Is there a particular theory against the philosophical possibility of eternal life? I ask this because it seems to me that if eternal life were possible, men may lose the incentive to philosophize, hence the demise of philosophy.

Is there pleasure in the melancholic? I like reading sad films, I enjoy solitary walks getting sad about sad things, puffing cigarettes that I know will kill me, alone in cafes, half-drunk and looking out at swarms of people buzzing around me, getting sad that I might turn out to be one of them. Is there pleasure in the melancholy? Why?

I live in the Northeast, U.S.A. Should I care more about someone starving in a distant U.S. state than I care about someone starving on another continent? Should the sufferer's proximity to my location or the precise form of suffering being endured affect the answer to the question?

Regardless of all the technological and agricultural improvements made since the end of the 18th century when Malthus wrote his essay on population, there are more people living in extreme poverty today than there were people (in total) living when his essay was published. This is consistent with what Malthus claimed: there is no way for human population centers to live within their means -- any increase in resources will inevitably lead to a rise in population until the available resources are again insufficient to maintain the population. The seemingly noble cause of ending world hunger, if doable even for a relatively short time, would ultimately lead to more poverty and hunger (barring some unknown hole in Malthus' theory). Is it ethical to help someone in need today if you are quite certain this will only cause more people to suffer later?

What flaws should one be wary of in an argument? Please explain in layman terms (I have not studied philosophy). Thanks.

What is a function (of an object or an idea)? I once read that functions are conventional or "artificial". I can understand that an ashtray has its function (being a place to put cigarette ash) only if we assign it to it, but the function of our hearts (to pump blood) seems quite more natural.

I recently ended a romance with a man, when he told me that several months ago he'd secured the services of a psychiatrist-friend of his, whom he'd asked to come to his home for the express purpose of listening-in on a 2-hour phone conversation with me. The listening-in occurred completely without my knowledge. My ex told me that he wanted his psychiatrist-friend's input because he didn't trust me at the time. What are the ethics of this sort of spying, if spying's what it can be called? Does it make any difference that my ex is a retired Professor of Philosophy/Ethics? Thank you for your consideration.

I am having trouble with secondary qualities, which are manufactured in the brain after receipt of digital signals from the sense organs. For example, if I see a green leaf, I know that chlorphyll molecules in the leaf transmit electromagnetic radiation of a frequency such as to produce a sensation of green in my brain. The problem is that all the empirical objects that I perceive are structures of secondary qualities, and these are all outside my head. So where are secondary qualities, inside my head, or outside?

Hi, I can't stop thinking and speculating about Wittgenstein's unbelievable question: "What is left over if I subtract the fact that my arm goes up from the fact that I raise my arm?". I was wondering how you guys speculate and maybe even answer Wittgenstein's question. It appears at least to me that it's a biconditional link which is why it's so interesting. Is there even any difference between the two? What does 'raise' truly mean (which I feel might be the secret to the question)? Is an action [such as raise] only an action if there is some end or fruit to it? Is it possible for a means to have no end?

Might it be true that certain practices of ethical philosophers are in some sense unethical? E.g., might it not be in bad taste (i.e., betray a bad character) to ask “Why shouldn’t I exploit my friends?” or “What’s so bad about pedophilia?”? This might apply more to an Aristotelian ethics, but in any case, it does seem to reflect certain attitudes in everyday modern life. E.g., we seem to place a higher ethical value on a person who is simply naturally good and doesn’t know or care about any reasons for being good (the picture of innocence).