is especially to be appreciated when one takes into account that he himself was a veteran (and, more specifically, a veteran of a defeated army). While there is a long tradition of philosophers reflecting on the ethics and practice of war, probably the topic was most heated recently in the 1960s and 70s during the Viet Nam War and during the Cold War. Today war seems a little less the topic of choice today (compared with the 1960s), though it is not neglected and it is not unusual to see work on international justice, nationalism, global justice, and genocide. I feel sure...

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