It's not clear to me that the question of whether one should undergo plastic surgery even falls within the scope of morality. (Following certain recent philosophers, such as Robert Adams, T. M. Scanlon, J. B. Schneewind, and Susan Wolf, I am inclined to think that the scope of morality is actually rather narrow.) Here's one way to frame the issue in terms of morality. If one thought that one's body has been entrusted to one by God to preserve, then one may think it impermissible, indeed a transgression against God's will, if one were to tamper with that body. But then, it would seem, such a person would also be unwilling to lift weights, use make-up, go to the hair salon, etc.. This, however, seems to me to be a somewhat implausible position, that would have all sorts of problematic consequences, especially when one considers medical care (Christian Scientists encounter problems on this score). To my mind, it seems that one has the right to do with one's body what one pleases, and the only...

I can understand the concern that one might have about causing sentient beings pain--which may be a reason not to kill or slaughter animals--but it's not clear to me that one should go so far as to claim that all sentient beings have rights, or at least the right not to be treated as property--perhaps all sentient beings have a right not to be harmed, or subjected to pain, but it's not clear to me why all sentient beings have the right not to be treated as property. Hence it's not clear to me that this is indeed a good basis for the decision not to eat eggs. It seems to me that some other justification needs to be given for veganism.

I think that only one person is in a position to grant forgiveness--the person from whom one is seeking forgiveness. When one seeks forgiveness, one is asking someone against whom one has trespassed in some way to absolve one of the trepass, and, thus to restore your relationship, and only the particular person is in a position to do so. Forgiveness thus, I think, belongs to the class of what the philosopher J. L. Austin called "performative utterances": actions, such as promising, christening, and marrying--there are many others--that are undertaken by saying something. And just as not just anyone can marry two people by saying 'I now pronounce you husband and wife'--in order for this to, as Austin says, "come off," the person who utters the words must have the authority to marry two people, and utter those words in the right circumstances--not just anyone can grant forgiveness by saying 'I forgive you' or the equivalent: only the person from whom forgiveness is being sought can grant forgiveness to...

If by 'feeling sorry' for an action, it is meant that the action is regretted, then it seems to me that one may sincerely regret an action and nevertheless for some reason commit a similar action. (That an agent repeats an action that s/he sincerely regretted may reveal something deep about the agent's character--for example, that s/he is unreflective--but I don't think that the fact of such a repetition undermines the sincerity of the agent's regret. After all, s/he certainly did feel regret, assuming that s/he correctly reported her feelings, and so the fact of her feeling regret cannot be called into question unless one is willing to attribute a very deep lack of self-knowledge to the agent.) I think that some of the philosophical significance of this question arises from its connection with the nature of apology, a topic that has received some attention from philosophers, albeit less than one might think the topic merits, given its deep and pervasive importance to human relations. At...

I think that how one sees the relation between intelligence and morality might well depend on how one conceives of morality. If one had a strongly intellectualist conception of morality--as, arguably, Plato and certain early modern Rationalists, such as Leibniz, had--then one might well think that an agent's capacity for moral reflection might well depend directly on her intelligence, and so one might conclude that a more intelligent agent would at least have the capacity to be a more moral agent as well (although, of course, s/he might fail to exercise that capacity). By contrast, if one thought that morality was a matter of following the law (as, for example, early modern natural law theorists, such as Pufendorf, thought), or that it was a matter of habituation (as, at least on certain interpretations, Aristotle thought), then one might think that the capacity to be a moral agent would be altogether independent of one's capacity for moral reflection. Indeed, certain philosophers have suggested that...

The question of whether homosexuality is a choice may be morally relevant. If, as is commonly--although not necessarily correctly--assumed, agents are only responsible for what they choose or do, then only if homosexuality is a choice can one be responsible for being a homosexual, and consequently, subject to moral or religious sanction for being a homosexual. The question of whether homosexuality is a choice, while a vexed one, remains unsettled, although it does appear that the balance of evidence currently seems to favor the view that homosexuality is not a choice. Although the question of whether homosexuality is a choice may thus well be taken to have moral significance, and although it has been linked to the issue of the legality of gay marriage, it is not clear to me that the issues are indeed related. The issues might be taken to be related in the following way. If marriage is supposed to reflect the 'natural' suitability of the partners in question, then, if homosexuality were indeed a...

I wanted to add some remarks on this deep and subtle question, to which Charles has very interestingly responded. What's at stake here is when, on what grounds, and if, one should grant forgiveness. This is a thorny issue that, I think, goes to the very heart of human relations. "Forgive them," Christ said,"for they know not what they do." Christ seems here to be advocating that forgiveness should not at all be predicated on any action on the part of the betrayer: this recommendation, however, may be psychologically quite difficult to fulfill. Indeed, in my own experience, I have found that some sort of recognition of wrong is necessary in order for me to grant forgiveness. (Perhaps this simply reflects my own limitations.) As for 'forgiving and forgetting', that, while perhaps an ideal to be aimed at, again seems to be quite difficult to achieve. (It's very difficult to overcome one's own resentment at being wronged. Perhaps this means that it is very difficult genuinely to forgive...

Just to add a little to Eddy's fine response, which neatly limns both what position is taken on free will by most philosophers and the general state of play of the debates around free will. I just want to comment briefly on the status of the debate on free will for moral prescriptions--which I take to mean the justifiability of ascriptions of praise, blame, etc. (however they are understood--and there is debate, especially, on how to understand the nature of blame: for a sophisticated, but accessible and very clear treatment of this topic, see T. M. Scanlon, Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame ). Both compatibilists and incompatibilists agree that ascriptions of praise and blame are justified just in case agents are free, but they differ--as Eddy pointed out--with respect to how they define free will, which definitions reflect differing views on metaphysical and scientific views about the nature of human beings and of the world. Very roughly, incompatibilists believe that in order to be...

It depends on what one means for it to be bad to have a favorite sibling. I'll take the question to mean whether it is appropriate or morally permissible to have a favorite sibling--i.e., to like one person to whom one is biologically related more than another. Now it seems to me to be natural to prefer some people to others, and, hence, equally natural to prefer some of one's siblings to others. (This, of course, doesn't bear on the question of the appropriateness or moral permissibility of preferring one sibling to another.) Provided that this preference isn't manifest to the sibling in question, then it would seem to me not to be bad, not morally impermissible to prefer one sibling to another. However, in such a case, it seems to me that one must take special care not to manifest one's preference--that, it seems, could be bad, for it might be harmful to the sibling in question.

Let's distinguish the question of whether it is wrong to lie from the specific example that you offer; I'll treat them in turn. Whether it is ever appropriate to lie depends on what one thinks determines the permissibility of an action: Kant, for example, at least on some interpretations--the topic is vexed--seems to say that lying is never permissible (much has been written on this topic: I recommend Christine Korsgaard's advanced, but stimulating essay, "The Right to Lie: Kant on Dealing with Evil," in her collection, Creating the Kingdom of Ends ); a utilitarian who believes that the permissibility of an action is in some sense determined by its consequences (the sense in which consequences matter to utilitarians varies, depending on the form of utilitarianism in question), might say that lying is justified when the consequences of lying are more beneficial than the consequences of not lying. (For a interesting treatment of the permissibility of lying, see another essay by Korsgaard, "Two...