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Debating with a theologian over the validity of biblical condemnation of homosexuality i've been offered a sequence of arguments that seem to me circular. First argument: Divine directives 1. God has given the directive to establish the eterosexual marriage 2. Homosexual acts are condemned in the BIble 3. Homosexuals brake the divine directive Second argument: Perverse heart 1. To brake a divine law willingly is perversion 2. Homosexual acts are condemned in the Bible 3. Homosexuals are perverse Third argument: social deviance 1. To diffuse behaviours that are condemned in the Bible is a form of social deviance 2. Homosexual acts are condemned in the BIble 3. Homosexual are social deviant To me it is obvious that all these arguments implies, as a second premise, the condemnation whose validity is in question. When i have made this observation i have been offered a curios answer: anyone has a worldview that starts from certain unquestionable premise, that are in themselves circular but not invalid. For instance: Premise: God exists. Conclusion: God exists. For a Christian the validity of the Bible is a presupposition that is not questionable. Therefore there is no circularity in their argument. When i have asked a more detailed explanation, pointing to the fact thta there is a logical jump from their premise to their conclusion, i have received only personal offences. Could you help me to understand better the concept of "worldview" and which ideas can be considered correctly as unqestionable presupposition of a worldview and which not? Thanks Luca ps excuse me for my poor english...
Accepted:
October 31, 2013

Comments

Allen Stairs
October 31, 2013 (changed October 31, 2013) Permalink

Interesting.

It's true that we do sometimes rely on assumptions, premises or whatnot that we simply take for granted. In fact, it's hard to see how we could avoid doing that; otherwise we'd end up in an endless regress of justifications. We could use the term "worldview" for broad premises that we use this way, but I'm not sure the term adds much so I'll leave it aside.

But there's another question that leaves an ambiguity in what you're saying. Is the theologian offering an argument that s/he think should persuade a non-believer? Or is he offering arguments that a believer might accept whether or not anyone else does?

If your asking this person "Why do you believe that homosexuality is wrong" then pointing out that it's a consequence of other assumptions that the person accepts and sees as more basic is fine. In that case, he's simply setting forth the internal logic of his view. Whether or not you accept the first two beliefs, there's no circularity in saying "The Bible represents God's directives, and we should obey God's directives. The Bible tells us what God's directives are, and it directs us not to perform homosexual acts. Therefore we shouldn't." There's also no logical jump. If you accept the premises, it's reasonable to draw the conclusion

On the other hand, if what you're asking the theologian is "Why should I, who don't share your religion, think that homosexuality is wrong?" then the arguments are plainly not good enough. They rest on premises that you don't simply accept, and you've been given no reason to believe them. Compare: suppose someone said to this theologian "Utilitarianism is the right view of morality. [That is, roughly: what's right is what produces the most happiness and the least unhappiness.] There are no good utilitarian arguments against homosexuality. Therefore it's not wrong." In the circumstances, that would be no better an argument. The theologian plainly doesn't accept the first premise, and he hasn't been given a reason to.

Now the theologian might say that any reasonable person should see that his premises about God are true. But of course, that's not so. Many clearly reasonable people disagree -- just as many reasonable people don't that utilitarianism is the correct story about right and wrong. There are interesting, serious reasons to doubt that there's a God. And even if there is a God, there are interesting, serious reasons to doubt that a literal reading of the Bible reveals his will. (Likewise, there are interesting, serious reasons to doubt that utilitarianism gets morality right.)

If your theologian turns to insult rather than argument when you ask for clarification, there may not be much point in pursuing the discussion. But it could be pursued. Chances are neither of you would end up convincing the other. But you each might gain more insight into why the other thinks as he does.

But this doesn't say anything about your last question: when is it reasonable to put a premise beyond question?

That's a hard question. For one thing, it's context-dependent. If people who share a broad point of view are arguing about details, it's usually reasonable not to call the shared presuppositions into question. But that's not the only context. For most of us, there are certain views that we're not likely to give up even though we know full well that others don't share them. (Basic ideological commitments are sometimes like this, for example.)

Still, I think we can say at least a little more. One point is a rule of thumb: if the person you're disagreeing with seems sane, thoughtful and well-informed, that's a reason to take seriously the possibility that they might be onto something. Another point is related: sometimes, even though we don't find our opponents' reasons compelling, we can see that they have some force; we can feel their tug. For example: I'm opposed to capital punishment. But I can see how a perfectly reasonable person might come to a different conclusion. That suggest that I should't turn my opposition to capital punishment into an axiom. Similarly: I'm not a theist. But I know plenty of sane, reasonable theists, and I can understand the pull that theism has for them. Once again, that suggests I should't take my non-theism as an unquestionable presupposition.

Beyond that, it's not easy to say much. It sounds to me as though your theologian is not giving enough credit to doubters. That said, there's probably some room for you to give him at least some credit and it might be interesting to see where that leads.

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