Why is it that most people feel better after talking about their problems?

It doesn't take much science-fiction imagination to conceive of creatures -- Klingons, or whatever! -- who work differently. When their equanimity is disturbed, e.g. by relationships falling apart, then they naturally recover their emotional balance after a while, so long as they don't keep dwelling on things. Rather as we heal broken skin so long as we don't keep picking at the scabs, so for our Klingons talking about their problems is like picking at scabs. For them, it is better to "let nature take its course" and for their emotional system to recalibrate itself to the new situation without paying too much conscious attention to the processes. They don't suffer from effects of "repressing" bad experiences, etc.: in fact they function better if they do "repress". Now, if we are very different from our imagined Klingons (as modern therapeutic "it's good to talk" theories suppose we are), then that's an empirical fact about us. And if it is a contingent empirical matter, as it...

A long time ago - Jan 2006 if I'm not mistaken - Alan Soble wrote (http://www.askphilosophers.org/question/875): "Finally, the heart and soul of philosophy is argument, providing reasons for claims, including claims about morality and duties. In the answer to the question above, I cannot find a shred of argument. We should also avoid, that is, pastoral or friendly counseling. Without rigor, philosophy is nothing." That was back in the days when there was routinely more than 1 response to a question. Today's responses seem more and more to be becoming "pastoral or friendly counseling" without rigor. The panelists do not argue with each other - the responses are just accepted. Here's an example: Peter Smith wrote very recently (http://www.askphilosophers.org/question/2823): "For irrationally formed beliefs are not likely to lead to actions which get any of us what we want -- including a decent life, lived well in the knowledge of our all-too-explicable mortality." This statement - simply put out...

Jennifer Church points out a couple of types of a case where irrationally formed beliefs (or degrees of belief, in the over-confidence case) can promote our welfare. Sure there are such cases. But that doesn't affect the original point at stake. There being a few cases doesn't undermine the point that in general false beliefs (because of their content!) are unlikely to lead to successful action,* and so irrationally formed beliefs -- being likely to be false -- are not in general likely to lead to actions which get us what we want. And that is enough to explain why we should in general care a lot about forming our beliefs in a rational way. Which in turnis enough to counter the original questioner's worry that philosophy"uses as its main tool a mechanism [rational thought] that is theopposite of what is most important to us": in general ,rational belief-formation matters for getting whatever is important tous. *Indeed, some attractive views about ascribing content to belief...

I am perplexed by Alexander George's recent posting (http://www.askphilosophers.org/question/2854). He says "Your observation that we sometimes take pleasure in beliefs even if they have been irrationally arrived at seems correct but beside the point: it speaks neither to the truth of (1) nor to that of (2)." (2), in this case, is "(2) that actions guided by false beliefs are not likely to get us what we want. " I believe the science of psychology has shown us that we form many beliefs entirely irrationally. The mechanism for their formation is often a defense mechanism. The purpose of their formation is often to hide some truth about ourselves from ourselves - to hide some unpleasant information that we would have gleaned had we formed our belief rationally. I just can't see how the above information is "beside the point". The point is: 1) I want to be happy. 2) My beliefs are formed irrationally in order to reach that desired end. Perhaps what is beside the point is that the belief-forming...

Just a footnote to Mark Collier's helpful post. I actually said that irrationally formed beliefs are not likely to lead to actions which get us what we want (rather than cannot get us what we want). And that claim is enough to explain why we should in general care a lot about forming our beliefs in a rational way . Which in turn is enough to counter the original questioner's worry that philosophy "uses as its main tool a mechanism [rational thought] that is the opposite of what is most important to us": in general , rational belief-formation matters for getting whatever is important to us. Even if pockets of irrationality, episodes of self-deception, etc. can -- by good fortune -- happen to promote our welfare.