Topics Freedom

Question Compatiblism is attractive because it finds room for human freedom in a deterministic world. But objections that compatiblism is evasive or incoherent strike me as persuasive. Setting aside the indeterministic defense of free will, how might the hard determist endorse the claim that humans generally do bear moral responsibility for their actions? Or would the hard determinist have to bite this bullet and conclude that moral responsibility is illusory if we have no free will?

Accepted:
October 31, 2013

Comments

As I understand it, hard determinism by definition holds that because determinism is true, no one is morally responsible for his/her actions. That is, hard determinists are simply incompatibilists who accept determinism. See the definition of 'hard determinism' given at this link. According to that definition, hard determinists hold that human agents never bear moral responsibility for their actions. By 'hard determinist', did you perhaps mean to refer to a compatibilist who accepts determinism, or perhaps just anyone who accepts determinism?

I'd be interested to know which arguments persuade you that compatibilism is evasive or incoherent. I haven't found any that persuade me of that. You say that compatibilism 'is attractive because it finds room for human freedom in a deterministic world'. I find it attractive because it concentrates on the ingredients that actually seem to bear on an agent's moral responsibility, discovering thereby that indeterminism isn't one of those ingredients.

I like Stephen's answer, but I think you ARE asking about the hard determinist -- you're convinced by hard determinism about free will (i.e. tht determinism rules out freedom, not (directly) that it rules out moral responsibility), and you're worried about having to give up moral responsibility. But I suppose a lot rides on how one defines moral responsibility -- I don't think it's somehow intrinsic to the concept that we have to have freedom in the indeterminist way in order to be morally responsible. Dennett, for example, makes pretty powerful arguments that we don't and really shouldn't care about whether we 'could have done otherwise' generally speaking -- see Elbow Room. Now you could use that point to defend compatibilist accounts of freedom -- we're free despite determinism's being true -- and then hold that moral responsibility requires freedom. But since you are persuaded against compatibilism (though I hope you've read Dennett...), why exactly couldn't you hold that moral resopnsibility does not require freedom after all? That is, use Dennett's arguments to develop a general account of moral responsibility independent of whether we 'could have done otherwise,' and cut out the freedom middle man altogether? (You might also read Frankfurt's accounts of moral responsibility as well -- lots of literature there.)

hope that's useful --

ap