I think most ethical theorists would say that some acts whose effects are only on the agent can be unethical, but it will depend upon what you take "ethical" to consist in--on how you understand what it takes to be ethical. For example, the ancient Greeks (at least mostly) subscribed to an approach that was eudaimonistic (essentially, aiming at the overall well-being of the agent and those affected by the agent) . By this account, then, anything that one did that was not in one's overall interest (taking addictive drugs, for example, or drinking to excess, or becoming habituated to vices of any kind) would be a case of ethical wrong. Others (for example, Kant) would claim that goodness consists in treating those acted upon as ends in themselves. Any action that treated the agent herself as a means only, or which did not respect the agent's own autonomy (selling oneself into slavery, for example, or committing suicide) would be a moral wrong. Consequentialists (for example utilitarians...

Some philosophers would derive the former from the latter--Kant, for example, is generally supposed to think that obligation derives directly from rationality. But I think it is going to depend upon what specific notions of responsibility ("should") and rationality are at work. I think a good way to see how a negative answer to your question might work is to ask a different version of your question: Is it self-contradictory to say that one shouldn't always be rational, or to say that one should (sometimes) be irrational? For example, if one supposes that morality is wholly a social construct, and without any basis in reality beyond social convention (I don't believe this, but some do), then it seems to me that one might recognize duties imposed by whatever conception of morality was currently fashionable that seemed (and indeed were) irrational. But that is only if one does not also think that the principles of rationality are social constructs. Usually, however, those who think that morality...

The question you pose continues to be debated by Socrates/Plato scholars, so you should probably regard the answer I will give as a controversial one. On the one hand, as scholars who wish to resist the "authoritarian" reading of the Crito insist, Socrates clearly says that it is unjust to harm another, and that one who commits injustice actually harms himself most of all. But this can only serve to avoid the authoritarian reading if we beg the question of whether Socrates would believe that refusing to serve an unjust regime was what justice required. Here is something else we know about Socrates: He actually did serve--several times--in the Athenian army during the Pelopponesian War. On at least one of the campaigns we know he was a part of, Athens was attempting to kill all of the inhabitants of Potidaia. One might expect a moralist like Socrates to have some qualms about genocide! Socrates plainly recognizes that many things decided by the Athenians--including in particular...

I agree with the scientists. Very crudely, science provides explanations of how the world works, and bases its theories on matters that are open to regular observation by anyone (using the appropriate equipment, of course). Unless and until God decided to provide us with regular and inter-subjectively available observations of him/her/it, God's existence will not be a matter for scientific discovery. Moreover, if God does not exist, science can certainly not establish that. It is not possible to prove non-existence on the basis of empirical evidence, because all empirical evidence can supply is that there are no scientifically reliable observations of God (yet). Science can establish things that are contrary to religious teachings in other ways, of course. Despite the nonsense that has been recently stirred up on the topic of "intelligent design," science has more than adequately shown that the creation myth in Genesis cannot be literally true. But as for the existence of God, I don't...

Well, perhaps it will reassure you to know that there are several jokes about philosophers as social beings. One of my favorites is a cartoon labeled "philosophers at a party." All are staring off in space, obviously pondering some abstract question; none are interacting with anyone else in the room. Maybe you have also seen Monty Python's soccer match involving philosophers--again, all are so lost in thought they cannot manage to engage in the contest at all (until somehow Socrates figures out what he is supposed to do). So, OK, maybe we are not generally all that much fun to party with, and philosophers notoriously question others in areas they would prefer not to be questioned, which can cause a degree of social friction. But I guess I would caution you about allowing this stereotype (which I grant may have some basis in truth) to allow you to think of what you call your "quandary." To be more specific, if you have deficits in interpersonal skills, these will also create problems...

I think the only way both people could be right is if they don't mean the same thing by "married." Here is a case that might go like that. Suppose the first person is thinking of marriage as a holy sacrament in their religious sect. According to that sect, same-sex marriage is an abomination. Because of that sect's point of view, then, someone might think that there should be no right of same-sex marriage within that sect . Now, even if that is a strongly held belief of that religious sect, it is quite another thing to try to enforce one religious sect's view of things as a matter of law for the rest of the nation (or world). So someone else might think of marriage as a legal contract between two people, one that protects certain civil rights they can enjoy as a result (such as the right to adopt a child as a married couple, for example). It might be that same-sex marriage is an abomination according to some religious groups, but also should be legally permitted as a civil right.

Professor Bloggs is an easy grader, and students flock to his courses in droves, because he will give an A to a student just in case the student turns in all the assignments. The easiest answer to your question (other than showing in my example that the logical understanding of "just in case" is one legitimate sense of this term) is that the other senses cannot be reduced to the sorts of truth-functional connectives that are required in logic. But plainly, this is one of those expressions that can be used in several different ways--and thanks to Peter Smith for giving another clear case of this (where "just in case really means "because")!

This sort of case is the best example of a reason why organizations should be very leery of any system of recognition or reward that has the consequence of making its members feel they are subject to invidious comparisons. Even so, I do think that special effort and special merit also deserves special recognition. A system of nominations is supposed to bring attention to the most deserving cases, and if this system operates properly, then credit goes where credit is due. But, to be perhaps a bit too blunt, it sounds to me as if your co-workers are actually doing your best to make sure this system will not work effectively or fairly, by refusing to take part in it. By refusing to nominate your colleague, you do what is in your power to deny them the recognition they deserve. How can that be right? Instead you and your other co-workers are going to sit idly by and watch someone undeserving get that recognition, because you are unwilling to allow the system to work as it should! Now I...

I really found this a very interesting question, and in some ways, I am as much interested in asking other questions than in providing answers. So let me begin that way: You say you want to forgive someone who " is doing wrong " to you. I emphasize these words because they puzzle me--usually one forgives a wrong that was , not one that continues . So my question is, why do you want to forgive that person now ? Isn't it peerhaps a bit premature for forgiveness at this point? Perhaps you should be focused on getting them to stop wronging you , and then, if that works, you can think some more later about forgiving them. You seem to suspect that they are unaware of the offense. You need either to distance yourself, in that case, or make them aware of the wrong. So something other than forgiveness seems to have priority here. The second question I have is this: Just who is this supposed to be about? Are you forgiving them for their sake , or is this more about you ? Or...

Let me begin by saying that I expect my answer to this one will be controversial, as I think there are deep feelings about this issue, and also a very broad range of considerations. So my own response does not rise above simply stating an opinion for others to consider. For what it is worth, then: I think, as a matter of fact that within democracies military drafts should be mandatory . So, I suppose it is obvious that I think they are neither unethical nor immoral in democracies . I think in systems where the people's consent to government is not given, but simply coerced (the obvious example being dictatorships), then military conscription is almost always immoral, however. But in democracies, I think that military drafts (universal and with only carefully conceived medical or extraordinary hardship exceptions) should be mandatory. The recent situation in which the United States finds itself gives a fairly clear ground for why I say this. It is simply far too easy for a...