Question I have a question about the theistic argument from contingency (henceforth, TAC) and God's selection of universes. There is the following age-old argument which led Leibniz to reject TAC. Argument: 1. Necessarily, If God exists, then God creates the best possible universe. 2. God necessarily exists. 3. So, God necessarily creates the best possible universe (from 1 and 2). (3) gives us modal collapse, which goes against TAC. But let's say we deny (1). Still, God is strongly reasons-responsive. So, if God weighed reasons for and against creating a certain universe U, and God found the reasons to favor creating U, then God necessarily creates U. This would also give us modal collapse. But there may be a solution. My question is whether this solution works. The solution: suppose Molinism is true. Then, God is confronted with different contingent counterfactuals of creaturely freedom in some worlds in which he exists. Maybe in one world in which God exists, all the persons freely reject God's existence, so God chooses not to create a universe in which these persons exist (say, God doesn't want to throw all of them in hell). So in that world, God chooses not to create. So modal collapse is avoided. So, does this work?

Accepted:

October 10, 2013