My question involves the word "same" apropos to identity vs. comparison, especially to the base case of a particular induction proof. I was trying to find the flaw in the induction for: "P = All horses are the same color. Base Case: P(1) = One horse is the same color as itself. Induction: We have n+1 horses. Take any one away, and the rest will be the same (because of P(n)). Since it didn't matter which we took away, all horses must be the same." I posit that the flaw in this proof isn't simply the lack of "sameness" overlap in the P(2) instance, but in the choice of base case and use of the word "same." I say that there needs to be a comparison (i.e., 2 or more unique objects) in the base case to use the word "same" as it is in "P". If I say Horse A is the same color as Horse A, and you say Horse A is the same color as Horse B, are we really using the word "same" in the same sense? If not, doesn't it follow that it's better not to use them interchangeably in an induction proof such as the one above? If...

Should the impossibility of reaching a definite answer for many of the questions that philosophy asks realistically lead one to stop asking , or even considering, these type of questions? Ultimately, is asking a waste of time and energy?

Is it possible to employ a truth predicate or truth set (set of all true propositions) in ordinary first order logic?

People often die in car accidents due to their own negligence or incompetence. For example, a cyclist may be fatally struck by a car as a result of failing to stop at a red light. In cases like this, I have often seen observers express the following sentiment: "The cyclist should be denounced. He was the one at fault, and because of his failure the driver must live with the burden of having killed someone. If anything, it was the driver who was wronged by the cyclist, even though the former killed the latter." This seems to me puzzling attitude, and I was wondering if the panel had anything to say about it.

It seems to me that a lot of basic philosophy is about definitions of abstract words. So, Plato might have asked what courage or love are, Enlightenment philosophers might have been interested in what freedom is, more modern philosophers might inquire what science is. I guess I'd like to ask a two-part question. The first is what the difference is between the sort of definition a philosopher might give and the sort of definition a lexicographer might give. What are philosophers doing that lexicographers aren't? The second is, if it's fair to say that philosophers are interested in defining abstract words, well, is the task inevitably culturally and temporally specific? I mean, does the Latin word "pulchritudo" really mean the same thing as the English word "beauty"? Does the Greek "aletheia" really mean the same thing as "truth"? And couldn't the meaning of a word like "freedom" change over time?

When discussing new laws that give government agencies greater powers in relation to surveillance, people sometimes claim, "If you haven't done anything wrong, then you shouldn't have anything to hide." This doesn't sit right with me, but I find my disquiet difficult to explain. It's not that I'm worried about bad governments potentially abusing such powers; it's more that I feel some sort of violation has happened. In a very different context, when people reveal their inmost thoughts on social media, or even post nude photographs of themselves, it's sometimes said, "This is who I am. Why should I hide anything or keep anything secret?" Again, I'd suggest that the value of some sort of privacy or private space is being questioned. There's a sort of implicit challenge as to why anyone should be private at all. I was wondering whether philosophers have any good reasons why some sort of secret, private space should be valued in itself. If one is not a criminal, is there any reason not to live one's life...

Mustn't there be a counterexample to any statement that's a generalisation, because if there weren't a counterexample the statement would be a matter of fact and not a generalisation?

What is the I who watches what the mind does?

Hi there, I have a very basic question about Frege's object/concept distinction. Please don't make fun of me as I'm new to early analytic philosophy. This question has been bugging me for a while, so I'd appreciate a thorough answer. In sentences like "the cat is grey" or "the cat is in the park," do the words 'the cat' designate an object? If you were to formalize these sentences, I would think it would go as something like: there is some x such that x is a cat and x is grey/in a park. There wouldn't be a uniqueness clause, I would think. If the words that designate an object have to pick out something unique, does that mean the words 'the cat' cannot designate an object (since they are not specified enough)? If they don't designate an object, then what is their logical status? Thanks.

Should gamespersonship be accepted as part of sport?