Is it possible for one to be in love with the feeling of being in love, instead of loving the person you believe you're in love with?

The feeling of being in love is certainly lovable. And it seemspossible that one could love the feeling of love that one gets fromloving a particular person more than one loves that person.And it seems that one could believe that one loves a particular person,yet fail to really love that person, but because one believes that oneis in love with that person, one has the feeling of being in love withthat person. In such a situation, it seems, one could really love thefeeling of being in love with a particular person but not really love theperson. So, yes, I don’t see why not.

It seems that philosophers have reduced philosophy to nothing more than theories of knowledge, and are asserting epistemologies that prevent anyone from philosophizing. I understand the power of doubt, and that we cannot describe morality in “indubitable” or absolute terms. But, speculation and wonder are what make philosophy interesting to me. Why won’t you construct philosophy from the basis of wonder? Is it so terrible to view your profession as art instead of science?

According to Plato’s dialogues, the philosopher Socrates was a masterat inducing wonder in the minds of others. Before they met Socrates,most people believed that they had a good grasp of matters of someimportance. After he asked them a few questions, it became clear tothem that matters weren’t as simple as they had supposed and that theyreally didn’t know what they were talking about. Having had theirignorance exposed, they began to wonder what in the world they shouldbelieve. Some might take Socrates to be a skeptic. However, Socratesseemed not to agree. He maintained that the wonder that he induced wasthe first step toward acquiring wisdom. I know that there area lot of people who love wonder for its own sake, who revel in themysteries of the world, and who would like the world a whole lot lessif it were less mysterious or puzzling. I myself don’t think that thisattitude is particularly philosophical. Aristotle, who pretty muchdefined the discipline of philosophy as it is known in the West...

When is it time to get on the medical intervention train and when should you leave well enough alone? As I have gotten older, and my friends have gotten older, every doctor visit feels like stepping on a train that will soon speed up so much you can't get off - so fast you can't even see the landscape outside the window anymore. Chronic medication, more tests...preventive examinations, just one more, just one more. I understand that these things prolong life, but how do you distinguish treatable medical conditions from normal aging? How do you go gently into that good night?

It seems to me that the answer to this question depends on the answerto at least four other questions: (1) Under what conditions does onecount as living a life that is worth living? (2) Would a given medicalintervention allow me to continue to live a life that is worth living?(3) What obligations do I have to others (and in particular, does mycontinuing to live allow me to meet certain obligations to others, ordoes my continuing to live put morally unacceptable burdens on others)?and (4) Would a given medical intervention allow me to meet my moralobligations? Of course, the answers to these questions, and the weight that one should give to the answers to these questions, are verydifficult to determine.

Egalitarian principles suggest that it is important to provide equal opportunities for all. Does this mean that all countries should be let into the EU on the basis of equal opportunities rather than on merit, or that every continent should get an equal number of football teams into the World Cup despite some continents clearly displaying a higher standard of football?

When we’re attracted to a principle of equality of opportunity, we’re often moved by the thought that everyone should have the same chance to gain access to the good things of life. Of course, if people blow their chances, then they have no one to blame but themselves; but they might reasonably complain if their access to the good things of life is due to factors over which they have no control. But what, then, about my access to the NBA? I’m 5' 2", and while not entirely graceless, I’m not exactly the picture of athleticism. Is it unfair that the NBA excludes me from its ranks? It’s surely not my fault that I have the height that I have. So has the NBA violated some right that I have to equal opportunity? The reasoning here, of course, goes much too quickly. It seems entirely appropriate that access to jobs is determined by one’s ability to do the job well (even if one’s ability to do a particular job is due to factors outside of one’s own control). We wouldn’t want surgeons or even...

How can one get rid of his/her memories, either bad or good ones? Is there any way to forget a happening in the past?

Maybe our memories aren't under our direct control, but certain types of alterations of our brain will affect our memories. Since, given current technology, the procedures available for altering our brain (brain surgery, brain injury, drug abuse) are not very precise in their effect on memories, I wouldn't recommend them . . .

Do any of the panelists think that there are any moral constants over time? That is to say, anything that all societies have rejected as immoral? It seems to me that just about everything that we regard as right or wrong is based on the society that we happen to be in. For example - slavery. We think it's wrong now, but other societies in different times have had little problem with it. So is it really a case of 'There is no good or bad, but thinking makes it so?' as Hamlet put it.

If you look around the world or study human history, it is easy to beimpressed by the apparent diversity of opinion about what sort ofactions are morally permissible or impermissible. Moreover, it might seemthat certain moral disagreements– e.g., concerning the morality ofearly-term abortion– are not rationally resolvable. And thisobservation can easily lead one to the conclusion that morality issimply a matter of opinion. However, it seems to me that theevidence for a significant degree of rationally irresolvable moraldisagreement is not as great as it seems at first sight. Let’s take forexample the moral principle that one should never cause another persona significant harm just for the fun of it. I have never heard of any society or culture in which thismoral principle is not accepted. Ofcourse, in differentsocieties there will be disagreement about the circumstances in whichit is permissible to cause harm to another individual, but I think thatin many cases thebasis of this disagreement is not...

What is pain? Does pain really affect us, or is it a trick the mind plays to help protect us?

Many philosophers have held that the only thing that is bad in itself is pain. Nothing else can count as bad except to the extent that it gives rise to pain. But I wonder whether your suggestion (if I’m understanding it correctly) is closer to the truth. It’s not pain itself that is harmful; rather, when our bodies and minds are functioning properly, pain serves as a mechanism by which we are alerted to genuinely harmful conditions. Pain is, as it were, an alarm system that alerts us to the presence of harm, but does not itself constitute harm. To think otherwise is to mistake the menu for the meal. In fact, one might argue, in the ordinary case, the occurrence of pain is beneficial– it alerts us to genuine harm and makes it difficult for us to do anything else until we attend to and eliminate that harm. However, in some circumstances, our alarm system can get out of wack (as, for example, in the case of depression) and it can alert us to problems that don’t exist and prevent us from doing things...

Why is there no "happiness"ology? It seems that throughout history philosophy has strived to legitimize and analyze most basic human questions except that of what happiness is and how it is achieved. Is this accurate or am I mistaken?

Many, many, philosophers have thought about this issue. The Ancient Greeks, for example, gave a great deal of attention to what they called “ eudaimonia ”– a word that is often translated as “happiness”. But this translation can be somewhat misleading, since we often use the word “happiness” simply to refer to a momentary state of euphoria, as in, “I was so happy! He finally responded to my e-mail! But then, you know what he said? He told me to stop pestering him. I was so upset.” What the ancients were concerned to understand was not the nature of such euphoric states, but the nature of that state of being that we’ve achieved when we are in a very good state, when we’re doing well, when we’re flourishing. It was such a state that they called “ eudaimonia ,” and it is this state that is often referred to in philosophical literature as “happiness.” On this understanding, it’s then an open question what is the relationship between being happy and the sort of positive mental state that is...

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