Suppose I have a friend who keeps a stack $100 bills under her bed. For some strange reason she does not ever wish to spend the money; she just plans on letting it sit there. What's more surprising is the fact that she never counts it. So she would never know some went missing. Am I justified in taking a bit of the cash to, say, buy her flowers? She would be pleased to receive the gift, I'm sure; at the same time she would not have the slightest idea that the money use to pay for it was her own. So as far as she can tell she only benefits, meaning I'd be doing here favor. Yet, isn't it obviously cruel of me to even consider duping her like that? What is going on here?

A girlfriend showed me a short story in which a group of women on a kibbutz broke the hymen of an infant girl in a ceremonial, ritualistic manner. The act deprived any male from doing so--a kind of preemptive strike against male dominace, violence, etc. My question is, was this choice ethical? Is belief in an ideology or movement like feminism reason enough to alter the body of an infant who cannot object? If Jews perform a bris on infant males as a foundational religious practice, why not accept hymen perforation on secular feminist grounds? Thanks for your consideration.

What was the ethical way to handle the mountain-climber on Mt. Everest, David Sharp, who was passed over by 40 climbers as they left him for what they thought was dead?

I get the impression that arguments for nature preservation hinge largely on the idea that what industrial nations are doing to the earth is somehow "unnatural," that in uprooting forests and clubbing baby seals we are throwing off some "balance" in nature. If we as humans are in fact animals, however, in what sense could anything we do as a species be considered "unnatural"? aren't we and our actions necessarily an internal element to that "balance" many say we have disrupted from without? Locusts destroy fields; we, rainforests -- what's the difference? I understand that it may be in our best interest to preserve earth's flora and fauna (i.e., we shouldn't drive pandas to extinction, because they are nice to have around), but many seem to argue that our exploitation of the environment is somehow "wrong", and I don't know how this sentiment can be justified. -andy

Can a good deed be thought in any way to offset the mark of a bad one, or does the moral worth of either sort exist independently? If a person commits a crime we say is unforgivable (say, murder), do we nevertheless suppose that the deed might be atoned for by some (albeit tremendous) combination of benevolent deeds, or do we mean that that the crime's weight is absolute regardless of peripheral acts? -andy

If you are a promising young human being, say anywhere beyond the usual average, is there something like a moral obligation to make something great out of your talent? (Or asked another way: is somebody with great talent more obliged to achieve something great than any other person? See, this question is about one LIFE: taking huge pains, giving up trying to reach normality, all for the one reason of ART which is considered as a state of higher consciousness or whatever; a thing which begins to smell foolish to me and which I question more and more each day - without getting pessimistic, though.) Or is this whole should-would-could-thing just a question of decision?! Isn't life generally speaking just what you CAN and then what you WANT and at last what you DECIDE? I would be downright thrilled about getting an answer.. thx. (Wow, I don't speak english, I had to work on this question for more than an hour.. or actually I began working on it over 18 years ago... who knows, who cares!)

Suppose I personally disliked people with a certain trait and, as a consequence, choose (perhaps unconsciously) not to become close friends or romantically involved with them. As long as I am still friendly and polite to them, this behaviour as such would not be ethically objectionable as it would just be my personal taste, and I am not morally obliged to be friends with anybody. However, personal tastes are often grounded in cultural norms and fashions that can be pervasive across a society. Then all these individual personal dispositions together will cause systemic discrimination and real suffering amongst the "victims". Examples of this scenario are overweight people, the disabled, or people of certain races. But if all individuals can excuse their behaviour by personal taste, who is to blame, morally?

Consider the following scenario: an acquaintance I personally do not particularly enjoy talking to is learning French and asks me for a favour, namely to chat with them an hour per week in French, my mother tongue. Would it be morally good to do them the favour, even if it would just be out of duty? Or another scenario: my mum wants me to visit her for Christmas, but I wish not to, just as much as she wants me to go. Should I go out of duty? According to Kant, good actions must be motivated by a sense of duty, as opposed to inclination. But shouldn't it be just the other way round, at least if the action is about doing another person a favour? It almost seems immoral to do somebody a favour only because of duty.

Is a doctor or an optometrist ethically or morally obligated to report a patient with poor eyesight to the state department of motor vehicles?

Can I use someone else as a "mere means" in Kant's words without coercing or deceiving them? Is the use of someone as mere means possible when there is consent? Some of the examples I have in mind are: (1) Prostitutes sell their bodies, hence "objectify" themselves even though they consent to this action. We could consider two sub-cases, one in which a prostitute is forced to prostitution due to poverty, the other in which she or he has other options. (2) Two people, even though they don't like each other, meet regularly to play tennis. The only reason they meet is to play tennis. In short, they "use" each other to play tennis.