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Rationality

Can rationality be explained? Sometimes I think that it can, it is just something like non-contradiction. But sometimes I think it can't, since any explanation of rationality will have to assume it. ?
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November 8, 2012

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Charles Taliaferro
November 9, 2012 (changed November 9, 2012) Permalink

Great question! Your point about any explanation of rationality will have to presuppose (or assume) it seems right. After all, if our choice is between a rational explanation of rationality or an irrational one, the former seems to have the advantage! Moreover, I am inclined to think that there are basic, not further explainable truths about rationality: it is rational to believe in the law of identity (or A is A or everything is self-identical), but there are extant different accounts of the emergence of rational reflection among humans (and maybe some non-humans) and different theories of rationality. As for accounting for the emergence of rational creatures, some think this can be handled in accord with a thoroughgoing evolutionary account that shuns any reference to theism or Platonism or some other teleological (purposive account). For some of the difficulties facing this approach, see Thomas Nagel's fascinating new book Mind and Cosmos. In terms of the nature of rationality, there are two major views (among others) that are getting a great deal of attention. One is sometimes called internalism, according to which what is rational for a subject depends upon her desires and beliefs. If she desires to go shopping for philosophy books and believes the optimal place to shop for philosophy books is Blackwells in Oxford, she has a reason to get to Blackwells. On an alternative, normative account a subject may have reasons to have certain desires and beliefs, even if she does not have any of the current desires and beliefs. On this view, rationality may involve irreducible norms (irreducible in the sense of not further explainable) to the effect that some desires and acts are right (and one has reason to do them) or wrong (and one has reason not to do them) quite independent of a subject's desires (real or hypothetical). For a defense of the latter, check out Derek Parfit's two volume work On What Matters!

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