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What analytic philosophers have examined or critiqued gender and gender difference?

Many analytic philosophers have written about sex and gender. An early collection that might be a good place to start is "A Mind of One's Own: Feminist Essays on Reason and Objectivity" edited by Louise Antony and Charlotte Witt (1993). A more recent collection, a product of the Society for Analytical Feminism, is "Out from the Shadows: Analytical Feminist Contributions to Traditional Philosophy" edited by Sharon Crasnow and Anita Superson (2012). The website of the Society for Analytical Feminism is at https://sites.google.com/site/analyticalfeminism/home and has many useful resources.

I would like to know if the right to decide what is 'normal' and 'abnormal' belongs to any particular authority or type of expert. Whose job is it to define what is 'normal' and 'abnormal'? Is it the job of philosophers, or sociologists or another authority? Or a combination of these disciplines? Or is it not up to any type of authority and is instead up to everyday people with no particular expertise? Example: French historian and philosopher of history, Amaury de Riencourt claimed in one of his books that "Far from being an incomplete form of maleness...femaleness is the norm, the fundamental form of life." This statement implies that to be male is to be abnormal. Is he right because of his credentials? Are there counterarguments to this statement? If I disagreed with this statement, would I be wrong becuase I have no credentials to my name?

We are all fallible. Even experts. Especially about matters as value-laden as questions of "normality" of types of human beings. If you disagree with Amaury de Riencourt, and give reasons for your disagreement, then the fact that you have no credentials would not matter. Your reasons should be evaluated on their own terms. This particular claim about gender and normality is difficult to agree or disagree with because it is so vague. You think the statement implies that to be male is to be "abnormal"; but it may only mean that to be male is to be a variant (non-standard form). (I don't know the work of Amaury de Riencourt, so I do not know what is meant, and whether it is a biological, sociological, political etc claim.)

In this question, I'm going to assume there are strictly two human biological sexes, male and female. That assumption isn't exactly true (chromosomal variations), but it's a close enough approximation to ask the question. At restaurants such as "Hooters," provocatively-clad females serve food to patrons. There are no male waiters. No one seems to think too much about it. I think, however, that many people would be appalled if we had restaurants whose theme was to have provocatively-clad Jewish people serve food, or provocatively-clad African Americans serve food, or provocatively clad [insert religious or ethnic or national group] serve food. There are, of course, ethnic restaurants. So we might think of Hooters as nothing more and nothing less than another type of ethnic restaurant, this one peculiar to sex instead of ethnicity. Is this good reasoning? Maybe that reasoning is not valid. Women have a sex (female) and men have a sex (male). There can't be anything intrinsically more sexual about...

The questions that you are asking are terrific! They can also be taken further. E.g. is it necessary for you to assume that there are strictly two biological sexes? (I don't think so). Or e.g. What is wrong (if anything) with sexualization of a group? What is wrong with sexualization of a subordinate group? It is not difficult to turn up inconsistencies in what society considers to be socially normative.

Does the existence of intersex people invalidate the binary conception of gender?

You ask a complicated question very simply! Here's some advice about how to pursue this topic, with a few oversimplifications of my own. Sex (physical sex) is often distinguished from gender (gender identification in people, often culturally influenced) as well as from sexuality (sexual orientation). Intersex people have bodies that are not "typically male bodies" or "typically female bodies" but have elements of both. This ranges from (controversially) hypospadias in men (the urethra not opening at the tip of the penis) to individuals with both an ovary and a testis. Anne Fausto-Sterling's excellent book Sexing the Body describes the range. Then the question is, do we regard intersex individuals as "abnormalities," and thereby preserve our traditional understanding of biological sex as a binary, or do we regard intersex individuals as counterexamples to our traditional understanding of biological sex? Some (including Fausto-Sterling) appear to think that the answer to this depends at least...

I was reading an article where constructivist feminist views on gender were being discussed, and an example was given on how gender was constructed, how being a boy or a girl had nothing to do with physical bodies, and how physical bodies themselves are constructed by society. The text is from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: "Instead, our sexed bodies are themselves discursively constructed: they are the way they are, at least to a substantial extent, because of what is attributed to sexed bodies and how they are classified. Sex assignment (calling someone female or male) is normative. When the doctor calls a newly born infant a girl or a boy, s/he is not making a descriptive claim, but a normative one. In fact, the doctor is performing an illocutionary speech act. In effect, the doctor's utterance makes infants into girls or boys." Isn't this kind of thinking somehow flawed? Surely, if the child was born with male genitals and the doctor said "It's a girl!", the parents would be briefly...

Most constructivists think that assigned sex has something do with physical bodies; but how physical/biological information is incorporated into gender categories can vary depending on cultural, historical, pragmatic etc interests. Genitalia are one way in which we assign gender, but not the only way; we recognize, for example, that genetic males can have external genitalia indistinguishable from those of "normal" women (Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome), and that genetic females can have masculinized genitalia (Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia). There are also true hermaphrodites (individuals with both ovarian and testicular tissue). And then there are transsexuals who look one way and yet are "gendered" another way. There have been some cases of parents/doctors choosing the gender of an ambiguous infant, and sometimes the gender identification takes, sometimes it does not (we do not all have an inborn gender identification that resists change, although many of us do, and for most of us it...

Hello, do you think experiences of the world are structured by gender? If you have read Young's 'Throwing Like a Girl,' that is what I'm getting at.

Iris Young's "Throwing Like a Girl" is a wonderful description of gendered experience. Our experiences of the world are influenced by many factors that have to do with our positions in the world, both our physical positions (biological sex, physical disabilities) and our political positions (race, gender, social class, power). "Experience" is defined broadly to encompass all we are conscious of (some call it phenomenological experience). I recommend Kay Toombs work on the phenomenology of disability as another rich description of perspective.