The usual way of understanding their relation is that utilitarianism is a version of consequentialism. Consequentialism holds that the only facts about an action that matter to whether the act is morally permissible, etc., are facts about the acts' consequences — roughly, how good an act's consequences are. Utilitarianism offers an account of the relevant good, namely, well-being or happiness, so that, according to utilitarians, the only facts about an action that matter to whether the act is morally permissible, etc., are facts about the acts' consequences for well-being or happiness. (Note that it is possible to be a consequentialist without being a utiltiarian: so long as one holds that there are consequences of an act unrelated to its consequences for well-being or happiness that matter to whether the act is morally permissible, etc.)

This is a question with a long and disputed history. My own article in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy outlines some of the main moral arguments surrounding the permissibility of suicide: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/suicide/ There's a long of history of religious anti-suicide arguments. I don't find these convincing as moral arguments, even granting the theistic assumptions on which they rest. And while I find Kant's position that suicide violates duties to oneself plausible, let's set that aside and treat your question as equivalent to 'does suicide wrong others?', I think the fairest answer is 'it depends.' The most credible argument for the immorality of suicide is that it harms specific others -- family members, etc. — who are are harmed psychologically or materially (a child whose parent's death via suicide deprives her of her parent, for instance) and who have come to rely upon the suicidal person in various ways. As I lay out this role-based obligations argument in the SEP...

Some philosophers (utilitarians most notably) would agree that rights are "an idiom for really strong moral rules" that typically (though not necessarily) take precedence over other moral considerations. In the language made popular by Ronald Dworkin, rights function as "trumps," i.e., to have a right is to be protected against certain kinds of mistreatment even if that mistreatment would have very good consequences. So (for instance) a right to a fair trial is a right to be judged on the basis of certain procedures and evidence even if suspending those procedures might have very good consequences. But many philosophical advocates of moral rights would likely assert that while rights are really strong moral rules, when we say 'she has a right to X' we are saying something more than 'it would be immortal not to provide her X'. Rights are personal entitlements, claims to be treated in particular ways by others. Talk of rights thus seems aimed at capturing our sense that individuals are morally...

Kantian ethics does appeal to notions of consistency, but the consistency that Kantian morality requires is not consistency in respecting "preferences" (as you expressed it.) Rather, Kantian morality requires consistency in respect for practically rational agency, i.e, the capacity to set one's ends and choose the means to one's ends. Kant believed (not incorrectly, for the most part) that non-human animals lack this capacity and hence are not owed respect in this sense. Indeed, Kant held that, strictly speaking, we have no moral obligations to animals at all; animals lack the property (practical rational agency) that lends something moral standing. Many moral philosophers, including many Kantians, find Kant's conclusions troubling, inasmuch as it certainly seems intuitively plausible that we can wrong animals. Kantians have tried a number of solutions to rescue Kantian ethics from this position. Here are some articles in that vein: https://philpapers.org/rec/CHOADK https://philpapers.org/rec/DENKCO-2...

Based on your description of the scenarios you're envisioning, I'm not seeing any inherent moral difference between the scientist and those who procreate children in the 'ordinary' or 'natural' way. Whatever moral reasons seem to weigh either for or against procreating children knowing that there is a high probability they will have "short and extremely bad lives" apply equally to the scientist as to anyone else who procreates under the same conditions. Perhaps you're seeking to highlight that the scientist 'grows' humans outside of a "natural context" as a morally significant factor that makes his procreative acts morally worse. There I'd have to say that while his creating the offspring in some sort of artificial or 'unnatural' way adds to the 'ick' factor, but it's hard to see how there's any moral difference there. No doubt many people attach some moral significance to 'naturalness' when it comes to procreation. They might argue that somehow natural procreation isn't subject to the same moral...

Modern legal systems and practices are probably shaped by a number of different factors, as you note. Criminal sentencing, for example, is likely to reflect concerns about rehabilitation, deterrence, consistency — and revenge. You rightfully ask: Should revenge have a place in how wrongdoers are treated -- is there something morally suspect about revenge? First, it's key to recognize that revenge does not simply aim at making a wrongdoer worse off. Revenge is instead partly a matter of motive: Whenever we punish someone, we aim to make them worse off in some way. What distinguishes revenge from deterrence and other motives is that in acting so as to avenge, we aim to make the wrongdoer worse off for no other apparent reason than that the wrongdoer should be made to suffer. We aren't attempting to discourage the wrongdoer (or others) from acting wrongly, nor are we attempting to use the suffering as a way to improve the wrongdoer's character, etc. Revenge is fundamentally vindictive . To punish a...

Im going to set aside the last part of your question, whether it matters to the morality of looking at the images in question that those depicted are (sometimes) dead. That raises a collection of issues that it would take some time to address (a number of responses on this site under the topic 'Death' may be helpful to you: http://askphilosophers.org/topic/economics?topic=239). So is there anything morally objectionable at looking at the images of Abu Ghraib or of nude celebrities? My sense is that they raise rather different sets of moral issues. The Abu Ghraib images, for one, depict actions undertaken by government representatives (soldiers) in the course of a military conflict. Their release to the public seems to promote a good (knowing what our military is doing) that clearly doesn't apply to nude celebrities. To use a legal idiom, there is no compelling public interest at stake in disseminating nude celebrity photos. So if there is a moral case against looking at the Abu Ghraib images, it seems...

I must admit to some confusion about the assumptions behind your question: I'm not a medical doctor, but except in rare cases, having the genetic predisposition to the cancer doesn't guarantee you'll develop it. So getting the test and (potentially) learning you have the predisposition doesn't require that you "accept whatever is going to happen," i.e., resigning yourself to the cancer. The question of whether you should seek out this knowledge is distinct from what you might do with (or without!) that knowledge. In fact, it may make more sense to try to minimize your risk of developing the cancer through your lifestyle choices if you did find out you have the predisposition. Then you're dealing with a known risk instead of merely a hypothetical one. But knowing your situation and how you respond to that knowledge (or lack thereof) present different issues. On the other side, why will you siblings be unhappy if you opt not to get the test?I'm skeptical that they have a moral right that you get the test....

I'm going to leave aside your own suggestion that there are no moral truths absent moral agents, etc -- that raises some intricate questions in metaethics -- so as to focus on the dispute between you and your friend. On the one hand, your friend tries to demonstrate the existence of 'objective' moral truth by appeal to what is usually seen as a fallacious pattern of argument, so-called 'appeal to the crowd.' It does not follow deductively from 'everyone agrees that killing and eating babies is wrong' that 'it is objectively wrong to kill and eat babies' You seem to have cottoned on to that: as you note, your friend's argument indicates that there is a consensus that it's wrong to kill and eat babies but does not prove that it's objectively wrong to kill and eat babies. On the other hand, what you may be missing is that consensus opinion may not prove some claim true, but it might nevertheless be evidence for its truth. For instance, suppose that some scientific claim is overwhelmingly...

I don't think so. The allegation here doesn't seem to relate to the two acts in isolation. The worry is not that Decrying tax breaks for the wealthy is wrong. Nor is the worry that Taking advantage of tax breaks for the wealthy is wrong. Rather, the wrong is a kind of compound: It is wrong to decry tax breaks for the wealthy while also taking advantage of those same tax breaks. In other words, the charge is one of moral inconsistency or hypocrisy . The reasoning here seems to be as follows: [1] Moral hypocrisy is wrong. [2] For a wealthy person to decry tax breaks for the wealthy and then take advantage of those same tax breaks amounts to moral hypocrisy. Therefore, for a wealthy person to decry tax breaks for the wealthy and then take advantage of those same tax breaks is wrong. This argument is clearly valid: If [1] and [2] are true, then the conclusion necessarily follows. So if there's a problem here, it lies in the truth of the premises. Are they true? [1] is tricky....