Isn't this far too like e.g. the question "Is enjoying pornography immoral?" In that case it all depends what exactly is in question: a bald yes/no answer would be hopelessly insensitive to the great variety of materials that fall under the very sweeping term "pornography". My impression -- and I hasten to cheerfully admit to lack of expertise! -- is that "BDSM" is similarly used as a pretty sweeping term that also can be, and has been, applied to a pretty wide variety of activities. So here too, a bald yes/no answer is surely likely to be inappropriate. Moral philosophers will need to know quite a bit more about just which sorts of activities in what sorts of contexts are up for evaluation before they can proceed to say anything sensible.

Is it worth exposing flaws in the reasoning for a position, even if you haven't something better to replace it with? Certainly. At the very least, revealing flaws ought to make proponents less dogmatic in their endorsing of the position: they should proceed with caution in trying to implement policies based on the position, not close off the consideration of counter-proposals, etc. etc. All of which consquences are, in general, surely to be encouraged!

Insensitivity to suffering is indeed a bad thing. But Sally Haslanger's seeming implication that a willingness to kill animals and eat them requires insensitivity to suffering is highly contentious. I might happily go out of a late evening with gun and dog to get a rabbit for the pot (good sustainable food, and the proliferating beasts are bit of a pest, even with the foxes, buzzards, stoats and even local cats very busily doing their bit). Maybe that shows I'm not at all sentimental about about the bunnikins of children's story books, but must it show insensitivity to suffering? Why so? On the contrary, I take a gun which will give a clean kill, I'll put a sick animal out of its misery, and so forth. On the common land that runs almost into the centre of Cambridge, handsome Red Poll cattle are now raised by the local vet exercising her ancient commoner's rights as a local resident (sustainably using grazing that would otherwise go to waste). They are very well looked after and then locally and...

Suppose you and an enthusiastic partner have fun getting very imaginative with your video camera. Then after the event -- your partner away for a while, and with their encouragement -- you amuse yourself watching the results, and thereby "consume" what are pornographic materials (here taking pornography to be "the representation in books, magazines, photographs, films, and other media of scenes of sexual behavior that are erotic or lewd and are designed to arouse sexual interest"). It is very difficult to see why you should have any moral qualms about this. Suppose on the other hand you search the sleazier end of the internet to find illegal child pornography. It is very easy to see why you should have more than mere qualms about that . So -- fairly uncontentiously, I hope! -- it all depends on the type of materials, and there can't be a straight yes/no answer to the question asked. The tough question is different: where are the moral lines to be drawn?

Let me recycle the answer I gave to an earlier question . It is indeed a truism that, when I act, it is as a result of my desires, my intentions, my goals. After all, if my arm moves independently of my desires, e.g. because you want it to move and push it, then we'd hardly say that the movement was my action (it was something that happened to my body despite my desires). But even if everything I genuinely do (as opposed to undergo) is as a result of my desires etc., it doesn't follow that everything I do has a selfish or egoistic motive. For to say that I do something for a selfish reason is to say something about the content of my desires (it is to say something about what it is I desire). In other words, to say that I act on a selfish desire it is to say not just that the desire is mine but that the desire is about me or directed towards me or something like that. And it is just false that all my desires are like that. I can want to bring about states of affairs in which I...

Suppose I think (a) that it is normally wrong to kill humans, because so doing deprives them of a future life. But I also think (b) women have a "right to choose", and it is permissible to have at least a reasonably early abortion. Then I seem to be in trouble. For by (a) killing a very young human being in utero should be wrong, as it surely deprives it of the long future life it would otherwise have had, while by (b) killing it is permissible. On the face of it, then, my moral views (a) and (b) aren't consistent with each other, but imply that a certain act is both wrong and not wrong -- which is absurd. And note, I can't just shrug my shoulders and cheerfully say "ok, mymoral views are inconsistent" because inconsistent views don't give me anyguidance about what to do, and my moral views are supposed to help guide me! I want to decide to do in various circumstances, and inconsistent moral injunctions are no use at all for deciding. So I need to revise (a) or revise (b), or at least spell out ...

Yes. When the occasion calls for it, not having a bad word for bad people is just moral cowardice. Which isn't to say that you should be quick to judge, ready to put the worst construal on things or to spread the word about someone's shortcomings, let alone happy to indulge in malicious gossip. But those are faults many of us are all too prone to! And what is praiseworthy is lacking those faults, a disposition of character we respectfully but exaggeratedly describe as "never [but we really mean, never inappropriately] having a bad word to say".

Actually, I very much doubt that you do try to root out beliefs as much as possible. After all, you believe -- on very good grounds! -- that apples aren't poisonous, that butter keeps better in the fridge, that New York is east of California, that Obama is President, that the moon isn't made of green cheese, that 2 + 2 = 4, and a whole host of other truths. Why on earth would you want to root out beliefs such as these? And if you did try to do so, how could you live any sort of life? If you had no beliefs one way or the other about what is safely edible, then you'd very soon poison yourself! We need true beliefs to guide successful action. So, I take it that it isn't beliefs in general that you are trying to root out (that way madness lies!), but much more specifically it is those of your beliefs for which there are insufficient rational grounds and/or which are not generated in reliable ways. Beliefs which are not appropriately supported are too likely to be false, and we need our...

Let's agree that, from the moment of conception, we have a living thing -- and, if the parents are human, this living thing belongs to no other species than homo sapiens . So what? That fact doesn't in itself determine the moral status of the product of conception. Here's one possible view: as the human zygote/embryo/foetus develops, its death becomes a more serious matter. At the very beginning, its death is of little consequence; as time goes on its death is a matter it becomes appropriate to be more concerned about. In fact, that view seems to be exactly the one most of us take about the natural death of human zygotes/embryos/foetuses. After all, few of us are worried by the fact that a high proportion of conceptions spontaneously abort: few of us are scandalized if a woman who finds she is pregnant by mistake in a test one week after conception is pleased when she discovers that the pregnancy has naturally terminated a few days later. Similarly for accidental death: suppose a woman...

The question doesn't specify what is to be taught. That matters. To take an extreme case, only a fully expert, well qualified, person should teach brain surgery. It would indeed be unethical to ask anyone else, or for the non-expert to comply with such a request. Too much hangs on getting things right. But that's really a rather exceptional case. Fortunately. And most of us (unless we are very senior or in very big departments) from time to time do have to teach outside our areas of real expertise. Which is no doubt good for us (the effort is rarely wasted, and you can often find surprising connections with your main interests). It can be good for the students too. Being taught by someone who is vividly aware of the difficulties for a beginner on the topic, who isn't in danger of making things too complicated too soon, who is willing to share a real sense of exploring an area together (rather than giving oracular pronouncements as an expert), can all be very positive. Assuming we aren't...