Question Am i wrong in assuming the admiration of things, ideas, and/or people comes along with not only an unspoken, but definite predilection for them? - or is it possible to have that admiration, but dislike them entirely? i.e. Thinking something is the greatest thing ever, but all of its positive attributes are why you don't like it; maybe because of how the results of using said attributes makes you feel. Or would you say that the person doesnt truly admire it or even that they dont truly dislike the results?

Accepted:
April 30, 2016

Comments

Your questions raise

Your questions raise intriguing issues regarding how various goods or values are related.

As best I can tell, whatever our reasons for admiring something or someone, these reasons need not be accompanied by reasons to like that thing or person, and can even be accompanied by reasons to dislike that thing or person. I don't much care for golf, finding the game far too genteel and slow moving. But I can certainly admire the skill of a world class golfer or the skill shown by a particular player in a particular tournament. I certainly doubt I'd want to be present for that tournament or want to meet the golfer. Admiration seems, then, often disinterested in a way that 'liking' or 'having a predilection for' is not. You also ask about not liking something or someone because of its "positive attributes." That seems possible too. For instance, one might dislike someone you admire because the attributes you admire in them 'crowd out' other positive attributes. A person can be admirable for being very hard working, but unlikable because their work ethic has led them to neglect other desirable attributes — developing a sense of humor, say, or being compassionate toward others.

There is a large body of philosophical literature on how various goods or values are related -- whether they form a unified (or unifiable) whole, whether they can be fully realized or reconciled, etc. Of particular interest here are:
- the many discussions, inspired by philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle, of whether the virtues are 'unified' (i.e., whether a person with any of the virtues will have all of the virtues, or whether it is possible to have only some of the virtues)
- Thomas Nagel's work on the fragmentation of value
- Susan Wolf's well-known paper "Moral Saints," in which she argues that the most morally admirable individuals are not to like to be the most admirable, period