This took a bit of homework and consulting to find out. Many scholars seem to think that there may not be a determinate date for the setting of the Phaedrus as Plato was not committed to historical accuracy and ready to create a composite from different times to suit his dialectical purposes. This view is exemplified by Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff who, on page xiii of the introduction to their edition of the Phaedrus (Hackett 1995), assert that the people mentioned in the dialogue as present in Athens were never there at the same time: Lysias did not arrive in Athens until 412 BCE, Phaedrus was in long-term exile 415-403 BCE, and the dialogue strongly suggests that Sophocles and Euripides (who both died in 406 BCE) are still alive at the time it takes place. The most authoritative work on the dramatic dates of Plato's dialogues is Debra Nails: The People of Plato: A Prosopography of Plato and OtherSocratics (Hackett 2002). She disagrees with Nehamas/Woodruff and settles on 418...

I agree that Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is as much a critique of empiricism as it is of rationalism. But the title still makes sense if you understand two things about it. First, the word "Critique" here means not merely criticism but, more broadly, critical examination. The book draws limits to reason in some respects but also vindicates our reason in others. Second, the word "of" here means not only that reason is the object of critical examination, but also that reason is conducting this critical examination. So, in a nutshell, Kant promises in his title a critical self-examination of reason: an examination undertaken by reason of what reason can and cannot do.

What you are citing is not the principle Rawls is actually defending as his second principle of justice, it is merely a principle he considers along the way. In its canonical formulation, the second principle reads: "Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to be attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity [the opportunity principle ]; and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society [the difference principle ]." With the correct text substituted, your point about the least advantaged makes more sense. Still, what Rawls is demanding for the least advantaged is really in one sense more than a safety net. The word "safety net" suggests a certain minimum, perhaps some amount sufficient to meet one's basic needs. But Rawls is demanding the highest feasible bottom position, even if this turns out to be well above the level needed for economic security. So, even if...

Well spotted! Nozick holds that, in order for you to know p, it must be the case that, if p were false, you wouldn't believe p. This condition is not fulfilled when p is "it is not the case that I am a brain in a vat on Alpha Centauri being stimulated to have my present experiences": if p were false (if I were a brain in a vat on Alpha Centuri being stimulated to have my present experiences), then I would nonetheless be believing p. But this condition may well be fulfilled when p is "I am typing." It is fulfilled if, were I not typing, I wouldn't believe that I am. With this move, Nozick takes himself to have shown at least how knowledge is possible: it's possible that I am really typing and that, if I weren't typing, I wouldn't believe that I am. But do I know that I am typing or do I not? Well, according to Nozick, this depends on what I would believe if I weren't typing now. Nozick assumes that there's a definite answer to this question, a fact of the matter. But, even if we grant this,...

There is a great influence, of course. But it is subtle and impossible to understand simply by reading ancient philosophers. It makes more sense for you to prepare yourself by reading contemporary works that give you a sense of how citizens in the affluent Western countries think about themselves, their relations to the rest of the world, their history, and the world's future. These contemporary works will be more accessible to you, because you understand much better the context in which they were written than you can hope to understand the context in which Plato wrote. And you can still, in a few years, do some study of the ancients if you are so inclined. For now, I would try to find a textbook collection of contemporary essays on ethics or political philosophy, and then learn about the debates we have here about affirmative action, the environment, equality for women, war, poverty, trade, and so on. (By the way, I would give analogous advice to a young Western student departing for a year in China. She...

I don't think this responsibility is confined to those who have thought deeply about an issue. If climate change is a menace to the poor today and to future generations, and if we are much involved in fuelling this menace, then we all have a responsibility to act to slow down and stop this phenomenon. If the responsibility were confined to those who have thought deeply about this, the others could easily get off the hook simply by avoiding deep thought. Still, I agree that as one who understands the problem better one has a special role to play, namely the role of alerting others to their responsibilities. This is something philosophers can do and should do much more of: Help citizens think clearly and critically about their responsibilities as citizens of their state and of the world. In most cases, this indirect way of doing something about the problem is likely to be more effective than direct action. And it has the additional advantage of helping one's fellow citizens avoid involvement in grave...

As with other great works in the history of philosophy, Kant's Critique of Pure Reason -- the single greatest work of philosophy ever written, in my view -- is valuable more for the questions it poses and the ways it develops for pursuing these questions than for the answers. These questions and methods are understood and reflected in the best work done by philosophers today. Still, much current work in philosophy is not at this level -- mistakes of the kinds Kant exposed are still frequently made, esp. ones that are so "natural" to our ordinary ways of thinking. (For example, it is very natural to believe that you just know the temporal order of the events in your mental life ... until someone presses you to explain how a being with a plurality of mental items in her mind could possibly get from these the notion of time and some specific ordering of her mental items in time.) Kant explored so much new ground in this book, pioneering the language needed in this exploration as he went along...

Perhaps a more accurate modern translation would be: "Only a desire can motivate by itself, a belief can motivate only in conjunction with a desire." The Humean's response to your query would be: The belief that some action will give you pleasure can motivate you only if you desire to experience, or desire not to experience, that pleasure. In conjunction with the former desire, the belief will motivate you to perform the action. In conjunction with the latter, it will motivate you to desist. In the absence of either desire, the belief will have no effect on your motivation.

I would read Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature , perhaps with Reading Rorty as a companion text. It's a very rewarding text.

Kant better not say this. If everyone remained childless, then there would be no new babies either. So, by the same token, Kant would be condemning his own decision to remain childless. A good way of showing how remaining childless can be seen as permissible on Kant's ground is to interpret the categorical imperative as asking whether one can will not the universal adoption , but rather the universal availability of one's maxim. In a world in which enough children are born by to those who want to have children, I can will my maxim of remaining childless to be universally available: Even if everyone who wants to adopt this maxim does so, humanity will still continue. Applying this interpretation of the categorical imperative to homosexuality, it turns out that homosexuality is likewise permissible. Even if I cannot will humankind to go extinct, I can will the universal availability of a homosexual life: There are enough heterosexuals who want to have children to propagate the human race...