According to Taoist philosophy good and evil are equal and should both exist because one cannot exist without the other. However, according to traditional ethics good is better than evil and we should strive for a world with as much good and as little evil as possible. My question is: do you think that good is better than evil, as traditional ethics says, or do you think good and evil are equal as the Taoists think, and why? Should we strive for a world with as much good and as little evil as possible or should we let both good and evil exist?

A good question! On at least one plausible reading, the Taoist claim is that our distinctions and judgements - e.g. of things as good/evil, beautiful/ugly etc. - belong to human judgment rather than to the nature of reality: so these moral distinctions are pragmatic conventions for organising our life, but don't, in themselves, reflect any real features of the world. If so, it's not that good and evil are real and interdependent, but rather than they only appear through a certain perspective on the world, in this case, that of human beings living in societies. But the Taoists do still offer moral guidance in that they do praise certain virtues and argue that certain ways of life are aligned with or responsive to 'tao' - virtues like spontaneity and humility and therefore ways of life that include and are guided by these virtues rather than their opposing vices. A clear and accessible introduction is David E. Cooper, 'Convergence with Nature' (Green Books, 2012).

As a professional philosopher; which philosophical idea brings you the greatest joy whenever you think about it?

This is a really nice question, and one with a long pedgree: the British philosopher Mary Midgley once said that, if you really want to understand a philosopher, you need to ask what they are afraid of, what they loathe, what they love - of what goes deep with that philosopher, of what 'bone they are compelled to gnaw on', as Hamann once put it, or of what the philosopher wants to 'confess', for Nietzsche. Since this question might invite autobiographical answers, mine - for what it's worth - I find most pleasure in ideas that help to understand and articulate my hostility towards attitudes like arrogance, dogmatism, narrow-mindedness, and so on (what people nowadays call 'intellectual vices'), and, conversely, in ideas that present justice and openness and tolerance. I find beauty in that.

My question seems to be a simple one but I haven't been able to find a balanced answer to it so easily. As far as I can ascertain, there are two broad schools of philosophy, the Analytic school and the Continental school. Whilst Analytic philosophy focuses upon logic and reason and favours empirical or evidential arguments that focus to examine very clearly defined concepts, Continental philosophy tends to focus on a more abstract theorising that I am lead to believe, rejects the empirical and the rational as the means to discovering knowledge, and even treats knowledge, truth, and ideas in a much more relative manner. Therefore my question is as follows: "Does Continental philosophy really eschew logic and reason, if so then on what basis are credible arguments made? If this is not the case, then what is the general difference between the two schools and why should it be taken seriously in opposition to Analytic philosophy which at face value seems to be much more accessible and 'down to earth' in the...

Hi! the question you raise points to a very large set of historical and philosophical issues, and one that, so far, has sustained an equally large mass of scholarship! I'd offer three thoughts on this. 1. The characteristics often proposed for one of these two camps often apply equally as well to the other - for instance, enthusiasm for science, predilection for abstract theorising, careful attention to rational argumentation can be found on both sides of the divide (if there is one!) There is a nice discussion of this in Steven Burwood et al, 'Metaphilosophy: An Introduction' (Cambridge 2013). 2. The norms and forms of philosophical argumentation are not fixed - they are historically and culturally variable, even if, in many cases, they can survive 'de-contextualisation' to a high degree. So the Buddha, Socrates, Aquinas, Boyle, Nagarjuna, Dilthey, Quine, and Heidegger all argue , but the forms, presuppositions, presuppositions, etc., that inform and shape those arguments are very different - so...

Why should we accept compliments as the truth but accept insults as lies? Self-help books, quotes on the Internet, and average people in everyday life, often try to comfort those who have been severely insulted by saything things like: "They're just saying that because they're jealous," "They're just trying to bring you down because they're unhappy with their lives," "They don't know what they're talking about," and my favorite, "What people say about you says more about who they are than who you are." These sort of statements invalidate the insult, giving the insulted person no real reason to be upset. However, if all that is true, what about all the times that we have been complimented? They could very well falsely be trying to "bring you up" for whatever reason, it's still possible they don't know what they're talking about, and if it says more about them than it does about you, then good for them for being a "good person," but it really has nothing to do with you. But this isn't what we're...

This is a very interesting question! The social practices of complimenting and criticising are both extremely important - and of course philosophically rich (for instance, they invite both ethical and epistemological reflection). There is - in my view - no simple answer to the question of whether we ought to accept every compliment offered to us, for three reasons. First, sometimes the compliment will be false - one in fact lacks the virtue that the compliment attributes to one - and sometimes the compliment will be unacceptably exaggerated - "I'm good, yes, but not that good!" - and sometimes the compliment will entail insulting or demeaning other people - " Wow, you're way smarter than these other people!" Second, sometimes one might want to resist a compliment because one has worries about or objections to the complimenter. For instance, a friend of mine was recently praised by a member of a nationalistic political party for their tenacity and conviction - this was during a debate about...
Law

Should the government regulate hateful Billboards? I once saw a billboard that said the pope is the anti-Christ. I shrugged it off as a matter of free speech. But then someone pointed out that someone could advertise a billboard that expressed hatred for blacks. For whatever reason this has never happened. Most billboard owners dont want to accused of racism. So arguably society polices itself well enough without government intervention. Yet I suspect that there is another factor which is that billboards are owned by a very small amount of people because the high expense involved and the limited number of billboards. These folks don't want any bad attention. The same observation could be made about all aspects of the media. It is very difficult to get controversial or even outright racist materials despite the fact that many people are racist. (I suppose The Bell Curve is a notable exception) It seems like one "benefit" of concentrated wealth is that it promulgates political correctness to protect its...

Much depends on how one construes freedom of speech. Often one finds it defined very poorly as being the right to say (or display) whatever one likes - whether it is offensive, ill-informed, false, and so on - an "anything goes" attitude towards speech: you're free to say (or display) whatever you like! But that definition is indeed a poor one, and one way to show why is to ask why we value freedom of speech. A good argument to value freedom of speech is so that we can hear the considered and articulate views and arguments of others and then assess them - views worth hearing, worth taking seriously, worth changing one's life in response to - and one could then ask whether the content of those hateful billboards fulfil those criteria. My two cents. [I am happy to accept Eric's criticism - and am happy to be corrected! IJK ]

I sent a small donation by cheque to someone specifically for cancer research and left payee line open for them to fill name of project in. It now transpires cheque was made payable to that persons partner. I suspect this was to cover postage of collected goods to another part of world also for charity although I had made it known that would not be acceptable to me. It came to my notice only when I checked my accounts. How should I broach this with friend and is it acceptable for someobe to take money for one charitable cause and use it for another?

People often donate money to charities because they (i) have a special concern for the focus of the charity and/or (ii) because they research the charity and choose carefully the one they want - for instance people often donate money to charities for diseases that have affected their life somehow. In these cases, it would be wrong to redirect that money to other charities because (i) one misleads the donor about the destination of the money and (ii) one ignores the donor's wishes - and their right to determine to which good cause their money goes. One can imagine, too, cases where a person donates money to honour the memory of a deceased relative - one who died from the disease that one then donates money to the research of - and that would make it much worse. But even in a case where a person donates money to a charity chosen arbitrarily or capriciously - well, that's still surely a violation of trust.

What does allow scientist to make moral and ethical judgements? I always thought that science is purely neutral and objective(yes I know this is an illusion, even if we destroy all bias and all string pullers(government, private/commercial sector) still even scientists unconsciousness can make the objectivity of his work biased without him even being aware of it), yet I see scientists making moral and ethical(which seem purely subjective to me[based on belief or opinion]) judgements nearly everywhere...

You ask a very good question! Much depends here on (first) how one defines 'objectivity' and (second) what objectivity might mean in the case of science and (third) the standing of moral beliefs. Objectivity has lots of possible senses - e.g. being free from biases and prejudices, or being impartial and 'non-subjective', and so on - and it's not clear which of these senses of objectivity are defensible, and not clear either how they feature within science (for instance, perhaps scientists only need to be objective in a particular sense at a particular point in their research, such as its practical application). There is a very good history of the concept of objectivity by Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison called 'Objectivity' - beautiful but a little pricey - which explores three of the main senses of objectivity in the recent history of science. The standing of moral beliefs - whether they are or can be 'objective' or whether they are merely belief and opinion - is both easier and harder. Easier...

If you are at a conference and somebody behind you says something that you feel is offensive is it okay to take their picture and post that to the Internet so that a lot of people know that somebody said that offensive thing?

This is an interesting question - and an important one, given how often one overhears offensive comments (at conferences, on trains, in coffee shops, and so on!) There might be two sets of issues to separate, though. The first set of issues concern what was said, in what context, and why, and whether one can determine the motivation and intent, and so on. In some cases, though of course by no means all cases, there are further factors - not always apparent - which might affect our judgments about the offensiveness of a given remark (though, granted, this won't apply in cases of obviously offensive remarks). Given that fact, sometimes the best response is to confront the question - to confirm the moral judgement and establish that no moderating factors apply in this case - rather than just go straight into an online exposure. Due process, one might say. The second is the question of (for wont of a better term) enforcement. There are many ways to enforce good moral and social conduct, and shaming - e...

Do you think there is too little applied ethics being studied and researched in academia? I think analytic philosophy still has not recovered from the ideas of logical positivism. If ethics is still a worthwhile field of study, why then shouldn't it connect as much as possible to the public by advising every facet of human behavior?

Applied ethics is in fact in rude health! Over the last thirty or so years there has been (firstly) a revival of applied ethics as a distinct discipline in its own right and (secondly) a diversification of new areas of applied ethical theorising, such as environmental ethics, business ethics, agricultural ethics, engineering ethics, and so on - so happily applied ethics is now firmly back on the philosophical agenda and well-served by a range of established conferences, journals, and so on. Moreover there is an increasing sense of the need to connect applied ethical debate with (firstly) developments in economics, the cognitive sciences, medical research and so on and (secondly) with a variety of professional bodies and public policy-makers - for instance when philosophers of archaeology engage with archaeological professional bodies, cultural resource managers, aboriginal peoples groups, museum curators, and so on.

I've read many here who say that everyone alive who thinks critically is a philosopher, not just those who have published academic articles and books. Isn't this a dangerous and incorrect notion since it gives credence to the fact that Mao Zedong is just as much a philosopher as Kant? Many PhD holders in science wouldn't consider themselves a scientist if they don't work in science. How frustrated are professional philosophers in that the masses throughout history have accepted so much "bad philosophy" and cannot recognize exactly what philosophy IS and what its aims (if any) are?

A good question! Or rather, two good questions - the first about whether a desire to philosophise is innate in human beings, the second about what being a philosopher in contemporary society means. Taking the first, many philosophers have argued that a desire to philosophise is inherent in all human beings - but, of course, this is different from saying that (1) everyone has the ability to philosophise (or at least, to philosophise well) and that (2) any philosophical ability that they do have has been trained and cultivated. So perhaps everyone wonders about the nature of good and evil - well, that might be the case, but perhaps not everyone has the inclination to work up those wonderings into systematic reflection, and perhaps not everybody will seek out the sorts of rigorous intellectual training that makes someone a professional philosopher. Regarding the second, much also depends on how one wants to define 'philosopher'. If by that you mean an academic philosopher, then activities like...

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