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Art

I'm wondering about the interaction of a viewer with a piece of art. Beyond a basic psychological response of "I like it" or even a highly-reasoned critique, is there anything about art which spurs the viewer to do anything, to take any action? I suppose I'm asking about our response to art. Can you qualify a 'good' piece of art as one which produces a certain response in a person?

Art certainly can get us to do things or think in a certain way, and it is that which made Tolstoy attack it, since it controls our emotions, he argued, and took them down very dangerous avenues. It is going too far though to define good art as that which produces the right sort of response, since a lot of art we admire as art might evince in us a rather questionable response.That is, we may think highly of the art but not of the emotions it produces, or what it inspires us to do. You have touched on an interesting aspect of art, though, which is that it produces different effects on different people, and so we are bound to wonder whether it is irretrievably subjective in nature. I am afraid that trying to define the value of art in terms of its effects will be just as variable and subjective as any other attempt at getting that relationship pinned down.
Religion

Does it makes sense to pray if God's existence hasn't been rationally proven independently of faith? Does the meaning of the practice of praying depend on philosophical proofs of God's existence?

Certainly not, if anything like prayer depended on a philosophical proof it is in real trouble! There are many reasons to pray which have nothing to do with belief in God. You may enjoy the activity. You may do it because you want to participate in a communal activity with others. You may do it because it is expected of you and you do not want to upset others. You may do it because others do not want you to and you want to annoy them. Then you may pray because you wonder whether that would be a route to acquiring faith in God. Many devout people pray regularly and say that they are still waiting for something to happen that would represent for them belief in God. Perhaps God values their prayers more than the prayers of those who have no doubts, since after all it is easier for the latter to pray and carry out their general religious obligations.
Animals
Ethics

Is it ok to kill ants for fun.

I think there is a difference between saying that all that matters is pleasure and pain, and thinking that pleasure and pain is a good place to start when looking at such issues. If it is an open question whether ants feel pain, then we should not kill them, if that might hurt them, it seems to me. As has been suggested, perhaps there are other reasons not to kill them also, and these should be investigated, but there is something very clear about the pain issue which is not present in the other approaches to the topic. I remember growing strawberries once and each strawberry had bites in it, from slugs and birds, and I thought at the time that this was OK. The slug had had a bit, the bird had had a bit, and I could, after a bit of paring, have a bit also. This would not work for a commercial strawberry grower, of course, but I do not feed my family through my skill as an agriculturist, fortunately, so why kill animals who might suffer in order to have perfect strawberries? This strikes me as the...

I don't think those counter-examples are very helpful. Restricting the motion of a bird and a dog, even if drugs are used and/or they get used to it, is liable to cause discomfort and so I think is problematic on those grounds alone. It restricts their ability to future streams of pleasures of a varied and familiar kind. Certainly pain and pleasure are not the only issue here. Most of my friends in the US keep their cats inside, thinking, no doubt correctly, that they are safer not going out, but I tend to think that this interferes with the natural course of pleasures and pains that cats are in most cases entitled to enjoy. As for insects, I argued that if the case for them being conscious is not definitely settled one way or another, then we should assume they are conscious, and not gratuitously harm them. Flowers, by contrast, are fair game.

I am not so sure of Jean's response. Ants are indeed little centers of living, but then so are flowers and I would not necessarily think it wrong to pull the petals off a daisy, for example, and often do. Pain does come into it, and if ants feel pain, and might be able to feel pain, then killing or injuring them is clearly problematic, unless they are attacking us, perhaps. Even if they are attacking us, it is not through any desire to harm us, or to deprive us of our picnic, and we might well feel moral qualms at squashing them, if they can experience pain as a result. Here the type of ant is at issue. If it is a large tropical ant who has sunk his pincers in our big toe, then perhaps killing it is the only means of removing it, but in most European cases nothing so dramatic is likely to occur. If they could feel pain, and I understand this is something that is at present unresolved, then we should lay off them. Why not destroy a flower instead?
Education
Ethics

Have any of you witnessed a student cheating in your very own ethics class? Did you just laugh at the situation? Have students tried to challenge why they were morally right for cheating? If you haven't caught a student cheating, what do you think of the situation in general and how would you react?

Ethics is not about teaching people about how to be good, so we should not be surprised that those both studying and teaching the subject are no better, and hopefully no worse, than anyone else. It is well known that librarians often complain to the philosophy faculty that books on ethics are the ones most stolen from the university library, as though they are also surprised, but we do know that people often teach and study a subject without being well organized enough to apply it to their own lives, or even see the need to do so. Students who cheat need to be punished whatever their subject of study, and the only difference here between a student of ethics and one of engineering is that the former might be expected to know something of the different theories that lie behind punishment, together with the nature of moral rules, whereas the latter might not. Should we be surprised if a mathematician gives us the wrong change? Can a child psychologist produce dysfunctional offspring? Do...
Ethics

Is there really a fundamental moral difference between "killing" and "letting someone die"?

Yes, there is. As I sit here typing this someone at my house might be requiring my help, and they do not receive it so they suffer. But that is typically hardly my fault, and I am not to blame. If though I knew that they would require my help and chose to abandon them, then it would be a different matter. The distinction is important since if we are responsible for all harm we could prevent, the scope of our responsibility is immense.
Religion

Is it wrong to practice a belief which one does not believe or finds to be irrational? For instance, are cultural Christians like Richard Dawkins intellectually irresponsible for adhering to practices connected with the belief which they find unconvincing? This is a very bugging question for me since I am a Christian who is becoming more and more disillusioned with my religious beliefs, so a philosophical answer would be very much appreciated. Thank you.

I suppose we should not involve ourselves in practices based on beliefs we think are false or could not be true. On the other hand, if we are not sure, and feel that the practices might help us decide, we might well want to continue with them. Even praying to a God who might or might not be there has a point since the process of prayer itself is often helpful in clarifying our ideas on the topic. Many of us vote in elections where we are unenthusiastic about the alternatives on offer or unconvinced of the efficacy of our vote, but we still vote since we value the process itself, even though on particular occasions it may be ill-directed.
Ethics

APOLOGIES FOR HISTORICAL EVENTS I have been concerned in recent years about the tendency of governments and other bodies to apologise for shameful events perpetrated by their predecessors. Instances that spring to mind are the Australian government's apology to the aboriginal population for their previous maltreatment, the British government's apology to the descendants of First World War servicemen shot for cowardice, and most recently, the British Prime Minister's apology to people who were displaced and sent to Australia as children to lives of abuse and hardship. The first thing that springs to my mind is that it's easy to apologise for something that you personally had no part in. It seems to me that it is most likely done for political enhancement rather than true remorse. Surely the only people who could legitimately apologise are those who perpetrated the act, and if they are long dead, then the time for true apologies has expired. The fact that the recipients of these apologies (usually the...

I don't agree. I think that societies often see themselves, rightly, as linked with those who came before them and to those who will come after, and feel that responsibility is similarly extendable. After all, those of us alive today benefit to a degree from the actions of our predecessors, and if those actions were deplorable, then we should apologize for them, and more importantly, seek to provide restitution. I am sure you are right about the cheap political motives of the governments who do the apologizing. This does not disguise the fact that where a wrong has been done, then those who are their descendants can meangingfully apologize. It is a bit like the case when a country's government apologizes for the hooliganism of its soccer supporters. Ministers are not saying that they themselves are hooligans and now regret their actions. They apologize on behalf of their country for the evil actions of some of their citizens. The fact that those events take place today, and other events took place...
Religion
Value

My question is about how we can value religion from a secular perspective. When it comes to thinking about the religion of Islam for example, there are a multitude of ways to rate the religion's value (or lack there of). It is evident that Islam gives meaning and hope to billions of people, but at what cost? The end result is that the believer is left with a worldview that is erroneous in relation to history, science and the very meaning and purpose of life. Should we base our valuation of Islam upon how closely its teachings cohere to reality, or base it on how much the religion positively effects those who follow it?

If we base our view on a religion on how closely its views cohere with reality we shall have a tough time of it indeed. The point about religions is that they think they have a more acute view of reality than does the secular thinker. It does not seem to me that Islam is any worse, or better, than any other religion in the comparative stakes, although it gets a bad press in some cultures. I think you need to say why you think it is particuarly difficult to like, as compared with other religions, from an objective point of view. Islam has often seen itself as a religion in the middle, between the extreme asceticism of Christianity and the materialism of Judaism, and this is not an obviously ridiculous claim, even from a secular point of view.
Business
Ethics

Should I report a Consensual Amorous Relationship? I am a lab research assistant at a public state medical school, and I have discovered that the head of the lab has a Consensual Amorous Relationship with another researcher at the lab. I found out that prior to joining the medical school, they both worked together at another private academic hospital having the same type of work and personal relationship. It is my understanding that being public state employees, they have a duty to prevent the conflict of interests, and that a Consensual Amorous Relationship between the lab director and the lab researcher clearly generates conflict of interest. Their is also an internal policy in place that requires that Consensual Amorous Relationships between an employee and direct supervisor,are required to be reported. I have a serious internal conflict in how about to solve my dilemma, Should I confront my supervisor and ask them to self-report, or should I proceed to report it directly?

To snitch or not to snitch? It depends on whether you think the rule on reporting such relationships is worth having, and if you do whether even then it is worth disrupting their professional lives by reporting it. Saying they have a duty to report it does not really show that they have a moral duty to report it, and it is your views on this moral issue that are relevant here. Even if you thought they should report it, you might well not think it significant enough to confront them about or report them surreptitiously. Breaking the rules of an organization does not in itself establish guilt, you need to think about how valid those rules are, and if they are valid, how important if at all it is that they are enforced.
Profession

Consider the following scenario: I am very good at doing analytic philosophy (though I am not a genius by any means), specially analytic metaphysics, but not limited to that field. I am well acquainted with the literature on the subject, I have an excellent grasp of the arguments and am pretty good at suggesting objections or proposing new arguments (or variations of old ones). Also, I have a pretty good command of the relevant technical material, that is, classical logic, modal logic, mereology and set theory, etc. Suppose I am capable of original and rigorous work. Suppose I profoundly dislike being taught in a university but have a fine time debating with (competent) professors, visiting lecturers and students (outside of the lectures), who, if asked, will acknowledge my philosophical ability. However, since I am not fond of the academy (as a student), I do not have any degrees. Suppose I am still young so I haven't published anything but I have plenty of ideas which, with a little work, might make...

To a certain extent I think you need to think about what itis about the academy that you so dislike. You seem to want to teach in theacademy but not gain credentials there, yet of course as you know in order toteach you first of all need to be taught. Certainly you could write good stuffand it would get published, no problem there, but I wonder if you could be adecent teacher without having had the experience of being a student. One aspectof teaching that you ignore is that it involves more than just knowing yoursubject. I have met several very skilled philosophers who just cannot teach andsome of them at least do not, they could not enter the profession due to theirinability to succeed in this area of work, and since there are very few postsin philosophy which just involve research, there is not much they can do. In the past it was generally accepted that philosopherswould earn their livelihood doing something else, and it is really only fromKant onwards that we get the professional philosopher....

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