Do the laws of science disprove the existence of ghosts? The universe adheres to strict physical laws and constants; as Stephen Hawking notes; these laws MUST be adhered to 100% of the time, or they wouldn't be laws. In science, a theory can be supported by thousands of separate pieces of separate empirical evidence but it only takes ONE piece of empirical evidence which contradicts a theory for that theory to be disproven; in which case the theory must be discarded or modified. The existence of ghosts is evidence which would contradict thousands of theories in science; in physics, biology and chemistry (Newton's laws of motion, Einstein's equivalence of mass and energy, etc. etc.) The immutability of the laws of science are verified by the products of man's understanding and manipulation of these laws; technology, transportation, medicine, etc. etc. These things form the bedrock of modern civilization. I know that in science it is said that nothing can be "disproven"; for example, we can't completely...

Science is fallible. There is a long tradition of claiming phenomena to be "physically impossible" or "against the laws of nature" and then finding out that it is the laws that are the problem, or some underlying assumptions. E.g. in the 16th century, it was against the laws of nature to claim that Earth moves around the sun (it turned out that Aristotelian physics was wrong) and e.g. in the early 20th century continental drift was thought to be physically impossible (it turned out that continents do not move over the sea floors, but stick to them, making motion possible along with the formation of new ocean floor). So I'm not a fan of saying that the laws of science disprove the existence of anything that we have independent evidence for. I think it is more scientific, in fact, to ask "what evidence do we have for the existence of ghosts"? and take it from there.

What's the status of the so-called "scientific method" among philosophers of science these days? I realize that there are and have been many different methods employed in what we call or want to call scientific investigation, so I appreciate how misleading the singular term might be. But, with that caveat in mind, in school and elsewhere you hear all about this great 'method' we've established. And certainly scientists take themselves to know and share some activity. To put a finer point on this question, let me sketch what I get the impression this 'method' looks like: 1) It's empirical, that is, it involves observation and experimentation. 2) The scientist makes some initial observations, forms a hypothesis, deduces some predictions from it, then designs and performs a "controlled experiment" to "test" them. This experiment is done by attempting to identify variables, some independent, one dependent to ensure (obviously with fallibility) that the appropriate relationship/conditions are being...

"The scientific method" is often poorly or incompletely or misleadingly described in science classes (especially high school science classes). So I'll say a little about that first, and then something about recent philosophical discussions of scientific method. As you (and many others) describe the method, it begins with "the scientists makes some initial observations and forms an hypothesis." This is typically understood as the inductive part of scientific method. And, while it is true that scientists sometimes start with inductive generalizations, most of the time they start with a deeper hypothesis, one that offers a causal explanation for what is observed. If all we ever did was make inductive generalizations, we'd never get beyond the observable--never get to atoms and magnetic forces and osmotic pressures and all those other invisible entities or abstract concepts that form part of scientific theories. So really, the scientist starts with a hypothesis that is arrived at by abduction (...

What underpins acceptance of scientific theories by non-scientists? In a recent argument about climate change, I maintained that, as a non-specialist, I’m not in a position to judge the validity of theories or critiques of theories of anthropogenic climate change but I instead have to make a judgement about the reasonableness of believing in statements that a certain body of people make about the world. My point was that in the absence of any dramatic evidence to the contrary it’s much more reasonable to believe that the IPCC (and almost everyone else) is right than it is to believe either that there’s a huge con or a huge mistake. I think this is right but am I missing something more?

You ask an important question about how non-experts should make reasonable judgments when there is expert disagreement. It is not enough to say that the reasonable choice lies with the majority opinion; the majority has been both unreasonable and/or wrong often enough. I think it is important to look at the case in some detail (although obviously not in as much detail as experts are able to do) and see what kind of evidence the minority is putting forth. That is, are they just nitpicking at the dominant theory, when all theories have areas of weakness, or are they themselves engaged in active empirical research? Scientific disagreement can be productive when both sides are engaged in experiment and observation, but less so when one side is working from an armchair.

Is it plausible the theory of "occam's razor". Could a complex answer be the right one?

You ask an important question. Some philosophers (realists) argue that simpler theories are better confirmed by the data and therefore more likely to be true. Other philosophers (anti-realists) argue that simpler theories are psychologically easier to work with and therefore more convenient for us, but not likelier to be true. It is difficult to state exactly what counts as a "simple" scientific theory. Does it mean fewer causes and/or entities? Or something about the mathematical expression of theory? In any case, simpler theories are only preferred when all else is equal, and that is rarely the case. (We would love a simple theory of the causation of schizophrenia, but simple theories of the etiology of the disease have already been discredited.) Some feminist epistemologists have argued that simple scientific theories are not inherently preferable to more complex ones. Helen Longino, notably, argues that simple scientific theories often reflect/express/derive from a hierachical...

I am often confused by the rhetorics of physicists that their theory "came from mathematics". I remember the physicist, Brian greence tell the story of paul dirac discovery of anti-matter by pure a priori manipulation of mathematics. I see this to be very confusing, because i often imagine mathematics as being a priori, and necessary without any connection to the real world. That is, i can always imagine possible worlds( or universes) governed by different mathematical expressions, or descriptions. Does it follow that every mathematical expression/description describes our universe? Obviously not. With paper, and pencil, we could probable describe any universe with any arbitrary number of dimension of space, but does it follow that our universe has arbitrary number of spatial dimension? Obviously not. The use of mathematics seems to be good in formulating regularities of nature( laws of nature), and to extract the implication of those laws. It makes me wonder why physicists would say their theory comes...

You are reasoning correctly--mathematics deals with possibilities and physics with actualities (even though in quantum mechanics these are probabilistic). Theory in physics is often expressed mathematically, but that does not make it mathematical knowledge. Some theoretical advances in physics can come from working in an armchair and extending the mathematical implications of (already accepted and contingently true) theory. The actual status of mathematics (a priori or not) is debatable (Quine etc claiming that mathematics is an empirical theory like any other). But you are correct that physics is not mathematics, and the sort of evidence that confirms physical theory is not (or perhaps, not entirely) the evidence (or other considerations) needed to confirm mathematics.

I'm a scientist. The results of my research may generate technologies that could potentially be used in both and offensive and defensive military applications. These same technologies could potentially help people as well. Here are two examples: (1) My work could potentially create odor-sensing devices to target "enemies" and blow them up, but the same work could aid land-mine detection and removal. (2) My work could help build warrior robots, but it could also help build better prosthetics for amputees. For any given project, I have to decide which agency(ies) my lab will take money from. I do not want to decide based on the name of the agency alone: DARPA has funded projects that helped amputees and killed no one, while I would bet (but do not know for sure) that some work sponsored by the NSF has ultimately been used in military operations. So I'd like to base my decision on something more than the agency acronym. How can I start to get my head around this? What sorts of questions should I...

These are terrific questions and I hope someone else on the panel can also respond to them. The philosophy of science literature, and even the literature on values in science (Hugh Lacey, Helen Longino, Lynn Hankinson Nelson and others) is rather general and not sufficiently applied to give quick answers. I think you are going to have to do a good deal of the thinking yourself. But here are some questions and considerations. The agency acronym is, indeed, not an infallible guide to the nature of the research. However, it is a rough guide and perhaps more important, it is *perceived* as affecting the content of the research done. The funding agency will influence who chooses to work with you (science is after all not an individual enterprise) and how people evaluate your research. On the other hand, DARPA money is easier to come by than NSF money (or so I hear) and you might prefer to do research with DARPA money than not do it at all (that is a question to ask yourself). The issue here is whether...

What kind of scientific evidence, if any, could prove that free-will does not exist?

Let me turn the tables on you and ask, "What is free will?" When people use this concept, they may have any of several different ideas in mind. Some people think of free will as freedom from external factors such as bribery or threats, some think of it as freedom from acting in accordance with one's own baser urges, some think of it as lack of determination (by the laws of nature/brain processes etc.) I think different sciences are relevant to each of these questions and that we can have evidence supporting or disconfirming claims about free will. Another way for you to think about your question: if there is no free will, what would you have lost?

I have a question about “ghosts” that I am wondering whether a philosopher or two could help me explain. I know it sounds ridiculous even to bring up the topic, which is why I do so only under the cover of anonymity. Let me preface this by saying, as a law student in New Haven with heavily atheist leanings, I don’t think I’m a particularly stupid or superstitious person. But a few years ago I had an experience it is difficult to reconcile with my worldview. On a lark, a friend and I spent the night in a hotel room in Savannah that was reputed to be “haunted.” Naturally, we were expecting nothing to happen there. But curiously, every time we left the room, something inside it moved. (We would go in the hallway, wait a minute or two, and then re-enter.) A banana from the fruit bowl and a tub of shampoo from the bathroom were placed on the bed; my friend’s underwear moved from one corner of the room to a trash can in the other; my friend’s student ID was removed from his wallet and placed on the floor; the...

Clearly this experience at the Savannah inn is haunting you, if you are perplexed about it several years later! I'm answering as an empiricist (rather than as a dogmatic materialist/physicalist). I'm willing to believe in ghosts if that's where the evidence points. If you really expected nothing to happen--why did you leave for a couple of minutes, wait in the hallway (watching the door?) and then go back in? Who is this friend anyway and could he have tricked you? If the hotel advertises this room as haunted perhaps they have a hidden entry to the room and yes, they regularly break the law (but who can catch them at it?) If all you say is true--that is, no-one entered the room when you and your friend were absent, and your video camera would have captured e.g. an animal in the room or a hidden entryway then maybe, yes, you experienced something currently unexplained by science (no reason to give up your atheism, though!). In my experience, however, magic (good old fashioned trickery) can be more...

Is it the responsibility of the layperson to align his/her opinion with a scientific consensus (if there is one)? For example, if there is a scientific consensus contending that global warming exists, is it the responsibility of the layperson to assent to that contention? Is it irrational or unjustified for the layperson to dissent in such a situation?

This is an interesting question, combining issues in the epistemology of testimony and expertise with questions about philosophy of science. The reasons to agree with the consensus may include: deference to experts, accounts of the rationality of scientific consensus. The reasons to disagree with the consensus may include: knowledge of non-rational social epistemic processes (such as groupthink) and knowledge of the impact of ideology/politics on science. For many topics, it is unreasonable for the layperson to suppose that they can do better than scientists, although they might express uncertainty about the consensus (scientific consensus has often been wrong). For laypeople, the question of whether or not to dissent from scientists usually comes up for politically charged topics and especially those with practical applications (e.g. research on gender differences, research in evolutionary biology, research on global warming). For those topics, it is not irrational or unjustified for the layperson...

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