In the context of human rights, there is often talk about so-called "group rights." One such group right is the right to protection against genocide - i.e., against mass murder. Why is a "group right" necessary in such cases? If one accepts the validity of human rights at all, then one almost certainly accepts that all individuals, including all members of a minority group, have the right to life. Why provide an additional group right against genocide? Anyone committing genocide is necessarily and directly infringing upon the right to life. What is gained by formulating extra group rights, besides an additional offence to add to the records of human rights offenders? Other "group rights" are also, or could easily be, covered by individual rights (right to speak the language of one's choice, right to teach one's children the language and culture of one's choice, etc.). Groups, unlike the individuals that make up the group, cannot be said to suffer at all unless their constituent individuals suffer,...

I can see at least two responses to your challenge. International interventions and sanctions are confined to the most serious violations of human rights. And the seriousness of crimes is not merely a matter of the harm done to the victims, but also a matter of the motivations of the perpetrators. Just as we regard premeditation as an aggravating condition, we so regard also aggression directed against people on account of their skin color, ethnicity, religion, gender, or sexual orientation. Genocide -- defined as the deliberate and systematic destruction, in whole or in part, of an ethnic, racial, religious, or national group -- is then arguably more serious than random violence of comparable magnitude. And the special expression is then useful to indicate the heightened responsibility of people, within the affected society and abroad, to preempt genocide and to stop it with all deliberate speed if it nonetheless occurs. Or so one might argue. The other response can be introduced through your...

Why do we seem to consider the life of a child more valuable than that of an adult in many situations? When we consider the actual qualities of a child versus that of an adult, we should find that the adult usually wins on any measure of intelligence, capability, moral faculties, and so forth. Is there any ethical reason why we should value the life of a child more than that of an adult? (And just to be extra clear, I can think of a very compelling evolutionary reason why we would value a life of child more, but I'm not looking for an answer from biology or psychology.)

Isn't the reason just this? When an adult dies prematurely -- say at age 40 -- then she is losing many years of valuable life. When a child dies, then she is losing those same valuable years above 40 and in addition all the good life years up to 40. So the basic thought here is simply that the earlier someone dies, the greater the loss. While the common view seems to me to be based on this thought, it is not unassailable. You might say that the loss of years above 40 isn't a serious loss for someone dying as a small child, who has no conception of what such years would be like and moreover is very different from the mature adult she would have become 40 years hence. Thinking this through further, you might reach the view that the worst age at which a human being could die is in her or his mid-20s. At that age, one has a conception of the life one wants to lead and also typically is a productive member of one's family and society. Such a death is a great loss to the person and to many others...

This is the first sentence of Stanford Encyclopedia's article on rights: "Rights are entitlements (not) to perform certain actions, or (not) to be in certain states...." I checked my English dictionary, and it defines "right", in the relevant sense, as "entitlement", and "entitlement" as "right". In my own language (not English), there aren't even two different words for "right" and "entitlement", they must both be translated to the same word. I think we can conclude that "right" and "entitlement" are synonymous, as much as any two words can be. So do you think that there is any useful reading of that article's first three words? Thank you!

I agree that the word "entitlement" isn't helpful as an explication of "right" -- though the sentence still has some use by specifying the possible objects of rights (i.e. those things that a right might be a right to). As an editor of the SEP (though not of this particular entry) and as a friend of the author, I'll relay your concern and see whether we can get this changed.

The author of the "Rights" article has now sent me a long response. If you want to see it and/or want me to put you two in touch, please send your e-address to thomas.pogge@yale.edu

I watched an excellent short film the other day which presented the audience with what I thought was an interesting moral problem. I won't give away the title in fear of anyone googling it and finding a 'spoiler', but there is a scene in which a paramedic attends to the body of a man who has just been killed. The paramedic had earlier in the evening bought a lottery ticket and, after seeing the draw, found out that she did not win the prize money. In the dead man's hand she finds a winning lottery ticket. We know from earlier in the film that the dead man had no relatives or friends. Since he is dead, and so the money is no good to him and there is no one inherit it, and: a) since the paramedic herself had as good a chance of winning the lottery as the dead man did (they each bought one ticket); b) since he won the lottery not through any more effort than she put into the contest nor through any talent or qualities of his own but simply through chance - is it morally wrong for her to take his ticket and...

Perhaps there is really nothing wrong with a theft that does no harm -- stealing an apple from a privately own tree that is never picked, for example. But your case is not like this. If the dead man has no heirs, as you say, then his winnings will typically fall to the state. So the question here really is whether is is permissible to steal in a way that diminishes state revenues. And this is rather close to the question whether it is permissible to steal from the state or to cheat on one's taxes. To this latter question, asked in regard to a reasonably just state, you would probably answer "no". If so, I don't see why the answer should be different for the case you describe. Now in some jurisdictions unclaimed winnings would go to the lottery operator. This would increase its profits and thereby augment the taxes it pays. But the thief would also pay taxes on her winnings, so the state might be equally well off either way (or better off, even, if the thief pays taxes at a higher rate). Still, the...

Why is a person responsible for crimes they have committed in the past? How can we be certain that a person who commits an act at one moment in time has the same moral status as they had at another moment of time. So a person who murders a person at one moment may actually be a person who has a benevolent and charitable disposition the next moment. Wouldn't it be wrong to harm a benevolent and charitable person just because of what they did in the past when they held values that are different than what they currently hold?

Yes, I think it is wrong to harm a benevolent and charitable person just because of what they did in the past when they held values that are different than what they currently hold. But we cannot run a legal system so as to avoid this wrong. Just imagine that juries, to convict, would have to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused has not had a change of values since he committed the crime in question. It would not be hard for many accused (and their lawyers and jury experts) to create such doubt. Many criminals would be acquitted and many of these would then commit further crimes. Others would be emboldened to commit crimes by the confident expectation that, if caught, they would find a way to plead a subsequent change of heart. What I'm suggesting then is that our current practice of holding people responsible for their past conduct is the lesser evil. And we mitigate this evil in various ways: through statutes of limitation, through pardons, and through the occasional jury nullification ...

I'm pretty good at reading philosophy and making rational arguments. I am very bad at interacting with people, multitasking, remembering to turn off the stove, etc. So I spend most of my time reading about moral and political theory and getting worked up about the injustices I see in the world, but fear what might happen if I lifted a finger to help change the world for the better. I've taken a job helping adults with mental retardation live normal lives. I try to disseminate to my friends important information I read about in the news. I work very hard to be kind and empathetic. Yet I still feel that maybe my capacity for understanding and using reason obliges me to be more involved in political action. Is there a way for clumsy, awkward, introverted college graduates to fulfill their moral obligations without depending on skills they will probably never possess? Am I morally obligated to keep developing these skills, even if they never become strong enough to be useful? Is this moral obligation...

I agree that you do focus your efforts on tasks you are comparatively good at. One possibility here is to write a popular book or blog, building on the kind of dissemination work you're already doing for your friends. If this is difficult for some reason, then you might just financially support others who do effective work. In this context, you might check out www.givingwhatwecan.org.

Your company does work for a government-run enterprise. While waiting to be paid, the country suffers a massive earthquake. The enterprise is damaged but continues to run. Should the debt be paid or should the company write it off without any expectation of payment? The company is not a charitable organization.

Let me assume that the terms on which the company performed the work were fair and that the company actually delivered the work fully as agreed. In this case the company is really in the same position as other companies which are owed nothing by the country in question and perhaps never did business there. It would be a good thing for any well-off company or individual to make some contribution to the reconstruction of the earthquake-ravaged country. But the company that is owed the debt has no stronger moral reason to contribute. (It may have a stronger prudential reason, if the money is costly to reclaim or efforts to reclaim it would generate negative publicity. But this is a different matter.)

Hi, I'm wondering what is the purpose of moral philosophy assuming that our moral intuitions are mere products of evolution. Evolutionary psychology seems to explain our moral roots (genes that coded for cooperation helped the organisms in which they resided reproduce and replicate those genes). Given this, our instincts that say we should behave in certain ways are merely adaptations that increased survival. It seems then that there is no objective answer to "What should I do?" and the entire field of normative ethics is premised on the delusion that there is. Wouldn't it be more honest for professors of moral philosophy to tell their students that they're merely looking for a consistent framework for decision-making that best coheres with our moral intuitions? And that outside of these intuitions (which arose because they increased survival), there is no warrant for believing in some absolute, metaphysical grounding of ethics--in other words an objective answer to the question "what SHOULD I do?" Thanks!

As happens often, also with professional philosophers, your word "then" marks the weakest spot in your argument. "Our instincts that say we should behave in certain ways are merely adaptations that increased survival. It seems then that there is no objective answer to 'What should I do?'." How does the second sentence derive support from the first? Our instincts may predispose us to get frightened by certain sights and sounds, and we may through evolutionary factors have become disposed to overestimate vertical distances and to underestimate horizontal distances over water. Does it follow that there is no objective answer to the question of whether those sights and sounds really are associated with danger -- no objective answer as to what these distances really are? I think your worry comes about as follows. You believe that what really goes on in moral philosophy is that people are "looking for a consistent framework for decision-making that best coheres with our moral intuitions (which arose...

What the hell are morals anyway? Why *can't* I do whatever I want, to whomever I want? So what if I say "Screw the social contract!" I never signed anything. What's so great about morality anyway?

Some of the things you want to do may not be within your power; then you can't do them. Regarding the rest, you can do whatever you want to whomever you want. If you say "screw the social contract" and do nasty things to other people, it's quite likely that the social contract will screw you back. You'll end up in jail, and there very few attractive things will be left within your power to do. What's great about morality is that it affords a way to get along without the violence that results when some are set to do whatever they want to whomever they want and others are trying to stop and disable them. With morality widely accepted, we agree to restrain ourselves and so get less of what we want, but we also get less of what we definitely don't want: namely physical violence, jail time, and other social penalties inflicted on us. For most people, this is a good deal, and manifestly so. But perhaps not for you. Perhaps you want to do some nasty things so badly that you don't much mind going to...

Is it ever rational to be immoral?

Short as it is, this question is tricky because of two ambiguities. 1. "rational" could be understood in the sense of choosing what are foreseeably the most effective means to given ends, or it could be understood in a more ambitious sense that would allow the commitment to certain combinations of ends, or even single ends, to be irrational as well. 2. for each of the disambiguations for 1, the word "rational" could be understood to mean "rationally permitted" or "rationally required". I will read your "to be immoral" as shorthand for "to act in a way that is morally wrong." Suppose your overriding end in life is to make your sister happy. Her greatest wish is for a golden necklace that you cannot afford to buy. But you have a way of stealing it. This theft would be immoral. But it it rationally permitted and even required on the thin notion of rationality: stealing is the foreseeably most effective means for you to attain your end. This answer remains adequate even if we allow that...

Pages