In regards to deductivism and the work of Karl Popper, it's possible to deduce statements which are consistent with science's current understanding of something. These statements are hypotheses and some are testable, and hence scientific, and others are not testable, and hence they are unscientific. It seems to me in economics the profession is fond of deducing many statements from their models which are untestable. What is the purpose of this exercise? What can be the goal of deducing untestable statements other than to eventually arrive at something which is testable? Is there a word for these untestable statements besides "unscientific hypotheses?" Thank you.

Karl Popper thought that theories (hypotheses) could be tested by using them to deduce testable consequences. Many theories and hypotheses are quite abstract (physics and economics are good examples of abstract theories) and other assumptions are often needed in order to use them to deduce testable consequences. That's fine--the assumptions just need to be stated in advance and to be plausible. Popper would say that when e.g. economic theories are used to make predictions about the market, they are indeed testable, because the predictions can fail. Popper would have trouble with economists who make predictions which fail and who then don't take the failure seriously enough. Failed predictions point to the falsity of either the theory or the assumptions. Dogmatic scientists (those who want to defend their pet theories past the point of plausibility) always blame the assumptions, even when this is implausible. Popper urges scientists to consider blaming their own theories for failed predictions. If...

Karl Popper thought that theories (hypotheses) could be tested by using them to deduce testable consequences. Many theories and hypotheses are quite abstract (physics and economics are good examples of abstract theories) and other assumptions are often needed in order to use them to deduce testable consequences. That's fine--the assumptions just need to be stated in advance and to be plausible. Popper would say that when e.g. economic theories are used to make predictions about the market, they are indeed testable, because the predictions can fail. Popper would have trouble with economists who make predictions which fail and who then don't take the failure seriously enough. Failed predictions point to the falsity of either the theory or the assumptions. Dogmatic scientists (those who want to defend their pet theories past the point of plausibility) always blame the assumptions, even when this is implausible. Popper urges scientists to consider blaming their own theories for failed predictions. If...

Where can I find literature within philosophy on the "good judgment" that Miriam Solomon (june 5, 2014) describes as essential to philosophy? Is this "good judgment" something like the "tacit knowledge" explored by Michael Polanyi? If so, what is the current philosophical status of his work (as opposed to status within cog-sci)?

There is a vast literature on reasoning and rationality that tries to understand what "good judgment" consists in. It includes Michael Polanyi's work, which is still very much respected among some philosophers, especially those influenced by Ludwig Wittgenstein. But the literature starts (in the Western tradition) with Plato and Aristotle's ideas about knowledge and continues through contemporary work on scientific methodology.

This is a follow-up to Miriam Solomon's statement describing philosophy: "Philosophy involves more than deductive logic--it involves the exercise of "good judgment" which in fact we do not understand very well." (june 5, 2014) Can someone tell me more about what this "good judgment" is, please? I studied philosophy in college and I can't recall any of my professors ever suggesting that there was some elusive guiding principle in philosophy beyond what could be articulated...Instead, I was taught that it was about starting with premises and then executing deductive reasoning. Are you now saying that there's something mystical in there that philosophers can't articulate but which guides their work? That seems counter the way I learned philosophy, where the professors seemed particularly intent on articulating things clearly.

Since I was the one that introduced the concept of "good judgment" I feel I should explain. I am not introducing a mystical concept; just one that we currently don't understand very well. Deductive reasoning is lovely but it doesn't get us very far, as Hume discovered. I am all in favor of articulating good judgment. Some have already begun the project e.g. Nelson Goodman in the "new" (now about 60 years old) problem of induction. Another way of framing the issue is to say that the truth of the conclusion depends not only on the deductive logic used to get there but also on the premises. How do we know that our premises are true? The most we can do is exercise forms of good judgment in choosing them.

I am close to someone with Asperger's syndrome. Do you think Philosophy would be a good field for someone with asperger's to look into? Do you think there's a higher prevalence of it among the philosophy community than other disciplines? In reading through responses, it does seem like there are a lot of superficially logical replies that would feel, to an outsider looking in, on the range from emotionally insensitive to passive-aggressive. It seems that the field encourages ruling out replies based on emotion, being purely logical, which would suit an aspie perfectly. Thanks for your thoughts!

You ask an interesting question. If Philosophy was nothing more than deductive logic, then someone with skills in deductive logic but developmental issues elsewhere would probably excel in philosophy. But most people think that Philosophy involves more than deductive logic--it involves the exercise of "good judgment" which in fact we do not understand very well. Good judgment may or may not be absent of emotion: the philosopher David Hume puts emotion front and center in his ethical theories. We have a very poor understanding of autism spectrum disorders (indeed the diagnostic category of Asperger's has recently been removed from the DSM ). It used to be thought that people with autism lacked emotion; that is generally speaking not true (although the emotions may be different from those of neurotypicals). On rereading your question, perhaps you see a correspondence between some philosophers' apparent detachment and some autistic behavior. There may be an overlap here but I doubt that it...

Does having a mistrust of self identified feminist institutions make you an anti-feminist? When I heard that the university of Colorado invited a group of feminists (I think that's a fair description) from the APA my first inclination was to doubt their report because in my observation biased and otherwise problematic thinking patterns are typical of feminist organizations.

Your final statement expresses your views: "in my observation biased and otherwise problematic thinking patterns are typical of feminist organizations." You sound like someone who thinks that they are justified in being skeptical of the claims of feminists. Is that all you are asking?

I am relatively new to philosophy, as I am in an introductory philosophy class. My question is what made Francis Bacon's scientific method scientific since he was a lawyer or more into politics being he was more a political person than a scientist? I guess what I am saying is why is Francis Bacon's scientific method considered more scientific than it was political? Thank you.

Francis Bacon advocated the use of inductive reasoning in science. Inductive reasoning is going from particular observations to general conclusions. It is an empiricist method, and contrasts with the more rationalist methods of the time, such as the work of Descartes. Is there is a political dimension to the logic of inductive reasoning (or to its specific implementations)? You'd have to make that case; prima facie, going from specific observations to general claims is a logical/methodological rather than a political method.

What analytic philosophers have examined or critiqued gender and gender difference?

Many analytic philosophers have written about sex and gender. An early collection that might be a good place to start is "A Mind of One's Own: Feminist Essays on Reason and Objectivity" edited by Louise Antony and Charlotte Witt (1993). A more recent collection, a product of the Society for Analytical Feminism, is "Out from the Shadows: Analytical Feminist Contributions to Traditional Philosophy" edited by Sharon Crasnow and Anita Superson (2012). The website of the Society for Analytical Feminism is at https://sites.google.com/site/analyticalfeminism/home and has many useful resources.

Hello All, My question is if someone makes an argument using conditional statements is the argument necessarily deductive? Basically the person claims because I am using If . . . .then clauses then that makes my argument deductive by default. I was under the impression that some conditional arguments can still be inductive based on the context of the argument. So if I claim not all conditional arguments are deductive am I correct or incorrect?

An argument using conditional statements can be an argument of any kind (it depends on what other statements are used). There is one kind of well known argument--modus ponens--that uses a conditional statement and a premise stating the antecedent of the conditional. That argument is deductive.

In some fields, people make a distinction between "theory" and "philosophy" (e.g., political theory and political philosophy). On what basis is the distinction made and is there any value in it?

The more theoretical and the more general a subject is, the closer it is to being considered "philosophy." I don't think that there is a definite point where theory leaves off and philosophy starts. So political theory and political philosophy blur together, as do theoretical biology and philosophy of biology, and theoretical physics and philosophy of physics. I think that we worry more about the distinction than we should for intellectual reasons, because we worry about departments and disciplinary categories.

Can anyone become a philosopher at any age? If not, what are the IQ and age requirements?

Anyone and everyone can become a philosopher by asking questions about knowledge, existence and ethics. Being a philosopher is like being a writer--democratic in that the opportunity and the identity are available to all, but tough in that making a living at doing it is a privilege that most societies only support for a few people.

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