If a tree falls in the forest and there is no one to hear it, it does not make a sound. This makes sense because sound is a perception. Without a perceiver, the falling tree just creates sound waves that are never perceived as sound. But, Schrödinger's cat applies to a living thing whose existence is not dependent on any outside observation. Why is it that the the cat cannot be said to be alive or dead until an observation is made? Seems that the status of the cat is simply unknown until an obervation is made. Please explain.

When the proverbial tree falls in the forest, it vibrates creating sound waves that will, under normal conditions, cause a sound-experience as of a crashing tree in the mind of any normal hearer who is within range. There are plenty of vibrations and sound waves, and conditionas are ideal, but alas, there is no one around in that isolated forest, not even a wood-pixie, to have any sound-experiences at all. Was there a sound nevertheless? I say yes. "Sound" in its primary, objective use picks out, roughly, whatever features underlie the objective auditory properties we take ourself to perceive in the world outside us--vibration-events in the tree, more or less, or perhaps the soundwaves they cause. When I say that I hear the resplendent sound of that trumpet, I take myself to be representing a feature of the trumpet (or it's current activity) not a feature of my mind, though I recognize that my auditory capacities are required to accomplish this representation. Cases of auditory illusion (or...

This question obviously has a large psychological component, but I think there is a philosophical aspect as well: I have a four year old that is vaguely aware of a death that recently occurred. I do not want him to be afraid that his family will suddenly and permanently vanish, but, as previously discussed on this board, it seems neither moral nor prudent to lie to him. Is there any theory of what happens when someone dies that is at least somewhat plausibly correct but that will not terrify the little guy?

You're right, I think, that this is largely a psychological matter. So I respond here mostly as a fellow parent struggling with precisely this issue. Yesterday, Annabel, the pet goldfish of our our almost four-year old daughter, Lane, died suddenly while Lane was watching . Lane knew immediately what had happened: "Annabel died!" So we weren't confronted with the dilemma of whether to sneak out to a pet store during her nap to buy a fishy-doppelganger. But even though Annabel's death was surprisingly non-traumatic for Lane, it has raised in her all sorts of questions about her dead grandparents (one of whom she knew) and some other deceased pets. We reply that all these people and pets go to the same place. And when she asks where, we say that we don't know. This is border-line misleading, since we're atheists posing as agnostics. (I once replied that they all "went into the ground", but this seemed unnecessarily grim, and not exactly true about Anabel anyway, since she went down the drain.) The...

Me and a friend were arguing about this question: Is sex ultimately for reproduction or pleasure? I said reproduction, but he argues that you can have sex and never have a child, which would prove sex is for pleasure and children are the aftermath of a choice when having sex (to ejaculate and fertilize the egg). Is there any way to clear this up with the logic of evolution (to evolve, one must reproduce)?

It depends what you mean by "ultimate purpose". Sex and all that goes with it (the associated pleasures, the urges, the courtship-instincts) has clearly evolved because of its role in reproduction. It wouldn't exist if it didn't play this role. So if something's "ultimate purpose" is to serve that role the playing of which led evolutionarily to its existence, then, yes, sex is ultimately for reproduction. This is true, I think, even though this notion of purpose is, I take it, problematic on evolutionary grounds. One complication is that a thing (a process, a feature, a characteristic) may be a mere evolutionary by-product, and so not have a purpose in this sense. Moreover, things that evolve for one reason might start to serve new purposes, and persist and spread because of this. And finally a thing's evolutionary purpose(s) (if any) might be entirely indiscernible to us. I presume, though, that none of this applies to sex. In fact, sex is probably the only thing that I (from my armchair) feel...

Is it right for an author to publish a nonfiction piece arguing for a view the author does not really support? For example, say a tax professor writes and publishes an article arguing for a change in the tax law. The professor believes the change is worth considering, but should ultimately be rejected. Is it appropriate for the professor to publish an article arguing in favor of the reform (acknowledging perspectives against the proposal but concluding that it should be accepted)?

That's an interesting question. Certainly we don't begrudge a person advocating a position she may not support when it's her role to advocate this position. I'm thinking here of lawyers and certain members of government. However, in these cases the idea (though perhaps not the reality) is that truth and overall goodness will be achieved through a general process or system of advocacy. (Also, in such cases, arguments aren't put forth in the author's name alone, but rather on behalf of a client or agency.) One might argue that non-fiction can sometimes be part of a similar system--so that there's some good in throwing out proposals, suggestions and arguments one may not endorse in order that they be digested by a process that will, precisely through grappling with a variety of positions, arrive at a more comprehensive, nuanced and accurate view of reallity. (In certain moments I view professional philosophy in this way.) But these cases seem exceptional to me. Even when the system allows it, the...

Is "largest" and "smallest" only a result of comparison, or is there a single largest thing and single smallest thing that actually exist? Sorry in advance if this gets more scientific than philosophic.

You're right that the use of "largest" and "smallest" involves some comparison class, even if this is only implicit. We can say that the largest postage stamp is a lot smaller than the smallest planet because we are, of course, comparing the largest stamp to other stamps, and the smallest planet (Mercury?) to other planets. (Note also that "largest" and "smallest" can be used with different implicit senses of "size". Thus, the largest blunder of my life (not buying Google when it went public) needn't be very large in any physical sense.) To make things explicit, then, your questions are (or might be?): Is there a spatially largest physical object? Is there a spatially smallest one? And you're right, unfortunately, these are really best asked of a physicist. However, answering them will, I think, depend upon certain partly philosophical issues such as whether it makes sense to speak of spatial extension when it comes to micro-particles, and whether the universe as a whole can be considered an "object".

Isn't it more important to know what is true rather than what is truth? And can't one know the former without knowing the latter? If so, what is the point of a theory of truth, anyway?

Allowing that we can know anything at all, we can certainly knowthings--that there is currently a red rock on my desk, forexample--without knowing truth itself--that is, without knowing that agiven theory of truth is correct. In fact, I suspect most philosopherstake themselves to be in precisely this position, since the theoryof truth is so thorny. (If you don't want to take my word for this, please read thevarious entiries under "Truth" in the Stanford Encyclopedia.) But thisis really no more surprising than my being able to see that the rock isred without seeing (or knowing) the nature of redness, or of colorsgenerally. Is knowing true things more important than knowingthe nature of truth? Everyday knowledge has greater survival value to be sure, butknowing the correct theory of truth would be extremely satisfying. Andyou would shine in a room full of philosophers...if you could defend it.

I recently "rescued" a sea gull with a broken wing. I approached it while I was riding my bike on a very busy road filled with speeding wood-laden trucks and various other vehicles. The bird ran from me as well as it could, dragging its broken wing behind it; and as sea gulls are much more efficient at flying than walking, this was quite a feat. I managed to scare the creature off the road as well as I could, as I felt it was much safer in the fields beside the road, than on the road. Then I went home, feeling a little better with myself, as I believed I had helped the creature. The next morning I was driving my Jeep to work along the same road, and lo and behold, there was the same (at least I think it was) gull wending its way along the road, a full 3/4 kms further along from where it was the night before. It had survived a full twelve hours on a very busy roadway. I was carrying a cat cage in the back of the vehicle, and I successfully captured the bird. My philosophical quandary occurred shortly...

By my lights, both you and the vet did exactly the right things. You initially helped the bird help itself (by putting it out of harm's way), and then, when that seemed insufficient, took it to a place where you thought it could get medical attention. In my view, the vet also did the right thing in euthanizing the gull on his or her considered judgment that any other course of action would result in much greater suffering. Your qualms seem really to be with euthanasia, and your role in enabling it. One question to ask is how you think the gull (or the world) would have been better had the the gull not been euthanized, but rather left, in all likelihood, to die much more painfully a few days later. Many would argue that the euthanasia maximized the quality if not the length of the gull's life. The gull may have died more naturally and with more dignity if let be, but this is debatable I think, and in any case difficult to weigh against the much greater suffering. We have to be careful here to strip away...

René Descartes said that "I think therefore I am". Would it not be more true to say: "I am therefore I think"?

My pet rock, Rocky exists--he's on the desk in front of me. But this doesn't entail that Rocky thinks. In fact, I'm pretty sure he doesn't. That's why I like him so much. But if Rocky were to think something, then he would surely think. "I am" is something that a thinker could think. So is "I think". So, someone (not Rocky, alas) could think either of these, and on the basis of doing so conclude that she thinks. But of course her thinking wouldn't follow from her existence any more than it does in Rocky's case. Her thinking would follow from her thinking one of those thoughts. So, what does "I am, therefore I think" mean? It's false if means: I exist, and because of this I think. It's true if it means (roughly): I think that I exist, and because of this I think. (Or: I'm a speaker/thinker (as we can see from my currently asserting that I exist), and because of this I think.) On the second interpretation, the statement is "truer" than what Descartes said, if what he said is...

I study economics. In the first few pages of introductory textbooks there is often a distinction between positive economics (concerned with explanation and prediction) and normative economics (concerned with what one ought to be). I have a feeling that the distinction is not as clear as economists seem to assume, but I can’t put my finger on exactly why this is. Does philosophy have anything to say about this distinction?

Philosophy has much to say about this type of distinction, though I doubt I'm the one to say it. Nevertheless... It seems quite right to distinguish between the normative or prescriptive question of what the ends or even choices of an individual or institution ought to be, and the descriptive question of what, as a matter of fact, they were or are likely to be in a particular case. Moreover, it's important, as the books emphasize, to keep these different questions in mind as one assesses proposals, explanations and theories. I might predict that you will come to financial ruin because of a strong preference (e.g., for expensive wines) which I don't think you should have, or a series of choices (e.g., to invest in junk-bonds) which I don't think you should make. And I might argue that the government should raise taxes even though I predict it won't, and even though I doubt its policy leaders share the crucial assumptions that ground my normative view. So the distinction between normative and the...

What if we look at the universe completely wrong? In other words, what if all the laws of gravity, physics, and everything are actually wrong? Would people keep trying to make a fictional world with fictional rules or strive for the truth? Nick-14

It depends, and even then it depends. It depends first upon whether we ever discover our massive misconceptions. If not, then I imainge we'd continue along merrily piling fancy details upon them. But if (as I think you are imagining) we one day discover that we've gotten it all wrong, then what happens depends upon the inclination of the discoverers, and their culture. There would be shell-shock, certainly, and perhaps some desire to keep heads in the sand and continue on oblivious to the truth. But it's difficult to live by claims we know to be false--try it sometime. And we humans have a genuine built-in urge to understand the way our world works--some say it's what distinguishes us from the other animals. So in all likelihood, we would soon embark upon fresh attempts to understand the way the world actually works--new experiments, new theories, and new conceptual frameworks. I hereby propose, though, that an independent commission be established to determine how on earth we got everything wrong....

Pages