Hi there. I have a question about Searle's Chinese room argument. In it he seems to argue that purely syntactic programs are not sufficient for semantic content. From a biological perspective, I was wondering what if the program (genetic material) used the symbols themselves (proteins) to build a machine (a brain) that was capable of understanding meaning? What effect, if any, would this have on Searle's argument? I don't have any training in philosophy, so if you could pitch your answer with that in mind that would be great. Thanks, Tim

Searle's argument is that merely running a program cannot be enough for understanding, provided one understands 'running a program' in terms of symbol shuffling, rather than shuffling any particular physical stuff around. The response that you suggest involves shuffling particular physical stuff: proteins and nucleotides. There are two senses of 'running a program' at issue. What Searle has in mind is the sense in which electronic computers run their programs. In this case, it doesn't matter what physical stuff the symbols are made out of: they could be electronic pulses, clockwork springs, or anything. Your sense of running a program is more specific: it is the sense in which our genetic material 'program' for our developed physiology. In this case, physical stuff matters a great deal: only proteins and nucleotides do the job; 'running a program' is shorthand for a very specific biological process. Searle might interpret your response as therefore agreeing him that there is more to understanding...

Are machines able to have knowledge?

I agree with Peter's response, and I'd like to pick up on the possibility that the machines in question are not computers. Although it is not clear what computation is, it seems plausible that not all machines are computers. A claim that such non-computational machines can have knowledge would escape Turing's or Searle's arguments. One might argue that human beings are such machines: we work in mechanical ways, we have knowledge, but we are more than mere computers. John Searle has a mechanistic, non-computational, view along these lines. A potential challenge that such a view faces is to explain what this broader sense of 'mechanical' means. It must mean something different from 'performs a computation', but one might be reluctant to broaden the notion so far that it applies it to all possible systems: that would render it trivially true that machines can understand. Finding an intermediate ground is not obvious.

I frequently hear physician's voice the following argument with respect to sexual disorders and anxiety/depression, and I wonder of its validity: If there's a chemical treatment (e.g. pharmaceuticals) and it's successful, then the problem is physiological, not psychological. The argument appears invalid to me, because it seems to assume too large of a rift between one's psychology and one's brain. More exactly, if a chemical treatment works, and if one's psychology (i.e. thought-patterns and emotions) can have an effect on one's brain chemistry (and vice versa), then couldn't the problem still have a psychological source? It seems as if these physicians view psychology as having a basis in a something (a soul perhaps) that is causally independent of the brain. But that seems like an odd view for a Western physician to hold. I'd greatly appreciate any thoughts on this.

I agree that this reasoning seems strange. However, here's one possible justification for it. Any cause can be described in a large number of different ways. For example, a brick thrown at a window can be described as: (i) a brick thrown at a window, or (ii) the movement of a bunch of molecules through space. Which way we choose to describe a cause depends on our interests in the case. If we are interested in atomic physics, we may prefer description (ii); if we are interested in the movement of bricks in the area, we may choose description (i). Suppose that in medicine our interests are primarily to explain and treat disorders. For some disorders, it may be easier to explain and treat them by describing their causes in purely psychological language. For other disorders, it may be easier to explain and treat them by describing their causes in purely physiological language. There may also be difficult mixed cases, as you mention, in which the best strategy is to describe the causes in a mixed...