What is the current philosophical viewpoint (from professional academics) regarding the concept of "the embodied mind"? I have just finished rereading "Philosophy in the Flesh" (Lakoff, Johnson); I would like to know the current philosophical standpoint regarding the proposition of the embodied mind.
Thanks in advance for all replies!
If my friend is on a street corner with a life-like model of a dog and I drive past in my car so fast that I can't tell the difference between the fake dog and a real dog is there any point in me saying I saw a real or fake dog since, to me, the two are indistinguishable? The classes real dog and fake dog seem to combine to form the class dog-like object.
If this same analysis were applied to Searle's Chinese room then it seems pointless to say the room does or doesn't understand. If a person who is unaware of the room's setup (sort of like me in my car) goes up to the room and asks it questions then it provides answers that are consistent with the room understanding Chinese so from that persons point of view the room is just as understanding as any chinese person on the street. If we miniaturised the room and put it in someone's head and put a real Chinese speaker behind the Chinese room slot then the questioner will not be able to tell that any change has occurred.
I was just playing chess against my computer, and suddenly I realized that computer chess has no rules.
In computer chess there are things that happen and things that don't happen; there are "laws of nature" (although "nature" is here a computer running a certain software), but there are no rules in the sense of "things regarded as customary or normal", as my dictionary says, or in the sense of "a convention set forth or accepted by a group of people". This way, computer chess is very different from over the board chess.
Do you agree?
I'm engaged in a debate with a mate of mine over John Searle's Chinese Room thought experiment. I believe that the room doesn't understand Chinese because it lacks reasoning and the ability to weigh up all possible options and recognize the most appropriate answer. All the answers are already there and the answer given is not selected by the room itself but by the person and is dependent solely on whatever it is that they say.
His response to this (having weighed up all the possible options and recognized the most appropriate answer) was that we simply have different worldviews... that I'm an absolutist and he's an empiricist.
What exactly does he mean by this? What are your individual views on the subject?
Many thanks and great site. Keep up the good work =)
Hi there. I have a question about Searle's Chinese room argument. In it he seems to argue that purely syntactic programs are not sufficient for semantic content. From a biological perspective, I was wondering what if the program (genetic material) used the symbols themselves (proteins) to build a machine (a brain) that was capable of understanding meaning? What effect, if any, would this have on Searle's argument? I don't have any training in philosophy, so if you could pitch your answer with that in mind that would be great.