Is a child's life more valuable than that of an adults? Let's say you are about to be in a terrible accident (completely figurative) and you only have two options of ways to go. First, you could run into a construction area where there are five construction workers who are oblivious to the situation. Unfortunately, if you go this way all five will die. OR you could turn the wheel, but there is one single child playing which will be in the way and unfortunately die. Do you value the one child's life more than all five workers? Is it morally right to save the child because of its potential life?

If a sound argument is a valid deductive (or strong inductive) argument which has all true premises, and an argument which begs the question is an argument which although logically valid (or strong) assumes the truth of the conclusion within its premises, is it possible to have a sound argument which begs the question? If so can you provide some concrete examples.

When I help poor people with medicines, food, my own work or with money, I am also contributing to the growth of population in the Earth in the sense that I make it more probable that more people live and have offspring. Population is also a challenge to the life in the Earth and is probably one of the main reasons of poverty, environment destruction and wars. So perhaps making something good at the present could be a bad idea for the future. Is this right?, or is it just a excuse for not helping people in need?

The moral question of whether abortion is wrong is whether or not it is a person. Well, I don't understand why people say that a fetus is not a person. How are a fetus and an infant any different. An infant doesn't understand the future just the way a fetus doesn't. At 14 weeks a fetus begins to move and "explore" the womb and itself. That shows some curiosity and some sort of "thinking". On a genetic level or the form of the fetus also at 14 weeks it is "a person". So then at the very least shouldn't abortion be illegal after that? If we should not kill an infant, which is very illegal, why can we kill a fetus which in many instances is on the same level as the infant? If anything we should not kill the fetus because it is innocent and the infant is not. An infant cries just to be held where it should cry because it needs something. Just as a small example.

Is Zeno's paradox really refuted by the fact of someone's walking? ("Solvitur ambulando" - L. Carroll)

In a hypothetical situation that could possibly have real-life implications, how should one decide between helping a small group of extremely sick individuals with only a small possibility of benefits (e.g., caring for AIDS patients without knowledge of whether or not your treatment will allow them to live) or helping many who have a greater chance of surviving (e.g., spending more time with individuals with proven treatable illnesses)? With either choice, it seems that there is a serious quandary. Should one elect to help the many, neglecting to care for those who are most likely to perish anyways? If so, is this justifiable by helping cure more while leaving those few sick individuals to fend for themselves?

Some actions aren't regarded as morally wrong if their supposed "victim" consented to them. My question concerns whether the important thing is consent itself or, on the contrary, the desire (or the will) for the action. If someone does not consent but we know "beyond any reasonable doubt" that that person wants our action, wouldn't that be the same as if he or she consented? Certainly, if someone wants our action, in most situations he or she will ask for it or accept it, but in some cases this may be impossible (e.g., if that person is unconscious or for some other reason is not able to speak).

If a moral agent (a person) commits an act that he/she believes to be a morally right act, but it turns out the act is morally wrong, is that person blameworthy for committing it?

I am interested in who could be said to be the first atheist philosopher. Did all the ancient Greek philosophical big guns believe in gods, for example? More recently I know Hume published his atheist stuff anonymously for fear of reprisal and recrimination but before him the Elizabethan playwrights Christopher Marlowe and Thomas Kyd were "accused" of atheism so it was nothing new. So how far does it go back, especially as articulated by philosophers? Thanks in advance for your answers.

I think that moralistic judgements and punishments are insidious: they make people do things out of shame, guilt and for the wrong reasons. It seems to me that they can hinder people from empathetically connecting with their own needs and the needs of others, that is moral judgements are metaphorical defensive walls that we erect as part of our outer shell. Allow me to illustrate what I mean. Suppose one child hits another. If the perpetrator's parent interferes and scolds their child using the moralistic language and punishments that is pervasive in society, e.g. 'you are a bad boy', or 'that was a wrong thing to do' and then banning from watching T.V. Now the usual response this will get is either: a) defensiveness, e.g. 'he started it' and/or b) if the perpetrator does refrain from similar behaviour in the future it will probably be because they want to avoid being punished. This could be contrasted to a parent attempting to empathise with why the child hit in the first place and drawing the child's...