Recent Responses
When philosophers say that something is morally relevant or that a reason is a moral reason, what does "moral" mean? What makes moral reasons different from other reasons? Can something be both selfish and moral?
Roger Crisp
September 7, 2006
(changed September 7, 2006)
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As you'll have noticed from the responses by Peter and Thomas, philosophers can suggest different ways of defining 'morality'. So here's another one, which owes a good deal to the British empiricist tradition, and J.S. Mill in particular. Morality can be seen as a system of social control a... Read more
What exactly is evidence, and why do some maintain that we should not expect to find any evidence of God? What's the problem with rejecting the God idea based on lack of evidence? Sorry I can't be more specific.
Mark Crimmins
September 6, 2006
(changed September 6, 2006)
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Consider these (actual) evidential situations:
I have no specific evidence that there is a Danish plumber who looks enough like me to fool my mother in a photograph.
I have no specific evidence that there is a thirty-word English sentence that, when uttered, would cause an earthquake in... Read more
If time is not an object how can the phrase "I don't have enough time" be considered possessive?
Amy Kind
September 7, 2006
(changed September 7, 2006)
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In addition to the points that Richard makes above, we might consider the fact that the expression "time" functions oddly in lots of constructions. Having too much time on your hands is quite different from having too much lotion on your hands, having time on your side is different from havin... Read more
Can it be true, as I've heard, that most philosophers -- or at least philosophers of the Anglo-American School -- assume that language is required for conscious thought? Or is that just a radical minority?
Richard Heck
September 6, 2006
(changed September 6, 2006)
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I don't know that anyone's taken a vote on this, but the view that language is required for thought certainly was once a very popular one, and it is still held by many. Perhaps the most famous defense of this view is in Donald Davidson's paper "Thought and Talk". An even more radical view... Read more
I have a question/argument that straddles the free will debate, philosophy of mind and evolution. I hope it is not too bad. Suppose all of our actions are determined by the conjunction of natural laws and the history of the world and thereby we are deeply misguided in our view of ourselves as free, autonomous beings. My question is then, from an evolutionary perspective, why would we evolve to have this illusion about ourselves? Wouldn't philosophical zombies with no consciousness be simpler entities and thereby more likely to evolve? If consciousness does not really have any causal efficacy (in the libertarian sense), why do we have it?
Peter Lipton
September 3, 2006
(changed September 3, 2006)
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It is difficult to see why a zombie couldn't do all the behavioural things we do, and indeed just as efficiently and effectively as we do. But that wouldn't show that consciousness could not arise through evolution, since it might be that we do what we do with the help of consciousness.
B... Read more
Dear Philosophers, When philosophers write about scientific method, are they proposing a description of the actual practices of scientists or are they attempting to produce a normative theory of what science should be like? If it's the former, then shouldn't this be answered by historical study and not philosophy? If the latter, why do philosophers talking about scientific method bother to look at the history of science at all if one cannot gurantee an 'ought' from an 'is'? BMW
Peter Lipton
September 3, 2006
(changed September 3, 2006)
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Here is another way in which the normative and factual mix in the philosophy of science. One of the central normative issues is whether we are justified in saying that our best scientific theories are (at least approximately) true. The best known argument for saying that our best theories... Read more
Can you define 'own' without using another word for it, (belong, possess, etc.?) (And I mean 'own' as in possess, not in 'I can do it on my own.') 'Cause I know everyone sort of knows what it means and entails and whatever. But, what does it really mean to 'own' something? And how can you even 'own' something? (I unserstand it's an abstract idea.)
Alan Soble
September 3, 2006
(changed September 3, 2006)
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Let's suppose my general points are even slightly well-taken. Marks asks (1) whether rights are natural or (more positivistically) grounded, say, in social convention, and (2) whether (or when/if) a person has the right(s) about which he speaks. But he doesn't ask what a right is or what the... Read more
Is friendship necessary for romantic love? Is sexual attraction necessary for romantic love?
Alan Soble
September 1, 2006
(changed September 1, 2006)
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I wonder if Nicholas is telling us more about The Perfect/Good Life/Relationship than about ideal romantic love per se. But maybe they overlap.
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Hello, I am just a concerned college student. I have read the <i>Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals</i> by Kant and I am particularly convinced by Kant's Humanity as an End formulation. On this formulation, I refuse to randomly hook-up with girls at fraternity parties because I believe that would amount to using (and letting myself be used) merely as means and not as an end, which would violate the dignity of being a human. For the same reason, I deny to dabble in any sort of sexual contact unless I have a flourishing relationship with the person. My question is: Am I interpreting Kant in the right way? That is to say, does sexual contact of any sort or intensity (i.e. from making out to sexual intercourse) without a relationship amount to using someone as merely means?
Alan Soble
September 1, 2006
(changed September 1, 2006)
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Yes and no. Although, mostly yes. For the most comprehensive treatment of the issue (Kant and/on sex) that I know, see my essay "Sexual Use and What to Do about It: Internalist and Externalist Sexual Ethics," Essays in Philosophy 2:2 (June, 2001) [online journal, at Humboldt State] or, bette... Read more
When philosophers say that something is morally relevant or that a reason is a moral reason, what does "moral" mean? What makes moral reasons different from other reasons? Can something be both selfish and moral?
Roger Crisp
September 7, 2006
(changed September 7, 2006)
Permalink
As you'll have noticed from the responses by Peter and Thomas, philosophers can suggest different ways of defining 'morality'. So here's another one, which owes a good deal to the British empiricist tradition, and J.S. Mill in particular. Morality can be seen as a system of social control a... Read more