Topics Knowledge

Question A typical response to global skepticism (skepticism which claims that we can know nothing), is that such a position is self-defeating. However, couldn't the global skeptic respond by stating that such an objection relies on the objector having knowledge of the truth of the law of non-contradiction, which the skeptic claims we don't know? Thus, the skeptic could argue that they know nothing can be known while having the privilege of also incoherently claiming that they still know certain things. Would it even be possible to even intelligibly respond to such a claim, since it seems when one begins to reject things like the laws of logic, then intelligible discourse becomes impossible and were left with assumptions?

Accepted:
August 4, 2019

Comments

Fascinating questions.

The view that no one can know anything does not seem self-defeating to me. You think this version of global skepticism defeats itself because it implies that the view itself is unknowable. But why does this defeat the view? Even if we cannot know the view to be true, there still may be sufficient reasons to believe it.

Nevertheless, suppose you are a global skeptic who wishes to maintain that you know the truth of global skepticism. You believe global skepticism and its implication that you do not know the truth of global skepticism. Does the fact that you do not know the law of non-contradiction give you a reason to affirm that you also know global skepticism is true?

I do not see why. To be consistent in your global skepticism, you should admit that you don't know whether there are any true contradictions. But that doesn't give you a positive reason to believe that when you say "I know no one can know anything," it is both true and false.