Why is bestiality such a horrendous crime in most (perhaps all) countries in the world, whereas the killing of animals for consumption, and in some cases, even as a sport (deer, pigs, sheep, cattle, etc.) is not a crime? Isn't it more cruel to animals to kill them, than to rape (if that is the right word to use here) them?

Is it possible that objective moral truths are out there but have not yet been discovered?

Two questions: (1) When, if ever, could the fact that I commit a wrong against another person make it the case that I have less of a right to feel morally indignant if that same person commits a wrong against me at a later time? (Assume that the wrong that she commits against me is unrelated to the prior wrong I committed against her (e.g. she did not wrong me out of revenge for my wronging her).) (2) More generally, could the fact that I have committed wrongs in the past ever make it the case that I have less of a right to feel morally indignant at the wrongs performed against me by other people generally (not just the victims of my wrongs)?

Hume said that "reason is the slave of passion". I think recent philosophers translate it as "only desires motivate; beliefs don't". But consider the belief that some action gives pleasure. Isn't it an intrinsically motivating belief? Doesn't it motivate one to perform that action?

Do these statements mean exactly the same thing: (a) You should not not buy that book. (b) You should buy that book.

If we assume that there is no afterlife, what reason do we have to comply with a person's wishes as regards treatment of their corpse? In particular, it is striking to me that we should respect a person's wish not to extract their organs after death; what reason could we possibly have to heed the wishes of someone who no longer exists, especially when the donation of their organs could literally save the lives of several people?

Logically what is the difference between conceivable and probable or possible?

How can we discern the difference of how we authentically "feel" as opposed to how we "think" we feel?

If people who think irrationally are happy and don't have the trouble of thinking about abstruse matters, and thinking rationally brings distress to you, is it irrational, in this case, to be rational?

Dialetheist: "Some contradictions are true." My question: "Who claims (if any), that some tautologies are false?"