Can madness be explained in terms of irrationality?

Some definitions can be justified - for example, cats seem to be a discreet category in the real world, and thus a definition of the word cat must adequately describe this category and how its members differ from other things in the world. But when it comes to things like love, justice, government or art, these things are human constructs, and not some discreet entity in the world; so how do we create justified definitions of these terms? How do we decide what true love is, or what true art is, or what true justice or government is? We all have intuitions, but these intuitions change with time and culture, and people tend to bicker about the details. So how are definitions that do not apply to physical phenomena justified?

Scientific principles often deal with universal features of existence but a scientific experiment only deals with particular instances of those laws. So how can scientific laws be deduced purely from experiment? Aren't there always going to be a priori deducible scientific principles?

Suicide is often said to be irrational or immoral. But what good reasons does a person have to go on living if they are unhappy and have no reason to believe that they will ever be happy? Isn't the opposite often the case that the choice to live is in fact more irrational than the choice to die?

Why aren't sceptics sceptical about scepticism?

Why are questions about God considered both religious and philosophical but questions about Jesus or Krishna are considered purely religious?

Can I a sociopath be held morally responsible for his/her crimes? Is there any literature written on the subject of ethics in relation with those who lack empathy for others (or psychopaths who have uncontrollable urges to kill)?

What justifies adherence to the "principle of charity"? Are we trying to be nice? Is fecundity our aim? Is there reason to suppose that the strongest arguments tend to be those most authors actually intend?

I'm interested whether technological advancement can ever be morally good, and under what circumstances. It's a platitude to say that technology has both positive and negative effects (on the one hand, creature comforts, better health, cheaper goods and services; on the other hand, pollution, weapons, cultural homogenization, etc.) But, given the psychological evidence for "hedonic adaptation" (people quickly return to the same baseline level of happiness no matter what happens to them) and economic evidence such as the "Easterlin paradox" (average reported happiness of a country's citizens does not increase with average income), it seems unlikely that the supposedly positive effects of technology are genuinely good--especially those related to material prosperity. The supposedly negative effects may not be so bad either, but it's definitely not obvious that the good outweighs the bad, as people generally assume. Even if technology is neutral overall rather than bad, we probably shouldn't accept any...

This is a question about philosophy of economic theory and the concept of property. Supposedly when I buy a stock what I am doing us buying a share of a corporation. In other words I supposedly "own" a part of the corporation. I have several objections to that claim. I did not buy the stock so that I could have voting rights in that corporation nor did I buy it for the trivial dividends the stock supplies. Those things have no value to me or most investors, and with few exceptions no one buys a stock because they have a desire to have voting rights in that company. Certainly if you are going to own a part of something what you own is going to be what makes that thing valuable and profit is what makes a company valuable and thus to own a company is to own a share in it's profit and stocks don't really give you that. Is there some deeper and non-arbitrary sense of the term "ownership" that sophisticated economic theory relies or is "ownership" a loose term?