Is racial profiling immoral because it is ineffective? For instance, would the racial profiling of blacks become increasingly justifiable if blacks increasingly became criminals?

Can our social perceptions or cognition be subject to ethical judgement? I am thinking of a particular case here; let's assume, for instance, that in a certain country black people are extremely negatively portrayed by the media, in a stereotypical way. If somebody sees a perfectly innocent black person who has never done him harm, but because of widespread stereotyping sees him as dislikeable/dangerous/guilty, can we argue that he is morally responsible/guilty for such perceptions? Is the act of perceiving an innocent person as guilty immoral or, in terms of virtue ethics, unfair? What I'm wondering here especially is: since we can only be morally responsible for what is within our control, do we have enough control over our perceptions to consider them subject of moral judgement?

When I say "strawberries are delicious" am I saying something about strawberries, or am I just saying something about my tastes?

At this point I am so familiar with a) The human propensity for religious belief b) The history and basis of the world's major religious belief systems and c) The apathetic functioning of the universe, that intellectually I am unable to adopt the anthropocentric vision of the universe as presented by the monotheistic traditions. However, watching my muslim friend pray and fast during this month of Ramadan, I am struck by how much peace, happiness and purpose her beliefs bring her and contrast it with the emptiness and meaninglessness which I feel. The fissure between our worldviews is a constant source of alienation between us. 1) Would it be ethical for me to attempt to persuade her of the veracity of atheism (regardless of whether or not she is won over to this worldview), despite my knowledge that this may adversely effect her positivity about life? 2) Failing this, should I try to swallow the blue pill of theism and attempt -emotionally rather than intellectually- to force myself into believing it's...

While I don't have a firm opinion on the issue, I never understand many pro-life positions that state they are against abortion except in the case of rape or incest. Life is life. These babies are as innocent as others. The situation in which they were conceived should have no bearing on whether they should be allowed to be aborted. It is illogical.

Is it wrong to subject older drivers to more frequent (or perhaps more stringent) driving tests? Although I don't have any statistics at hand, it seems that we often read about an older driver plowing into a group of bystanders b/c they fell asleep, forgot to take the pills, etc. So why not subject them to annual driving tests? Or annual vision tests?

Moral arguments have long been made in support of theism, but the Euthyphro dilemma has always seemed to be a strong counter. Is there any way a theist can get passed the dilemma without simply biting the bullet and accepting that moral laws are based on the arbitrary whims of God? Sure they could also accept the first horn, but it would seem to cost them there argument that God has to be the source of objective moral values. Basically, I have heard some say that it is a false dilemma -- that there is some other way of resolving it perhaps. Is there any good philosophical reason for making this sort of claim?

My question relates to Plato’s dialogue of Euthyphro; specifically, I am interested in the two alternatives Socrates presents in what is deemed as “good” or virtuous. Socrates points out that if what is good is good because god decrees it, then god’s choice is arbitrary: there is perhaps no distinction between good and evil for god; god simply wills what he does. On the other hand, if god wills what is good because it is good, then morality is in some sense independent of or separate from god; we humans need only find out what is good, which we can do without god or religion. If, however, considering the first of these two options, god were to decree something good (like not committing murder), is this not sufficient to objectify goodness for us? If god decreeing that murder is “bad” is indeed an arbitrary choice for god, does it follow that it is arbitrary for humans?

Why do philosophers care about answering question on identity or consciousness?

I'd like to challenge the validity of the "Ad Hominem" fallacy - it seems to rest on a certain metaphysics. At the very least, this metaphysics should be argued, not assumed, in my view. The separation of a person from his/her ideas strikes me as certainly not obvious. Isn't this the reason why we urge people not to discuss religion and politics with each other? Because their views, expressive of their very identities, can offend us?