Often times, a common argument offered to stop people from complaining about their problems is to tell them to "be thankful for what they have and not complain too much". This can be quite irritating and annoying to a person that hasn't really found life to be all that enjoyable. Firstly, no one has asked for them to be brought into the world. As much as it seems hard to function in a world without a clear purpose or a sense of meaning, the thought of having to be 'thankful' for being alive, is hard to arise, perhaps even offensive when times are tough? How does one deal with this dilemma? Does the evaluation of life always have to be relative to other less fortunate beings in the world in order to feel better about one's situation?

There is a discussion of this issue in rabbinic Judaism, whether it is better to have been born, suffer and then die, or to never have been born at all. The answer they come to is that the latter is preferable, but since we are alive, we might as well behave well. From a secular point of view the question as to whether one ought to stay alive if one's sufferings are immense is a very real one. I suppose comparing oneself with others is one way of putting one's experience in proportion and accepting that perhaps life is not as bad as it might otherwise seem. There is an entertaining Monty Python sketch making fun of precisely what you are getting at, where different people talk about how tough their childhoods were, with the worst off trumping everyone else. The penultimate person talks about living in a box and the last man says with apparent envy "You had a box!" . But there is a serious point here, that we often feel miserable in situations which do not really call for that reaction, and we can...

The intolerable earthquake in Haiti that took thousands of lives brings up an important question: What obligations do we owe to other people? Virtually all of us believe that, when no comparable sacrifice is required, we have a moral duty to help those we encounter in dire need. If one were to let a child drown he would be unanimously regarded as a morally reprehensible individual, yet those who do precisely the same thing when they ignore the plights of those in distant countries are not viewed negatively by many. How can we account for this inconsistency? What are we morally obligated to do to help those in Haiti?

I wonder why you think that those outside Haiti who ignore the disaster there are letting harm happen which they could otherwise prevent. They might think that aid can do no good, they might think that they are better to give money to causes they genuinely understand and can supervise more directly, or they might not have the resources free that allow them to give. It is not like letting a child drown when one could prevent that from happening, presumably because it is happening near to you and you can swim. With Haiti you have to believe a lot of things about how charity operates and whether it works properly before you can justify giving money. Also, you might decide that if you have limited funds then it is better to give to something much more unfashionable than the cause which is the flavor of the day. You do not in that situation ignore the vast human suffering, you just take the position that you can only do so much, and this is not something which you wish to support, given your limited means.

Hello Philosophers, Does an act of betrayal have to produce harm to the person or group of people being betrayed? For instance a man Bob promises to his wife Mary that he will quit smoking. Mary believes that Bob has not smoked for over a year when in fact he has been smoking the whole time without her knowing. Would this be considered betrayal even though his smoking is causing no harm to Mary as she is unaware? would it be considered betrayal only when she finds out?

It clearly would be betrayal since Bob is regularly doing something he tells his wife he is not doing, and deception is part of betrayal. She does not know but to argue that as a result she is not harmed is like arguing that if I steal from someone and they never know, then I am not harming that person. Clearly I am and theft is not only theft when the owner of the stolen property misses it. Perhaps even more significant here though is not the harm to Mary but the harm to Bob. He apparently spends a year lying to someone, and carrying out the activity which he denied practising on perhaps a daily basis, and one wonders what effects this has on his character. Would this make him likelier in the future to be tempted to deceive others? Might this encourage in him a feeling of contempt for the truth and communicating the truth to others, even those close to him? These factors suggest that there is also an issue in whether Bob is in danger of betraying himself as well as Mary.

Is it wrong to desire power?

Not necessarily, I suppose one might want it to do good things and so on. On the other hand, if the desire is for power just for the sake of being in control, or dominating others, then this would be problematic. Why would one want to do this, unless one had a suspect moral nature? We are familiar with people who enjoy directing others and controlling situations, but since the basis on which they act presumably is that they know better than others what ought to be done, and how and when it ought to be done, they place themselves in a position of implicit superiority and this is morally questionable. Even though we may need some people to take on these authority roles, they should always be aware of the damaging effects such roles can have on them as well as on others and seek to prevent the onset of moral corruption as a result.

Is death without afterlife really all that bad? I mean, it could be worse, right? Of the plethora of possibilities the human mind can imagine, quiet, peaceful oblivion seems to me like not such a terrible thing.

It may be to you but to a lot of people they would prefer a life of discomfort to no life at all. It is difficult to know how to judge the rationality of such attitudes, and is perhaps more an issue for the psychologist than the philosopher.

Why do so many equate 'natural' with 'good?' It seems to me as though there are loads of cases stating the very opposite. So is what is natural always what is good?

You are right and they are wrong. It is not. On the other hand, we are part of the natural world so it is no bad thing for us to acknowledge this.

I've been wondering this for quite some time now and I'm not sure how to word it in an intelligent way a philosopher may like to be asked. But I have been practicing photography for quite some time now and am currently studing it. My main interest is social documentary...i think it's important to document what it is today. My question is (and I'll try my best). Is it right for someone to document something and not interfere. Not help. Just watch? I'm thinking of this as there is a famous photographer who shot a world famous photo of a child and a vulture in Africa, Kevin Carter was the photographer if you would like to look it up, he never helped the child, was that right, I don't think he was allowed to interfere with things like that. But let's say even the likes of a war, documenting it, is it right to sit on the fence and observe someone being shot without doing anything about it? I suppose the question is, is it ok just to observe and not interfere when it is probably morally right to do so. I...

You put the point very clearly, and yet it is not clear to me why a photographer would feel that he or she could not intervene in a situation where such intervention would be helpful. Of course, by recording the event one is perhaps setting up a wider response to it which is going to put events like that within a context that may discourage them in the future. The viewing public may be horrified and so prevent their recurrence. On the other hand, if one can help an innocent person then surely one ought to do so, and taking a photograph as opposed to helping would be difficult to justify, since even if one's profession was photography, the individual is not thereby excused from normal human morality. If on the other hand there is nothing one can do, or at least nothing one could do without undergoing huge risks, then recording the event is the next best thing, if one has that sort of skill.

Do we have a right to procreate? Life can be a pretty difficult journey. What right do we have to decide that another person should go through it? Even if in good faith we wish our children health and happiness, we know that some suffering is inevitably part of life. If for example I know that my child will inherit with 99% probability a very painful disease: can I be held responsible for his/her suffering? What if the probability is 50%? what about 1%? What about the 100% certainty of death: aren't I responsible for the effects that I know will surely result from my actions? Life can also be quite unpredictable, who knows what will be of our world in 80 years. Isn't having a kid placing a bet (hopefully benevolent) on someone's else life? Does it even make sense to say that I do something for the well being of someone who doesn't exist yet? Isn't having a kid a very selfish thing, something we do out of our present desires (or fears) which will cause the suffering of another human being? I hope...

There is a Jewish joke that suggests that it would be better never to have been born rather than to live and then die, but who is so lucky? Many issues are raised here, but for most people it might be hoped that there are more pleasant than unpleasant aspects of life, and so playing a role in bringing them to that life is not such a grim choice as is suggested here. The fact that some suffering will occur does not mean that there will be so much that life itself becomes unbearable. Unless one has any special reason to think that one's child will be subject to special problems of this kind, procreation is not necessarily going to be as grim as you suggest. In fact, if you are going to concentrate on suffering you might want to look not so much at the child as at the parents!

Do the dead have rights? Example: suppose my father dies and leaves me his house in his will, on the condition that I never sell the house to anyone outside the family. If I were to take the house, and later sell it to someone outside that family, it is not clear that my father is harmed (he is dead!). Yet it seems wrong. Why?

Of course, you might think that although his body is dead, his soul lives on somewhere and would be horrified at what you did and so would be harmed. Otherwise, I suppose it would be relevant to ask whether you had agreed to his demand, since if you did and then reneged on it, you would be at fault. Let us suppose this is not the case. It does seem to me to be possible to harm a dead person, not directly perhaps, but in the sense that you dishonour their memory by going against their wishes. Even on utilitarian grounds this might be problematic, since it might create generally a disinclination for people to trust their descendants to uphold their wishes, and so might discourage passing property from one generation to another. The father could use the value of the house while he was alive and then it passes to the institution that financed him on his death. Not that there is anything wrong with this, but he would not in his last years have the feeling that his property would remain in the family,...

Members of the Abrahamic faiths believe that we are all children of God and all equal in the eye of God. Therefore our lives are sacred and have an inherent equality of value that is beyond price. However, if God does not exist then a human life cannot be sacred. In this context can its value be beyond price? And if not, upon what basis should its value be calculated? It appears to me that if a human life has no inherent value then its only value is its social value, which for most purposes is its market value. But in that case there are categories of person whose lives cost more to society at large than they personally contribute, so that their social value is negative. And so logically it would appear on grounds of economy and social utility, and upon Darwinian principles of survival of the fittest, that such lives should be eliminated. Upon what rational grounds could one dispute this?

Surely one does not have to be religious to think that life has inherent value, one would just identify that value without reference to religion. Life would not perhaps be sacred, but still could be seen as having value, and that value need not be linked to its social role or economic standing. You don't have to be religious to respect people, quite the contrary. It might even be said that without religion respect is more unconditional, since there would then be no religious limitations on its breadth!

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