The moral question of whether abortion is wrong is whether or not it is a person. Well, I don't understand why people say that a fetus is not a person. How are a fetus and an infant any different. An infant doesn't understand the future just the way a fetus doesn't. At 14 weeks a fetus begins to move and "explore" the womb and itself. That shows some curiosity and some sort of "thinking". On a genetic level or the form of the fetus also at 14 weeks it is "a person". So then at the very least shouldn't abortion be illegal after that? If we should not kill an infant, which is very illegal, why can we kill a fetus which in many instances is on the same level as the infant? If anything we should not kill the fetus because it is innocent and the infant is not. An infant cries just to be held where it should cry because it needs something. Just as a small example.

In addition to Allen's points, it should be noted that not everyone agrees that the issue of abortion boils down to the issue of whether the fetus is a person. Judith Thomson has famously argued that other persons do not have a right to use my body, even if preventing them from such use would cause their death. For example, if I had a rare blood type and was taken into custody an hooked up to someone who needed blood of my type, this would be a violation of my rights and I would be permitted to resist, or unplug myself. Because a fetus is using the pregnant woman's body, sometimes against her will (think of rape especially, but also contraception failure), she does not have a moral obligation to allow such use. In some cases it would be very kind of me to allow such use, e.g., if it wasn't at great cost to me, but even if we count the fetus as a ful person, it doesn't have a right to such use. See: Judith Jarvis Thomson : A Defense of Abortion . Philosophy & Public Affairs , Vol....

Some actions aren't regarded as morally wrong if their supposed "victim" consented to them. My question concerns whether the important thing is consent itself or, on the contrary, the desire (or the will) for the action. If someone does not consent but we know "beyond any reasonable doubt" that that person wants our action, wouldn't that be the same as if he or she consented? Certainly, if someone wants our action, in most situations he or she will ask for it or accept it, but in some cases this may be impossible (e.g., if that person is unconscious or for some other reason is not able to speak).

There are two separate questions here, one more general and the other more specific. On the general question about whether it is wrong to do something to someone (or for someone?) if they desire it but don't consent to it, I would argue that in most cases it is wrong. One might desire something, but not approve of that desire. For example, Alice might want to have sex with Bob, but because Bob is married, not approve of that desire. In such cases, Alice might not consent to sex with Bob, even if Bob could know full well that Alice desires it. If Bob were to pursue Alice further, knowing of Alice's desire, I think that would be clearly wrong. The general point is that there is more to showing respect for someone than showing respect for their desires, especially if they themselves are critical of their desires. The more specific question is how we should decide how to act if a person is unable to consent. Your proposal seems to be that we should act on what we know to be the person's desires. ...

If one were to treat someone differently based on their appearance, would that be racism, or would it only be considered racism if the outcome of this action was to hurt or insult the person of "other race" in question? If I for instance helped colored people because of their color, I am treating them differently than other human beings. Many people encourage helping people of other races out, yet aren't we simply affirming they are different based on color if our action is motivated by the color of that person?

Good question. If race is a morally irrelevant feature of persons, to what extent should it matter (if at all) in deciding how to act? To begin, it is worth noting that there is huge controversy about what to make of our ordinary racial categories. There seems to be a fairly wide consensus amongst geneticists that there is no meaningful genetic or biological classification that maps onto the racial classification system that we currently use in the US. So some have argued from this that 'races' are illusions. However, it is compatible with this that our racial terminology actually picks out social groups, i.e., groups of people who are viewed and treated in a certain way within the dominant cutlure. It seems fairly clear that people who appear "white" and people who appear "black" or "asian" or "hispanic" are viewed and treated differently within our culture. So when you suggest that by treating people of color differently Whites are "affirming they are different based on their color",...

Would Immanuel Kant oppose alternative rock? If we were to universalize the maxim "It is permissible to listen to alternative rock" then "alternative" rock would become mainstream, since everyone would listen to it. This of course creates a contradiction, implying we have a perfect duty not to listen to alternative rock. (I'm not trying to be silly. I think I've wildly misinterpreted Kant, and I was wondering if you could clear it up.) You might say that just because alt. rock was permitted, that doesn't mean everyone would listen to it. But if stealing was permitted, it doesn't logically follow that everyone would steal. (Same goes for lying.)

I'm not a Kant scholar so can't say much helpful about your interpretation of Kant (the contradiction test has always puzzled me), but there is an assumption in your argument that seems worth questioning. You suggest that if everyone listened to alternative rock, it wouldn't be alternative anymore, and so there is a contradiction in generalizing the maxim. But I wonder if it is essential to alternative rock that it is "alternative"? It seems to me that alternative rock is a kind of music (I kind I like a lot) that is not defined by its being alterantive, but by the norms of the genre. There are kinds of rock that aren't mainstream, but aren't "alternative rock" either. They are just unpopular. So "alternative rock" is not equivalent to "unpopular rock" or "non-mainstream rock". Philosophers sometimes distinguish two ways of using descriptions. One way is to pick something out, but once you've picked it out using the description, you can talk about that thing even in contexts where it...

I believe that there are only 3 possible options. 1) That God or some all powerful being created the universe. This is a very bizarre state because it means we are all subordinates to an independent being that has always existed. Strange. 2) The universe was created out of nothing. Truly weird. 3) That the universe has always existed. This is simply incomprehensible. Because these are the only 3 options I see and because each is mind-bogglingly discouraging or incomprehensible - or downright goofy - I think this whole existence thing is either some sort of hallucination or a complete joke. (Another possibility is that I am in some sort of hell.) Therefore, I take nothing seriously and treat this whole thing sort of the way you deal with the pain of stubbing your toe. Kind of grit your teeth and wait for the pain to end. Any thoughts?

Even if you are right that each of the options you describe is difficult to accept, I'm wondering how you can possibly treat "this whole existence thing" as a hallucination or a complete joke? Are you saying that you don't take the question seriously (but do take your and others' existence seriously), or are you saying that you don't take existence seriously? If your point is that you don't think it is worth continuing to ask the question, I can sympathize; but I would suggest that you may want to think a bit more about (a) whether there are presuppositions that are responsible for the seeming incoherence of each option, and if so what they are, and (b) whether there are questionable presuppositions of the question. I note, in fact, that you don't actually forumate a question, even though you are considering possible answers. What, exactly, is the question you are seeking an answer to? Is it "Why is there something rather than nothing?" Or "What is the cause of everything, i.e., the whole...

Is happiness really all that important? A lot of people think so, but that being happy just for happiness' sake is a waste. If there was a "happiness pill" that could make me happy for the rest of my life, I wouldn't take it. Because if I did, I'd get lazy and wouldn't accomplish anything. It seems like the pill would be cheating. But on the other hand, I'm not so sure I'd want to be the most successful person in the world if it meant I could never be happy. So I have to wonder: is it happiness or the things that make us happy that we should value?

On this topic, I have always been intrigued by Simone de Beauvoir's comments in the introduction to The Second Sex. She says: But we do not confuse the idea of private interest with that ofhappiness, although that is another common point of view. Are not womenof the harem more happy than women voters? Is not the housekeeperhappier than the working-woman? It is not too clear just what the word happy really means and still less what true values it may mask. There is nopossibility of measuring the happiness of others, and it is always easyto describe as happy the situation in which one wishes to place them. In particular those who are condemned to stagnation are oftenpronounced happy on the pretext that happiness consists in being atrest. This notion we reject, for our perspective is that ofexistentialist ethics. Every subject plays his part as suchspecifically through exploits or projects that serve as a mode oftranscendence; he achieves liberty only through a continual reachingout...

In many Western countries divorce laws have requirements that force the party with the greater income to continue in paid work and pay alimony to allow the other party to maintain the style of living to which they "have become accustomed during the marriage," or with similar wording. However, I am having a hard time reconciling this with some of the replies to question #1796, which referred to the obligation to have sex during marriage. Most people would certainly agree that one is not obliged to have sex with a partner, or an ex-partner after a relationship has broken up. The arguments there focused on people having an "inalienable right to one's body", but surely this same argument could be used against forcing people to do work they don't want to do? More specifically, how is forcing person A to work against their will to provide financial support for person B *ethically different* from obliging person A to have sex against their will to provide sexual satisfaction for person B?

There are lots of complex issues here (as in the previous question r#1796 referred to). In response to the earlier question, I focued on rights and obligations because those were the terms in which the question was asked. Prof. Soble emphasized there that many other moral considerations are relevant in intimate human relations, e.g., what would be virtuous, nice, religiously required, what one should do out of a sense of duty, justice, or reciprocity, etc. I was not answering a question about what would be virtuous or just, but what is obligatory. I took obligations to be closely tied to rights. So I was not asserting that there are no other moral considerations in matters of sex as he seemed to read me, but only that there are some important rights and obligations that are relevant to whether one has an obligation to have sex in marriage. But it is difficult to articulate what rights and obligations there are, and this current question rightly demands clarification. First, we might want to...

I have responsibility for planning long range infrastructure at a state level. The subject continuously comes up of equity and fairness in the setting of priorities. If the most equitable and sustainable solution for the future of all citizens requires some citizens currently to have less equity or do with less now: is this temporal inequity justified or fair, for the superior sustainable equity for all in the future? On the other hand, if we are fair to all now, the future will definitely be unfair for all and worse for some.

As you might expect, the answer to your question depends on what conception of justice you hold. One sort of utilitarian maintains, for example, that the right distribution will be the one that maximizes the greatest amount of welfare over the long run. So it will be permissible to have short-term inequalities if they promote welfare overall. If equity is a factor in welfare, then on this view it is OK to have short-term inequities in order to gain long-term equity. It is unclear, however, to what extent equity is important to maximize welfare. Another approach, then, would be to accept a consequentialist view that does not focus entirely on welfare, but recommends maximizing other goods, such as equity. However, one complaint about utilitarianism, and consequentialism generally, is that it ignores the rights of individuals. So it is important to consider the sorts of things being distributed. For example, would it be permissible to deny voting rights to some people now if doing so would...

Can the well-documented placebo effect in medicine be applied to the comfort religious belief gives many? In the case of religion, should such an affect be encouraged, discouraged, or dismissed? You could argue that none of us will ever know until we die, and if we were wrong in being religious we will never know we got it wrong. If various monks or nuns in various religions (to take an extreme example of devotion) got it wrong - and some would have to have had if you subscribe to the logical view that only one religion can assure you an afterlife, what possible advice can be given? If you feel someone is wasting their life on a misguided religious quest should you just preserve silence, salute the meaning it lends their life and leave well alone? What duty do we have here, if any? Philosophers understand the points involved better than most and can see through many misconceptions in religious belief that believers are unaware of. Each-to-his-own is surely a tragic cop-out.

This isn't really an answer to your question but, rather, a point I find interesting about the framing of your question. (You could still ask your question in slightly different terms, of course...) Although the idea of a "placebo effect" is common, there is actually some reason to doubt that it is "well-documented". A recent article in the New England Journal of Medicine by Asbjorn Hrobjartsson and Peter C. Gotzsche, (May 24, 2001) argues tha t the trials aiming to establish a placebo effect are, for the most part, not sound. http://content.nejm.org/cgi/content/abstract/344/21/1594 For example, in some cases the studies don't take into account the fact that the condition of some percentage of people will improve without any medication at all. Although the studies compare people who take medication with people who take a placebo, they don't always compare people who take the placebo with those who take nothing. This, as you might expect, doesn't settle the question, but...

Hi, I am interested in taking a post-graduate philosophy program (MA or Doctorate) in Vietnam. It has been nearly impossible to get any information about the programs, and sometimes the pages of the university don't translate into English. I do not speak Vietnamese. I was wondering if you can give me any advice into the English-language speaking philosophy programs that Vietnam offers? Can you direct me anywhere where I can find this information? Thanks for your help! -Nadia

I don't know anything about Anglophone philosophy programs in Vietnam, but I would guess that if the websites don't have English translations, the program isn't an Anglophone program. If you are interested in translations, one way to find a translator is to advertise on Craig's List. There are Craig's Lists in many major US cities. http://www.craigslist.org/about/sites.html

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