Topics Religion

Question An atheist friend and I (I am a theist) had a long series of discussions about the existence of god, and his comments made quite an impression on me. I found what he said so stimulating, in fact, that I beagn to read more philosophy of religion to help me better understand the nature of the issues raised. One question, however, is a bit puzzling, and I have not read much about it, though I have seen it raised in atheist/theist debates about the existence of god. The issue is simply falsifiabilty: how can we know if some occurrence of anything is an act of god and therefore, say, the result of prayer, or the result or effect of natural processes? For example, if I pray for a sick relative and she recovers, I can say god healed her; but I can also rightly argue that medical science healed her; or, even more precisely, physicians using medical knowledge stabilized her body so that it could heal itself. I know many theists regularly thank god for certain acts (many of which they pray for) that could easily be explained in more natural terms. How do we know when an act can rightly be attributed to god, and therefore the result of prayer, and when one can be attributed to something quite natural? I have considered various ideas (e.g. things one prays for that are congruent with some religious text are caused by god; things that are congruent with god's nature, i.e. good things, are caused by god; etc.), the answers I have considered seem problematic in one way or another.

Accepted:
February 21, 2013

Comments

Much appreciate! I believe that the assessment of whether any particular event is the result of God's provident will rest on one's background beliefs. If, for example, one has plausible reasons for thinking theism is true (based on any of the classical or contemporary arguments, for examples of these see the entry, Philosophy of Religion in the free and online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy), then there will more openness to accepting a theistic account of, say, a healing than if one has independent reason for thinking theism is false and naturalism is true. However, I suggest that it would be best to see any argument for (or against) God based on ostensible miracles as a component in a comprehensive case for theism based on religious experience. There are a host of defenders of such an argument: Kai Man Kwan, William Wainwright, Caroine Davis, William Alston, Keith Yandell, Richard Swinburne, and others. Of course, as in all interesting matters, there are serious critics, but my point is to draw your attention to some of the players (see the Stanford Encyclopedia for a list of philosophers pro and con). The reason why I think arguing over religious experience is the place to go is that everyone on earth now and in the future is being prayed over so there is no "control group." That is, many of us who believe in God pray "for all people in their daily life and work" (to use the language of the Book of Common Prayer). In the Episcopal Church we daily pray for all those who are ill, all those in need, trouble...the suicidal, the lonely, and the lonely," and we pray for those who have died and those who will be born. We also give thanks to God for all those blessed with health, love, meaningful employment and such. We even pray for the whole creation, so I would assume this means that if there are any life forms circling one of the 300 stars in our galaxy they have been prayed for as well. So, unfortunately or fortunately, there is no way to test the "efficacy of petitionary prayer" by comparing two groups, one of which is not prayed for. I personally think this is a good thing and can't imagine devout Jews, Christians, Muslims, and theistic Hindus (as well as all those who seek healing from a "Higher Power") to agreeing to only pray for some narrow sub-set of living things. For a general treatment of matters of verification and falsification, you might check out: Contemporary Philosophy of Religion, published by Blackwell.

Charles Taliaferro's reply is very helpful. For me the two things that have the most importance for your question are the Wittgensteinian approach, in which the one who wants evidence that the good that happens is, indeed, the result of prayer, is slipping in and then out of the way of the religious attitude to the world. When you have that attitude towards the world, you will not ask the question, or you cannot . . . This is similar to the approach given in John Wisdom's "Gods", in the parable of the gardener. The replies that were made to this piece are equally interesting. I also wonder why one wants to know whether an outcome is indeed the result of prayer. I personally do not have your question, though I am not sure why not, unless it is what I have said above, and so it occurs to me to ask whether the question itself might need a kind of justification, and, if so, what form it would take.